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Foreword
This book emerged from the conference “The Collapse of Memory – Memory 
of Collapse: Remembering the Past, Re- Constructing the Future in Periods of 
Crisis” in Lund 2016. The conference aimed to explore, how the management 
of crises is affected by previous experiences and memories and how crisis, dis-
aster or collapse affect cultural memory and political agency. The topic, more-
over, represents yet another turn in the research agenda and methodology of 
the interdisciplinary International Research Training Group (IRTG) “Baltic 
Borderlands: Shifting Boundaries of Mind and Culture in the Borderlands of 
the Baltic Sea Region”.
The starting point of investigation and theorization laid out in 2010 had been 
the application of “borderland” as an analytical category to various strata of spa-
tial organization. As a result, the core question focused on the cultural implica-
tions of border change within the entire Baltic Sea Region from the 15th century 
until today. In “Die Neuerfindung des Raumes. Grenzüberschreitungen und 
Neuordnungen” (The Rediscovery of Space. Crossing borders and new order-
ings, 2013) researchers of the IRTG challenged conventional understandings of 
region and space, and instead proposed alternative (disciplinary) perspectives 
on social, cultural, cognitive, etc. spatial orders. Many of these orders had been 
located along established border lines defined by political orders like monar-
chy or nation and, as earlier studies argued, the topography. In the following 
volume “Beyond the Sea. Reviewing the Manifold Dimensions of Water as a 
Barrier and Bridge” (2015) international experts both from within and outside 
the IRTG challenged the peripheral treatment of the sea that characterized 
conventional accounts and instead discussed the cultural impact of agents, 
their practices and narratives in crossing the seas and also living along their 
shores. The sea hereby emerged as “a borderland of communication, a space 
to govern and to invest with symbolic meaning”. Comparative approaches nur-
tured another paradigmatic shift in researching borderlands. In “Globalizing 
Borderlands Studies in Europe and North America” (2016) doctoral students 
and professors of the IRTG and of the Ancient Borderlands Research Focus 
Group at the University of California, Santa Barbara, juxtaposed for the first 
time the roots and developments of border and borderlands concepts. This was 
achieved by introducing individual case studies and approaches to borderlands 
research that featured a twin focus on the Baltic Sea region and also the con-
tested US-Mexican border. The interdisciplinary discussion associated with 
the global perspective on borders opened up new directions and topics for the 
Foreword
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researchers at the IRTG. Trauma, crisis, memory, media, narration, institutions 
are just a few terms and categories that condition the appearance, conceptu-
alization and changes within borderlands. Two of them, crisis and memory, 
showed considerable promise and appeal for scholars within and outside the 
IRTG. Combined with a narratological perspective, crisis and memory intro-
duced yet another turn in our research field of Baltic Sea region and border-
lands studies. “The Collapse of Memory – Memory of Collapse. Narrating Past, 
Presence and Future about Periods of Crisis” presents the first results of this 
emerging field and challenges both disciplinary boundaries as well as research 
approaches by assuming a narratological perspective and introducing a flexible 
concept that takes into consideration not only agents, but also those affected.
The conference and book represent a collective undertaking, which could not 
have been realised without the active assistance of a number of people. For all 
organizational efforts, I like to thank especially Niklas Bernsand and Barbara 
Törnquist- Plewa at Lund University. Also, each chapter of this volume has been 
peer reviewed. I sincerely thank all referees for their valuable comments, which 
greatly enhanced both the readability and academic quality of the contributions.
A special word of gratitude is also extended to Böhlau, and particularly to 
Dorothee Rheker- Wunsch, for their interest in this topic. Our greatest debts 
are to Charlotte Haugg, Jan Richard Reinicke, Gero von Roedern, Jörn Sander, 
Friederike Schmidt and Sarah Thiele who took on most of the heavy lifting in 
preparing the manuscript for publication, and to Doreen Wollbrecht and Hielke 
van Nieuwenhuize for seeing the book through the final stages of production.
Michael North, Greifswald, summer 2018
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Alexander Drost
Collapse Makes Memory: An Introduction
The fascination of failure and destruction sustains an entire sector of the media 
industry, for compelling stories can be drawn from catastrophes, crises and 
collapse. The decline of empires and kingdoms as much as earthquakes and 
infectious diseases have fired the imagination of authors, film makers and 
painters. They become motivated to present their vision of catastrophes as a 
key turning point for individuals, nay, even for entire societies. Taken this way, 
catastrophe emerges as a multi- faceted construct of experience, interpretation 
and emotion. The resulting narrative combines analyses of facts about the col-
lapse with a retrospect evaluation, update and confirmation of these facts in 
the cultural memory of a given society. When the incisive event enters into 
the collective consciousness, the narrative frames the event in time and also 
permits a view into the future. The objective is not only to overcome collapse 
but also to prevent similar catastrophes from (re-)occurring in future. In this 
process, the narrative is key in understanding collapse and its impact on soci-
ety as well as societies’ interpretation of collapse through cultural memory.
For these reasons, the contributors of this volume have taken a narratolog-
ical approach in examining collapse, disaster, catastrophe and how these in 
turn manifest themselves across different types of media. In this way narrat-
ing collapse is understood as an active process of forging meaning by selecting 
certain occurrences to construct a story. This process transforms the random 
occurrence into a memorable event. Considering how such events are con-
structed from a narratological perspective, the contributors have broadened 
their approach to include: mechanisms of construction, such as the use of par-
ticular media, narration strategies as well as the impact of cultural memory in 
narrating and thereby coping with collapse.
Two observations guide their analyses of how past experiences and knowl-
edge are re- interpreted and employed in order to overcome situations of crisis 
and collapse. First, the narrative of collapse is the key element of how and why 
we perceive certain events and developments as collapse or crisis. Second: The 
diversities of collapse narratives derive from the selection of facts, their combi-
nation and interpretations. Therefore, we introduce this edition about collapse 
and disaster with an overview of discourses that define our understanding of 
collapse in recent years. These discourses have appeared in novels and movies 
that illustrate the “cultural memory of disaster” in the 20th and 21st centuries. 
Alexander Drost
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They will be presented in the following six paragraphs on war, systemic failure, 
terror, financial and refugee crisis, and natural disasters.
War
In the recent history of narrating collapse since 1945, post- world- war narratives 
about the Second World War, Nazi rule and the Holocaust dominated the con-
tent, extent and form of descriptions of collapse. The unprecedented military 
trials in Nuremberg in the immediate aftermath of the war established ques-
tions of guilt and responsibility as central motifs in post- war narratives. This 
topic had emerged in media in the aftermath of pre- WWII violent conflicts. 
However, the exceptional scale of murder and terror beyond military combat 
in WWII, in particular the Holocaust, added an unexampled severity. The first 
serious literary attempts to cope with post- war- collapse of German society 
included Wolfgang Borchert’s Draußen vor der Tür and Heinrich Böll’s Wo 
warst du, Adam? These narratives presented the heaviness of guilt and moral 
failing of the individual before a canvas of many unanswered questions, hereby 
added to the incomprehensibility of the “Weltkrieg”.1
Loss of people and virtue determined post WWII poetry.2 Movies like Die 
Brücke 3 ignited the question of a lost moral thinking at war in the 1950s, when 
suppression of war experiences and entertainment overshadowed post- war nar-
ratives. False justification, denial and forgetting characterised early “distortions” 4 
in narratives of the cultural, social and ethical collapse of German society. In 
contrast, professional historians took a more critical and facts- based direction 
in the systematic reappraisal that began in the 1960s and 1970s. Backed by state 
institutions in Germany, historians provided the groundwork for a critical con-
troversy about Nazi crimes and criminals in Western Germany and beyond.5 
 1 Wolfgang Borchert, Draußen vor der Tür (Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1947) (In English, The 
Man Outside, performed on stage in New York 1949); Heinrich Böll, Wo warst du, Adam? 
(Opladen: Friedrich Middelhauve, 1951).
 2 Manfred Durzak, “Zwei Deutsche Literaturen nach 1945,” in Propyläen Geschichte der 
Literatur, Vol. 6: Die moderne Welt: 1914 bis heute, ed. Erika Wischer (Berlin: Propyläen 
Verlag, 1982), 297 – 298.
 3 Die Brücke (DE 1959), director Bernhard Wicki.
 4 Manfred Gerstenfeld, “The Multiple Distortions of Holocaust Memory,” Jewish Political 
Studies Review 19, no. 3 – 4 (2007): 36, 38 – 39.
 5 Katrin Hammerstein, Gemeinsame Vergangenheit – getrennte Erinnerung? Der Natio-
nalsozialismus in Gedächtnisdiskursen und Identitätskonstruktionen von Bundesrepublik 
10 Alexander Drost
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This controversy had its roots in detailed analyses of the structures and organ-
isation of the Nazi regime 6 that sought to answer the question of “how could 
this happen?”, culminating in an academic dispute about the exceptionalism 
of the German state formation process.7 While historiography focused on the 
Nazi regime, the grand novels in post- war literature like Günter Grass’s Die 
Blechtrommel and Heinrich Böll’s Gruppenbild mit Dame addressed society and 
culture.8 Die Blechtrommel stimulated a controversy about the roots of fascist 
thought in the petty bourgeois life of the 1920s, 30s and beyond.9 Böll’s novel 
focused on themes of social exclusion and the emotional as well as ethical hell 
of war.10 Both topics had been continuously connected with pictures of combat, 
destruction and suffering in artistic narratives. Considering the lasting effects 
of war on the collective and cultural memory of societies, war provides one of 
the most important images of collapse.
Systemic Failure
The collapse of the Eastern bloc, of the Soviet Union and of communism rad-
ically changed the (negative) image of collapse. The falling of walls, of author-
itarian regimes, their economy and of an entire ideology nurtured images of 
openness, freedom and new opportunities. In Thomas Brussig’s Helden Wie 
Deutschland, DDR und Österreich (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2017); Michael Beleites, 
“Isolierte Aufarbeitung? Zur zweigleisigen Erinnerungskultur in Deutschland und ihren 
Folgen,” in Aufarbeitung der Diktatur – Diktat der Aufarbeitung? Normierungsprozesse 
beim Umgang mit diktatorischer Vergangenheit, ed. Katrin Hammerstein, Ulrich Mählert, 
Julia Trappe, and Edgar Wolfrum (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2009), 48 – 58.
 6 Martin Broszat, Der Staat Hitlers: Grundlegung und Entwicklung seiner inneren Verfas-
sung (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch- Verlag, 1969).
 7 Ulrich von Hehl, Nationalsozialistische Herrschaft, 2nd edition (Munich: Oldenbourg, 
2001), 110 – 116.
 8 Günter Grass, Die Blechtrommel (Darmstadt: Luchterhand, 1959); Heinrich Böll, Grup-
penbild mit Dame (Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1971).
 9 Silke Jendrowiak, Günter Grass und die “Hybris” des Kleinbürgers. “Die Blechtrommel”, 
Bruch mit der Tradition einer irrationalistischen Kunst- und Wirklichkeitsinterpretation 
(Heidelberg: Winter, 1979); Irmela Schneider, Kritische Rezeption. Die Blechtrommel als 
Modell (Bern: Lang, 1975).
 10 Hans Joachim Bernhard, Die Romane Heinrich Bölls. Gesellschaftskritik und Gemein-
schaftsutopie, 2nd revised and extended edition (Berlin: Rütten & Loening, 1973), 335 – 381; 
Werner Bellmann, “Die Akten der Nürnberger Kriegsverbrecherprozesse als Quelle für 
Heinrich Bölls Roman Gruppenbild mit Dame,” Euphorion 97, no. 1 (2003): 85 – 97.
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Wir, the collapse of the socialist system in the German Democratic Republic 
led to healing of the country’s moribund society. Similar pictures of relief and 
re- emergence of historical connections after the collapse were communicated 
in Ericht Loest’s Nikolaikirche or Günther Grass’s Ein Weites Feld. Ein Weites 
Feld, however, introduces the inertia of a formerly disconnected cultural mem-
ory, with considerable impact on the perception of present developments and 
the prediction of the future.
Polish authors like Andrzej Stasiuk in Dziewięć or Jerzy Pilch in Rozpacz z 
powodu utraty furmanki felt the heaviness of history in the immediate aftermath 
of the collapse more keenly than their German colleagues. The Polish approach 
to collapse simultaneously was one of mental persistence and departure to a 
different life, which seem to have inspired Pilch to make use of the allegory of 
the “European in Slavic Underpants”.11 The collapse of communism initiated 
a search for identity in re- emerged nations like Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. 
While Tõnu Õnnepalu (alias Emil Tode) in Piiririik situated this search in the 
borderland of the senseless survival of the west and the romantic idyll of the 
east, Jaan Kross in Väljakaevamised and Paigallend explored the traumatic past 
of banishment and the remediation of the first Estonian national collapse in 
the Soviet bombings of 1944.
For the Baltic societies, the perception of the collapse of the Soviet Union 
was – and remains today – irrevocably connected with collective as well as 
individual trauma and trauma management. Several of these traumata were 
suppressed for decades by official, ideologically framed narratives. The cultural 
memories of many societies preserve similar traumatic collapse narratives, 
including the post- Apartheid narratives in South Africa and the post- Khmer 
narratives in Cambodia.12 Further, the collapse of ideologies has a prominent 
place in political and historical disaster narratives, for example, after the fall 
of the military dictatorship in Argentina (1976 – 1983), of Pinochet (1973 – 1990) 
in Chile and of Suharto (1967 – 1998) in Indonesia.13
Throughout history, the collapse of ideology and the re- emergence of his-
torical consciousness beyond the artificial caesura of political dogma and con-
viction have stimulated manifold re- connections of collapse experiences. The 
 11 Maria Janion, “Farewell to Poland? The Uprising of a Nation,” Baltic Worlds IV, no. 4 
(2011): 4 – 13.
 12 Martine Gosselink, Maria Holtrop, and Robert Ross, eds., Good Hope: South Africa and 
the Netherlands from 1600 (Nijmegen: Uitgeverij Vantilt, 2017).
 13 Mary S. Zurbuchen, “Historical Memory in Contemporary Indonesia,” in Beginning to 
Remember. The Past in the Indonesian Present, ed. Mary S. Zurbuchen (Singapore: Sin-
gapore University Press, 2005), 332.
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examples above show that cultural memory and foundational principles of 
society determine intellectual approaches to explain war and ideological col-
lapse, including moral legitimisations and ethical thinking.
Terror
“The moment that changed your life”: Post 9/11 narratives evoke this incisive 
and sudden observation by millions of people in response to the collapse of 
the World Trade Centre in New York on 11 September 2001. In Saturday, Ian 
McEwan reinforced this image, describing how disasters like 9/11 alter people’s 
entire lives in one day. Collapse is inescapable and inhumane, according to 
McEwan’s narrative of planes whose passengers knew their kidnappers’ intended 
destination.14 People were scared, shocked, traumatised, and concrete fear of 
terror became a definable threat in daily life. This new dimension of collapse 
through terror has no place, no specific country, maybe is a distorted culture 
of religious extremism. However, it can happen everywhere, at any time.
Other narratives explore the very nature of terror through their characters’ 
responses to terrorist attacks. Claire Massud’s The Emperor’s Children leads up 
to and concludes with the collapse of the World Trade towers. Don DeLillo 
in Falling Man uses the collapse of the southern World Trade tower as the 
starting point of his narrative. Novels like Saturday and Heidi Julavits’ The 
Effect of Living Backwards transfer the quality of 9/11 into comparable events 
in London and Morocco. The authors reflect on the mental effects of terror-
ism, including its ability to evoke fear everywhere and anytime it happens – 
for example, in the Charlie Hebdo attacks (Paris 2015), Bataclan (Paris 2015), 
Krudttønden (Copenhagen 2015), Charleston (2015), Erawan- Shrine (Bangkok 
2015), Brussels Bombings (2016), Nice (2016), Berlin (2016), St. Petersburg 
(2017), Drottningsgatan (Stockholm 2017), or Manchester (2017).
Financial Crisis
Collapse became crash when, on 15 September 2008, Lehman Brothers went 
bankrupt and an entire line of business, the banking sector, was accused of 
jeopardising the finances of states and institutions around the globe. However, 
narratives drawing comparisons to the 1929 global world economy crisis were 
 14 Ian McEwan, Saturday (London: Vintage Books, 2006).
13Collapse Makes Memory: An Introduction
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sparse. Rather, as shown in The Big Short by Michael Lewis and Vicky Ward’s 
The Devil’s Casino, an insular culture of greed, self- indulgence, corruption and 
hedonism was seen as responsible for the financial collapse.15 The crisis con-
tinued in different facets and dimensions in Portugal, Greece, Spain, Ireland, 
Iceland and across the European Union. The temporal overlap of the financial 
crisis with terrorist attacks contributed to the idea of a crisis- ridden (global) 
society. Pictures of states collapsing amid wars in Afghanistan, Syria and Iraq 
underpinned this perception, including through images and stories of mil-
lions of refugees.
Refugee Crises
Irishness is not the first concept that comes to mind these days with respect 
to state, economic and social collapse. However, Ireland has one of the longest 
experiences of any European country with mass migration. Mass migration 
contributed to strong networks of Irish diasporas around the globe. Frank 
McCourt introduced the Irish experience of mass migration in Angela’s Ashes.16 
Other examples of diaspora communities are the Chinese diaspora, which has 
existed since the 14th century,17 and the Vietnamese diaspora in the aftermath 
of the Vietnam War.
“[…] we had no belongings except our stories”, says the protagonist of Viet 
Thanh Nguyen’s short story Black- Eyed Women in The Refugees.18 Narratives 
about refugees are built on threatening memories that reflect the cruelty and 
awkwardness of the refugee experience. Knowledge of this experience sepa-
rates refugees from the host society and marks them as displaced persons who 
do not “belong”, as the mother in Nguyen’s narrative points out. Flight and 
expulsion cause widespread individual collapses of life, which often amount 
to a vivid part of the cultural memory of entire societies with experience of 
forced migration through violence, crises and catastrophe. Several events since 
1945 have forced large numbers of people to leave behind not only their home 
 15 Michael Lewis, The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine (New York: W. W. Nor-
ton & Company, 2010); Vicky Ward, The Devil’s Casino: Friendship, Betrayal, and the 
High Stakes Games inside Lehman Brothers (Hoboken, New Jersey: Wiley, 2010).
 16 Frank McCourt, Angela’s Ashes: A Memoir (New York: Scribner, 1996).
 17 Geoffrey C. Gunn, History without Borders. The Making of an Asian World Region. 
1000 – 1800 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2011), 111 – 130.
 18 Viet Thanh Nguyen, The Refugees (London: Corsair, 2017), 7.
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but their way of life. These include the Second World War, the Soviet terror in 
the newly established Soviet Republics, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the 
Yugoslav Wars, and the Syrian War.
Displacement involves collapse, first of an individual’s life, then of identity 
and belonging to a collective and lastly, of the existence of an entire society. 
In Võõras kodu (1945), Keegi ei kuule meid (1948), and Neli tuld (1951) Valev 
Uibopuu dealt with the flight of Estonians from their country due to Soviet 
occupation in 1944. Uibopuu uses motifs such as shipwreck, collaborators 
and opponents to embed the transformation of Estonia in a narrative of decay 
and disappointment. Bernard Kangro, Valev Uibopuu and others understood 
the danger of flight and exile to their national culture, which had less than 
two decades to grow independently before displacement. The authors grasp 
the severity of this experience in narratives that attempt to establish a virtual 
place of Estonianness between the Estonian archetype Balthasar Rüssow 19 
and their lost home towns.20 These virtual places emerge from individual and 
collective memories of places, experiences, cultural patterns and practices 
combined in narratives, which serve also as markers of the refugee’s belong-
ing. These practices and narratives include refugees’ efforts to cope with their 
fate through music.
The perspective of refugees is just one side of the story of refugee crises. 
The observers’ perspective of the “audience” is another. The more immediate 
encounter with the “other” evokes as many perceptions as the refugee story 
told by someone else. Turning the attention to the audience of narratives, we 
examine a key element in the construction of disaster narratives. As mentioned 
before, narratives require interpretation and offer to the audience a certain 
liberty in applying meanings to the presented facts. In this context, the vivid 
images of ship wreck, of dead bodies in the sea, or the stories of virtual places 
of belonging depend on aesthetics, the audience and its reference points.
Natural Disasters
Collapse is destruction. Often, we view war and systemic decline as man-
made and therefore distinct from natural destruction through storms, floods, 
earthquakes, volcano eruptions, forest fires, ice, tsunamis and hurricanes. 
However, in dealing with the impact of natural disasters, people seem to frame 
 19 Jaan Kross, Kolme Katku Vahel (Tallinn: Eesti Raamat, 1970, 1972, 1977, 1980).
 20 Bernard Kangro, Tartu (Lund: Eesti Kirjanike Kooperatiiv, 1962).
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and integrate catastrophic events to make sense of the collapse they caused.21 
“Naming” or “labelling” an occurrence is widely used to cope with the uncon-
trollable. Longstanding narratives in the disaster tradition include “Etna” for 
Sicily’s still- active volcano, or “Eyjafjallajökull” in Iceland. Earthquakes are 
named after the next settlement, which they often destroyed, while hurricanes 
are named with female and male first names, like wind storms in Europe or 
typhoons in Asia.
Storms appear figuratively in our stories about grief, suffering and dis-
ruption. Narratives about storms take the perpetrators’ perspective – storms 
appear in media before they reach communities of people in their forecasted 
path, which are presented along with intrinsic hopes for salvation. Through 
their names, storms become “actors” in a plot of destruction. In accord-
ance with the scale of their impact, their names become part of the collec-
tive consciousness. Hurricane Katrina in the United States, or the storm 
Kyrill in Germany, are recent examples of natural disasters that reappear in 
our collective consciousness when we are faced with the threat of similar 
storms. Through this process, we use our experiences to understand the cur-
rent impacts of storms and flooding, while updating our collective memory 
of Katrina and Kyrill.
Similar processes of updating the collective memory of disasters take place 
in our response to earthquakes, volcano eruptions and storm tides. We com-
pare numbers of people endangered, injured, displaced and dead, as well as 
accounting for financial damage. Narratives of natural disasters turn quickly 
to the topic of recovery. Taking this kind of disaster, fixed in time and place, 
as a starting point of the story, its occurrence is transformed into an event 
with strong repercussions on social and economic structures. The threat for 
life demands immediate action. However, we also must deal with “developing 
natural disasters”, often embedded in the meta- narrative of changing climate 
and environmental pollution. These include stories about contingency, insur-
ance and prevention in particular.
Weather forecasts and eye- catching meteorological phenomena tell these 
stories in miniature. The negotiations of climate agreements like the Paris 
Agreement narrate the bigger picture. However, both employ risk analyses, 
and both are framed by political negotiations that produce and use these sto-
ries for economic, political and sustainability aims. In Frank Schätzing’s Der 
 21 For the theory of “framing” see: Robert Entman, “Framing: Toward Clarification of a 
Fractured Paradigm,” Journal of Communication 43, no. 4 (1993): 51 – 59.
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Schwarm,22 the macrocosm of maritime pollution develops in a disastrous 
apocalyptic picture. This imagery is used in real life, too, when politicians 
and academics describe maritime areas in seas and oceans as “dead zones”. 
Natural disasters as much as manmade crisis nurture fear and preventive 
action in society, which repeatedly becomes aware of its vulnerability through 
stories of collapse.
Narratives of collapse are an important part of making sense of disaster and 
catastrophe by selecting occurrences, embedding them into a story, and mak-
ing them part of the cultural memory of society. As we have seen, interpreta-
tion and updating in narrating disasters has different dimensions depending 
on timing. Historical distance to the occurrence allows the incorporation of a 
more complex interpretation history communicated through cultural memory, 
rather than presenting immediate or recent incidents. Reporting on current 
or recent collapses, therefore, tends to focus more on impacts for the future. 
However, distance cannot only be applied backwards. Projections of future 
developments – often subsumed under the umbrella of science fiction narra-
tives – offer the same distance of decades and centuries to optimistic or semi- 
apocalyptic imagined futures of mankind. Both ways of constructing disaster 
narratives are rooted in the presence of narrator and audience, reflecting their 
experiences, interpretations, and collective memories, retro- and prospec-
tively. The interrelation of narrative and cultural memory is part of the next 
paragraphs to illustrate that the process of making sense of collapse is rooted 
in narratological and cognitive processes.
The Narratological Approach: Narrative and Cultural Memory
The recognition of natural hazards as decisive events depends on the perception 
of such an occurrence as disaster, collapse, or crisis. While a heavy earthquake 
in Los Angeles like would cause enormous damage and loss of life, the same 
earthquake in an unpopulated desert would only excite researchers at their 
seismographs far away. Man- made disasters, on the other hand, usually grow 
out of social structures but have comparable destructive effects like geophys-
ical hazards. Both natural and man- made collapses of social, administrative, 
economic and political structures show societies’ vulnerability. In this way, 
they affect our collective approach to managing crises, shaping our strategies 
as well as patterns of resilience or disaster risk reduction. In reflecting disas-
 22 Frank Schätzing, Der Schwarm (Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 2004).
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ters and disaster management strategies, recent research has highlighted geo-
physical hazards and man- made disasters as part of our mental representation, 
and storytelling as part of our way to make sense of the world.23 Earthquakes, 
tsunamis and wars, financial crises, recessions or state collapses invoke our 
collective strategies to manage the situation. In this process, they become part 
of our cultural memory through the stories told, the news spread and the re- 
mediation in cases of repeated disaster experiments.
This collection of interdisciplinary essays discusses how the management of 
crisis is affected by previous experiences and memories and how crisis, disaster 
or collapse affects cultural memory and political agency. Astrid Erll suggests an 
ample “provisional” definition of “cultural memory”, outlining “the interplay of 
present and past in socio- cultural contexts”.24 Event and representation, disaster 
and story merge in the phenomenon of “cultural memory”. For the narratives 
analysed in this volume, this definition of cultural memory highlights the con-
nectedness of past experience, future (precautionary) projections and acting in 
the immediate moment of a collapse within a specific cultural context. Cultural 
memory in the context of disaster management includes a process of making 
sense of the past, using past experiences to generate knowledge and ability to 
manage a crisis, and projecting an imagined future.
The narrative is the key element of these sense- making processes. Jürgen 
Straub states that “memory processes and recollection achievements follow 
in an equally important way the narrative structure”.25 From a psychological 
point of view, personal recollections or remembering takes place in telling a 
story. Any representation, including mediatisations of collapse and disaster, is 
not “a natural reproduction of […] events but a result of productive epistemic 
actions that are both cognitively and emotionally, or motivationally” 26 loaded.
Narration theory exemplifies how narratives are constructed through “fram-
ing” the “narrative material” and how this material is exposed to a “narra-
tive drive”, which allows textual and extra- textual stimulations to recognise a 
 23 See for example Jeffrey C. Alexander, Ron Eyeman, Bernard Giesen, Neil J. Smelser, and 
Piotr Sztompka, eds., Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2004).
 24 Astrid Erll, “Cultural Memory Studies: An Introduction,” in A Companion to Cultural 
Memory Studies, ed. Astrid Erll and Ansgar Nünning (Berlin and New York: De Gruyter, 
2010), 2.
 25 Jürgen Straub, “Psychology, Narrative, and Cultural Memory: Past and Present,” in A 
Companion to Cultural Memory Studies, ed. Astrid Erll and Ansgar Nünning (Berlin 
and New York: De Gruyter, 2010), 216.
 26 Ibid, 220.
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narrative.27 Rick Altman supports our approach of researching the interrela-
tion between collapse and cultural memory through the lens of narratives by 
expanding traditional narrative theory beyond classical plot- based definitions, 
which often even neglect characters, forget about the reader and ignore cultural 
contexts. Altman’s approach encompasses contexts, including characters (not 
only actors) and narrative activity, which again implicates some motion of the 
reader with the character through the narrative and the framing of a story.28
The processes of remembering, using and shaping cultural memory function 
depending on the way we tell and use stories. The selection of material in per-
forming cultural memory, which includes protagonists, their actions and their 
particular context, is comparable to the “narrative material” that provides the 
basis for storytelling. Mediatisations and actualisations of disaster and collapse 
through “creative” channels like news, movies, and research are analogous to the 
“narrative drive”, which is “to make sense of social customs, ancient stones, and 
physical symptoms”.29 According to Altman, this is what everyone does, from 
researchers to doctors, and even car mechanics at a particular place and time. 
Erll’s idea of an “interplay of present and past in cultural contexts” resembles 
these creative processes in storytelling and perception.
A closer look at the material used in storytelling and performing cultural 
memory reveals more similarities in both processes. For cultural memory, 
Aleida Assmann noticed a certain dynamic in the “tension between the past-
ness of the past and its presence”.30 Her starting point to grasp the essence 
of this tension is the division between canon as the “working memory” and 
archive as “reference memory” or store house. In her most recent study, she 
also applies the term “stored forgettness” 31 to the latter. However, both are still 
accessible, even though an archive is less in use than, for instance, a library, 
which Assmann says belongs to the canon. Here, information and materials are 
used and re- used, “re- read, appreciated, staged, performed, and commented”.32 
The past events, in this way, get selected and applied to present situations and 
develop a different “pastness”, or rather “presence”.
The performance of cultural memory in this context is comparable to nar-
ration, which resembles a similar construction process and at the same time 
 27 Rick Altman, A Theory of Narrative (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 10.
 28 Ibid., 9 f., 12, 15, 17 ff., 21.
 29 Ibid., 19.
 30 Aleida Assmann, “Canon and Archive,” in A Companion to Cultural Memory Studies, 
ed. Astrid Erll and Ansgar Nünning (Berlin and New York: De Gruyter, 2010), 98.
 31 Aleida Assmann, Formen des Vergessens (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2016), 36.
 32 Assmann, “Canon and Archive,” 99.
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is the main medium for performing cultural memory. While the actualis-
ation process is akin to Altman’s idea of narrational activity, with its focus on 
perceiving and recognising a story as story, his concept of “narrative drive” 
resembles the actualisation process in cultural memory theory. The material 
is as important as the narrational activity and narrative drive, which focus 
on the perception of the reader and the actualisation of material. Examining 
the dynamics of cultural remembrance and inspired by Hayden White, Ann 
Rigney emphasises the importance of narrative structures in the formation 
process of cultural memory and the assigning of meaning to memory sites 
and events. Additionally, she underlines the aesthetic dimension of narratives, 
which support mnemonic processes and cast literary texts as “monuments” or 
“sites” of cultural memory.33
How does disaster connect to these theorisations of narrative and cultural 
memory? Individuals and societies make sense of the impact of disaster and 
manage the disaster through the stories they tell. Beginning with “news” in the 
immediate aftermath of the event, this “making- sense- process” continues in 
numerous actualisations and re- mediatisations. These serve different purposes. 
First, both provide a basis for survivors to work through their experiences, sur-
vive and continue life. Second, such processes help re- establish structures and 
re- connect lost strands of social, cultural and economic life. Third, narrating 
collapse helps societies work through the trauma of the unspeakable, thus cre-
ating new (cognitive) protected areas.34
Why did disaster cultures become such a prominent research field? In par-
ticular, the precautionary principle seems to have shifted social perceptions of 
collapse and its management. Kenneth Hewitt stated in his 2015 publication on 
the cultural framing of disaster that, “less often mentioned is the great expansion 
in resources and organizations devoted to disaster concerns. Of late, profitable 
industries have developed around disaster response in reinsurance, security 
technologies, relief and reconstruction”.35 Collapse and disaster seem to have 
 33 Ann Rigney, “The Dynamics of Remembrance: Texts Between Monumentality and Mor-
phing,” in Cultural Memory Studies; An International and Interdisciplinary Handbook, 
ed. Astrid Erll and Ansgar Nünning (Berlin and New York: De Gruyter, 2008), 347, 349.
 34 Cathy Caruth, ed., Trauma. Explorations in Memory (Baltimore and London: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1995); Cathy Carruth, Unclaimed Experience. Trauma, Nar-
rative, and History (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); 
Dominick LaCapra, Writing History, Writing Trauma (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2001).
 35 Kenneth Hewitt, “Framing Disaster in the ‘Global Village’. Cultures of Rationality in 
Risk, Security and News,” in Cultures and Disasters. Understanding Cultural Framings 
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moved more into the centre of society’s consciousness and thus into the cul-
tural memory. The singular event of geophysical hazard or financial crisis has 
developed into a permanent condition of risk and danger. In this context, Isak 
Winkel Holm pays considerable attention to the “man- made disasters” and their 
circumstances, claiming that “as climate change has replaced the atomic war in 
the cultural imagination of disaster, it has become more and more meaningless 
to think of disasters as sudden concentrated events”.36
This shift in society’s perception has influenced disaster research, which 
“has shifted its focus from the event impacting on human society towards 
human society contributing to the disaster”.37 This contribution is three- fold 
and includes precautions, experiences and mediatisations. On the one hand, 
society’s contribution results from the way societies proceed to build structures. 
This includes the establishment of emergency structures, command structures, 
and the implementation of safety rules and laws. In other words, the character 
of future disaster is connected to the prediction of disaster and the structures 
we have developed to prevent disaster. However, neither prediction nor struc-
tures can be observed disconnected from the actual experience of a disaster 
and the immediate actions taken in case of emergency.
Additionally, the continuous actualisation of experiences through (re-)
mediatisations of the disaster shape our perception of disasters. Hereby, re- 
mediation through print, audio- visual and internet media, but also through 
academic research and for educational purposes, connects precaution meas-
ures and experience. Both refer to the cultural memory of disaster, which has 
been – as part of the process of overcoming a disaster – continuously updated 
in the immediate aftermath and later on. Often, these remediation processes of 
cultural memory 38 are accompanied by strategic discussion of precautions to 
be taken to protect society, its values, or its foundations of wealth and security.
in Disaster Risk Reduction, ed. Fred Krüger, Greg Bankoff, Terry Cannon, Benedikt 
Orlowski, and Lisa F. Schipper (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2015), 21.
 36 Isak Winkel Holm, “The Cultural Analysis of Disaster,” in The Cultural Life of Catastro-
phes and Crises, ed. Carsten Meiner and Kristin Veel (Berlin and New York: De Gruyter, 
2012), 16.
 37 Ibid., 16.
 38 Astrid Erll and Ann Rigney, ed., Mediation, Remediation, and the Dynamics of Cultural 
Memory (Berlin and New York: De Gruyter, 2009).
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Contributions to this Volume
The analyses of disaster and collapse narratives in this volume feature an overlap 
and entanglement of events, re- mediatisations, re- mediations and collective 
memories. First and foremost, these phenomena have been arranged by the 
object of enquiry, the event and the stories about it. However, our recognition 
of this overlap and entanglement is an epistemic question, comprising socie-
ty’s growing awareness of living under a permanent condition of risk and the 
collective desire for physical and moral protection. It is not sufficient to have 
a protective rampart against the imagined threats of society – measurements 
must be approved of by a majority of society and legitimised by social values 
and cultural traditions.
Elisabeth Oxfeldt’s object of enquiry in this volume presents a convincing 
example of the complexity of contemporary collapse. Approaching the inter-
pretation of Margareth Olin’s De andre through the lens of guilt and morality, 
Oxfeldt discovers the interwoven experiences and memories of juvenile dis-
asters presented in the Oslo massacre and refugee children. In addition, she 
highlights resemblance of guilt and moral standards of Norwegian society in 
the stories told by Margareth Olin. These stories about the endangered “other” 
threaten the “observer” through an emotional process of narration. Further, 
this approach touches on the question of the hidden guilt of a saturated and 
confined society, mentally distanced from certain events and yet, not immune 
to re- mediated entangled human disasters.
The dynamics and entanglements of memories in the narration of flight and 
expulsion after the collapse of state structures in the aftermath of the Second 
World War are the focus of the analysis of Uta Bretschneider, who highlights 
the frictions between official and individual narratives of flight experiences. She 
encounters the strategic and restrictive mode of the “narrative drive” behind 
flight stories through changing political settings from the Soviet Occupational 
Zone, the German Democratic Republic, and the reunited Federal Republic of 
Germany. While the content of these narratives refers to flight and expulsion 
in the context of the Second World War, the analysis focuses on the conditions 
of storytelling and its impact on the formation of cultural memory of collapse.
The motif of shipwreck evokes images of collapse and disaster. It has appeared 
in collapse narratives in literature and beyond. Its application and meanings are 
the focus of Philipp Wagner’s analysis in this volume. Wagner focuses on authors’ 
construction of the shipwreck motif, and its effects on readers’ interpretation 
of events. Focusing on Lars Sund’s novel En lycklig liten ö, Wagner encounters 
narrative strategies in employing a disaster motif that has been updated con-
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tinuously in the cultural memory of maritime societies, and recently returned 
to the collective consciousness with refugee deaths in the Mediterranean. He 
also touches on the question of what we perceive as a disaster and what is 
understood as merely an accident.
Legacies, in particular political ones, are contested. Competing interpreta-
tions of events and thus competing narratives draw on different and often con-
flicting framings of events. Florian Peters embeds his analysis of the cultural 
memory of the 1980/81 movement Solidarność in the contemporary conflict 
over liberal and right- wing populist interpretations of the end of communism 
in Poland. His descriptions of representations of victims and masters in com-
peting cultural memories within Polish society shed new light on the use of 
rupture and collapse events in shaping national consciousness and identity. 
In this regard, the events of 1980/81 and 1989 had been employed to different 
effect in master narratives of Polish history. In addition, they mark a period 
of transition from rebellious social activism to political movement forced to 
adapt narratives according to their changing political setting.
Observing an event through the lens of another comparable event influences 
our perception of both events. Mariëlle Wijermars examines the phenomenon 
of pre- mediation by comparing the narrative structures, strategies and motifs 
in Sergei Loznitsa’s Maidan and The Event. Her analysis highlights the inter-
connectedness of interpretations of state collapse in the Soviet Union in 1991 
and Ukraine in 2014. The social and political implications of these “revolutions” 
have been studied in recent decades. However, Wijermars’s approach takes 
another turn, exploring the narrative structures and strategies in which these 
events were placed by Lotznitsa, and how this contributed to the formation of 
cultural memories of these events. In this way, Wijermars discovers interven-
tions of established narratives, for instance from Lotznitsa’s artistic arrangement 
of pre- existing documentary footage in the case of The Event.
The “narrative drive” of collapse narratives has been nurtured by the finan-
cial crises of the last decade. Beyond public responses of outrage in countries 
like Iceland, where the collapse of the financial sector hit the entire economy 
and thus the entire society, the crises also stimulated debate around the values 
and structures of politics, economy, society and hereby, in the case of Ireland, 
led to social transformations. Valur Ingimundarson approaches this collapse 
management process in his analysis of the politics of memory through the lens 
of transitional justice mechanisms. Collapses of dictatorships and post- war set-
tings contribute to historical narratives in which the evaluation of past crimes 
supports the introduction of new orders and structures in society. Research 
on the crimes of the Stasi by the Stasi Records Agency in the aftermath of 
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the collapse of the German Democratic Republic in 1990, or by the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa on crimes under Apartheid 
are examples of transitional justice mechanisms. Ingimundarson focuses on 
Icelandic society’s search for the “truth” about the collapse of the banking sec-
tor. He shows the differences in applying transitional justice mechanisms in 
Iceland, which is stuck, he argues, between competing metanarratives of left- 
wing damnation of neo- liberal politics and right- wing white washing through 
oversimplified memory politics.
Two politically motivated metanarratives proposed by left and right- wing 
factions dominate the cultural memory of the financial crisis of 2008 in Iceland. 
Even more contested narratives were added to these complex structures through 
narratives of systemic and personal failing, betrayal by the new government, 
and an averted revolution. Gunnþórunn Guðmundsdóttir examines monu-
ments and cultural memories of the Icelandic financial crisis in this contested 
environment of narrations. She explores the aesthetics and role of memori-
als in coping with the financial crisis in Iceland, focusing on Santiago Sierra’s 
memorial The Black Cone: Memorial to Civil Disobedience at Austurvöllur 
Square in Reykjavik. Guðmundsdóttir identifies the practices and location that 
impart meaning to this memorial and its role in fixing the cultural memory of 
Icelandic crisis in society.
It is consensus in memory studies that individual memory is shaped col-
lectively. People and media condition certain patterns of individual remem-
brance and premediate meanings of outstanding events like collapse and crisis. 
Collective memory overshadows individual life stories even more if one trau-
matised generation passes on fewer individual narratives due to early death 
or suppression. Franziska Sajdak seeks to understand these generational and 
trauma mechanisms in descendants of Holocaust survivors. In an approach 
that is novel in Scandinavian literature, Sajdak applies concepts like “telescop-
ing” to the novel Ett kort uppehåll på vägen från Auschwitz (2012) by Göran 
Rosenberg. In the process, Sajdak describes the mechanisms of trauma transfer 
and narration in the context of cultural memory formation.
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Elisabeth Oxfeldt
Memories of Crisis and Guilt:  
The Oslo Massacres (22 July 2011) and Margreth Olin’s  
De andre (Nowhere Home, 2012)
This article explores the current so- called refugee crisis at the intersection of 
memory, trauma and affective studies. I will focus in particular on guilt and guilt 
feelings.1 The current refugee crisis has triggered a sizable amount of fictional 
and documentary texts that explore the feelings of privileged Scandinavians, 
as they are confronted with the crisis and trauma of others. The texts posit the 
Scandinavian as going through a range of emotions in her encounter with the 
refugee, ranging from empathy to fear. At both ends of the emotional spectrum 
one finds a sense that the safe, peaceful, and stable position of the Scandinavian 
Self may be threatened, not just by a cultural Other, but also by a traumatized 
Other. The refugee is imagined as victimized, tortured, and traumatized, and 
as someone who may consequently disturb the Scandinavian in more or less 
violent ways – from physically to psychologically as the Scandinavian experi-
ences his or her traumas vicariously.
Within the literary field we find various texts exploring the Scandinavian’s 
emotional register vis- à- vis the refugee. We have for instance Christina Hessel-
holdt I familiens skød/Lykkelige familier (In the Bossom of the Family/Happy 
Families, 2007/2014), Lone Aburas’ Politisk roman (Political Novel, 2013), and 
Aasne Linnestå’s Morsmål (Mother Tongue, 2012). These fictional texts are 
written in the mode of realism, based largely on the authors’ experiences with 
 1 While guilt pertains to a legal realm in which one may be judged guilty, receive a pun-
ishment, and subsequently atone for one’s crime, guilt feelings pertain to a moral realm 
in which one’s conscience determines whether an injustice has occured. Philosophers 
who have written extensively on the various types of guilt and their social, political, 
and psychological functions include Martin Buber, Karl Jaspers, and Hannah Arendt. 
Psychologists furthermore include Sigmund Freud and Melanie Klein. For a review on 
this topic, see Elisabeth Oxfeldt, “Innledning,” in Skandinaviske fortellinger om skyld 
og privilegier i en globaliseringstid, ed. Elisabeth Oxfeldt (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 
2016), 9 – 31.
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helping refugees. It may also be significant that they are all written by women 
and may be considered postfeminist texts.2
Male authors, too, take up the issue of refugees in a personal, emotional, as 
well as a social and political context. Examples are Lars Sund’s En lycklig liten 
ö (2007; A Happy Little Island, 2016), Simon Stranger’s so- called Emilie- trilogy 
(Barsakh, 2013; Verdensredderne [The World Savers, 2012]; De som ikke finnes 
[Those That Don’t Exist 2014]), and Kristian Lundberg’s Vi er de döda, nu snart 
(We Are the Dead Soon, 2014). These are texts that may be read as exploring 
the various – male and female – Scandinavian characters’ social, political, and 
emotional engagement with refugees. They are also political texts with a pur-
pose as they clearly seek to promote a hospitable attitude towards refugees. As 
Linnestå asks rhetorically: “Staten sa ja / hva sier jeg?”.3
The encounters are furthermore explored in visual media, and within Nordic 
film we find, among others, Thomas Østbye’s documentary Imagining Emanuel 
(2011) and Aki Kaurismäki’s Le Havre (2011) and The Other Side of Hope (2017). 
In this chapter, however, I want to examine the work of a strong female voice 
in the Norwegian public debate on asylum seekers and refugees, namely that 
of filmmaker Margreth Olin. I have chosen to focus on her documentary film 
De andre (Nowhere Home, 2012) because of the way she draws on the very 
recent memory of another crisis and collapse in order to frame her story about 
under- age asylum seekers. This other crisis is the Oslo Massacres, commonly 
referred to in Norway as July 22nd. On this date in 2011, a lone perpetrator 
shot dead 69 participants at the annual Labour Party youth camp on Utøya 
after having bombed the Government buildings in Oslo, killing eight people. 
77 people died in all, most of them teenagers.
This way of framing one crisis in light of another ties in with one of this book’s 
main concerns, namely how past experiences and knowledge are re- interpreted 
and employed in order to overcome situations of crisis and collapse. The fact 
that the comparison with the Utøya Massacre turned out to be a somewhat 
controversial strategy, as evidenced by the reviews the film received, makes it 
relevant to investigate in light of Jan Assmann’s understanding of communica-
tive versus cultural memory and how his distinction is further problematized 
by the way the media operate to create media events immediately following 
 2 For a comparative analysis of these three works, see Elisabeth Oxfeldt, “῾Staten sa ja, så 
hva sier jeg?’ Flygtning og følelser i postfeministisk litteratur,” in Skandinaviske fortellinger 
om skyld og privilegier i en globaliseringstid, ed. Elisabeth Oxfeldt (Oslo: Universitets-
forlaget, 2016), 230 – 254.
 3 Aasne Linnestå, Morsmål (Oslo: Aschehoug, 2012), 19.
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terror attacks.4 In the following I will first introduce Olin’s oeuvre and De andre 
in particular. I will show how the film builds on a double framing of the Other 
pertaining to legal guilt on the one hand, and guilt feelings on the other. I will 
then explicate Olin’s use of the Oslo Massacres in an attempt to understand her 
choice in light of E. Ann Kaplan’s trauma theory and Judith Butler’s notions of 
shared precariousness on the one hand, and the troubled reception in light of 
memory studies on the other. As indicated I will especially turn to Assmann’s 
distinction between communicative and cultural memory and the way in which 
it was blurred by the mediatisation of the act of terror. Finally, I will discuss 
the film’s ending by showing how Olin draws not only on cultural memories of 
crisis (July 22nd), but also on what we may call cultural memories of comfort, 
that is a well- known Norwegian lullaby, turned ugly and uncomfortable in a 
time of crisis. My overall argument is that Olin effectively taps into Norwegian 
cultural memories to evoke feelings of guilt and discomfort. However, in the 
case of July 22nd, traditional boundaries between the individual, communica-
tive, and cultural memory are collapsed. Although this may be understood in 
terms of a personal trauma on the one hand, and contemporary mediatisation, 
on the other, the immediate effect of this collapse among critics was a sense of 
discomfort directed at Olin as a filmmaker.
Margreth Olin’s Films
For Margreth Olin, her profession as a documentary filmmaker has always car-
ried a strong ethical obligation. Olin seeks to give voice to social outsiders such 
as her uncle with Down’s Syndrome (Onkel Reidar [Uncle Reidar]), immigrant 
children who perform poorly in school (Ungdommens råskap [Raw Youth]), 
drug addicts (Engelen [The Angel]), or – in the case of De andre (Nowhere 
Home) – underage asylum seekers in Norway.5 In this film, Olin immerses 
herself in a participatory documentary film project based mainly on her inter-
views with four male underage asylum seekers in Norway. She witnesses their 
accounts of past traumas and observes current ones as their applications for 
asylum are rejected. The four young men are then institutionalized in asylum 
 4 The Oslo Massacres, as explained above, occured in two places. The Utøya Massacre 
refers to the part that took place on the island of Utøya.
 5 Onkel Reidar (N: 1997), director Margreth Olin; Ungdommens råskap (N: 2004), director 
Margreth Olin; Engelen (N: 2009), director Margreth Olin; De andre (N: 2012), director 
Margreth Olin.
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reception centres until their eighteenth birthdays when they can be deported 
as adults – no longer children. Olin follows their lives over a period of three 
years – through the aftermath of rejection and deportation as well.
De andre was made as a response to political changes occurring in 2009 to 
limit immigration. Previously, lone asylum seekers under the age of eighteen 
whose parents could not be tracked down in the children’s home country were 
given residence permit on humanitarian grounds. But after the government 
saw a record- breaking number of lone underage asylum seekers in 2009, they 
decided to become more restrictive. Children over fifteen who were deemed 
not to be in need of protection or not to fulfil the requirements for receiving 
residence on humanitarian grounds were granted only a temporary residence 
and had to return “home” at age eighteen. Olin’s clear- cut argument in the film 
is that Norway is breaking the United Nations’ Convention of the Rights of the 
Child, ratified by Norway in 1991.
A Double Framing of the Other
Olin, on the one hand, uses the UN Convention of the Rights of the Child to 
frame her “boys” (as she calls them) and to make a logical argument pertain-
ing to legal guilt expressed through the expository mode of the film – quoting, 
for instance, several articles from the UN Child Convention.6 The boys are 
victims, she shows, and the state is guilty of breaking UN Conventions. This 
was a point audiences easily grasped. On the other hand, she frames her “boys” 
to make an affective argument based less on guilt than on guilt feeling com-
bined with a sense of common precariousness. This affective argument hinges 
on a humanist understanding that there is no Other, separated clearly from a 
Self. It is an argument expressed both through the film’s ambivalent title and 
through its participatory mode – through Olin’s direct involvement with the 
boys and especially through the insertion of a dream sequence tied to the Oslo 
Massacres in the film’s title sequence.
 6 I am using Bill Nichols’ division of documentary films into six modes: poetic, exposi-
tory, observational, participatory, reflexive, and performative: Bill Nichols, Introduction 
to Documentary, 2nd edition (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010). A docu-
mentary can use several of these modes simultaneously which De andre does.
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The Oslo Massacres
The dream sequence is a reconstruction of a dream Olin claims to have had, 
linking the fate of her “boys” to that of the young Norwegians massacred, 
injured, and terrorized on Utøya on 22 July 2011. It consists of several underwa-
ter swimming scenes in which we see cropped images of bodies and body parts 
moving through water while Olin explains in voice over that she had a dream 
about participants at the Labour Party’s youth camp trying to save their lives 
by swimming away from Utøya and being rescued by Norwegian government 
officials. In her dream, the image of these young people in danger of drown-
ing merges with the image of two boat refugees swimming towards the same 
Norwegian government officials. At this point, age becomes a significant factor 
for the dream refugees who are fourteen and eighteen years old. A Norwegian 
policeman rescues the 14-year- old whereas the 18-year- old is denied entry and 
is told to swim back. “In my dream they are no longer Norwegian kids. They 
are the boys from my film. And they’re in open sea”, announces Olin.7 We see 
a man floating in the ocean, the screen turns black, the title appears in white 
capital letters accompanied by foreboding electronic music and Olin’s voice: “I 
make this film because I’m afraid. I’m not afraid of the others. Of the strangers. 
I’m afraid of what’s happening with us when we no longer are capable of seeing 
the individual”.8 Here, Olin’s focus is on a crisis pertaining to us, our values, 
and our national identity, rather than to “them”.
As mentioned above, comparing the refugee crisis to the Utøya Massacre 
created a connection to a recent national trauma that made several critics 
uncomfortable. Film professor Bjørn Sørenssen, for instance, thought it was 
unnecessary and came across as an added afterthought in a film that already 
made a strong point. Britt Sørensen in Bergens Tidende saw the framing as 
appropriate, but found that aesthetically, the images were ill chosen since they 
came across as intrusive and overstated.9 Ingunn Økland in Aftenposten found 
that the dream imagery spoiled the film in a melodramatic way and functioned 
 7 “I drømmen er det ikke lenger norsk ungdom. Det er guttene i filmen min. Og de er i 
åpent hav” (Throughout this article, I use the English subtitles on the DVD for English 
translations of De andre).
 8 “Jeg lager denne filmen fordi jeg er redd. Jeg er ikke redd for de andre. For de fremmede. 
Jeg er redd for det som skjer med oss når vi ikke lenger er i stand til å se det enkelte 
menneske.”
 9 Britt Sørensen, “Skriften på veggen,” Bergens Tidende, October 18, 2012.
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as a noncommittal reference to the massacre.10 My argument, however, is that 
the affective framing, including the dream sequence, can be understood in rela-
tion to trauma aesthetics as posited by E. Ann Kaplan and Judith Butler both 
of whom discuss how we frame the precariousness of ourselves and Others. At 
the same time, the critics’ discomfort may be understood in light of Assmann’s 
distinction between communicative and cultural memory considered in rela-
tion to a contemporary mediatisation of terror attacks.
A Traumatized Film Maker
Turning first to Kaplan and Butler, we find that they wrote Trauma Culture 
(2005) and Frames of War (2009), respectively, as reactions to 9/11, its media 
representation, and its violent political aftermath. They share a strong con-
cern that the media’s representation of trauma nourishes a culture of war and 
violence. Traumatic events, they underscore, also have a potential for uniting 
people nationally as well as globally. Yet, accounts of people’s common vulner-
ability have to be found elsewhere than in the daily media. In Trauma Culture, 
Kaplan analyses several films from the perspective of trauma. She is interested 
in trauma experienced directly as well as vicariously. In a chapter on the eth-
ics of witnessing, she writes: “One has to learn to take the Other’s subjectivity 
as a starting point, not as something to be ignored or denied. It is only in this 
way that we can gain a public or national ethics”; and she adds: “Certain films 
may be pertinent in constructing a position for the viewer that enables him or 
her to take responsibility”.11
The dream sequence may be seen as indicative of trauma. Olin’s dream occurs 
after her intense participation in the lives of her refugee boys. She has perceived 
traumas through direct observation in the present and through listening to their 
trauma narratives about their pasts. This, as Kaplan points out, puts her in a 
complex position of experiencing vicarious trauma, and of passing this onto 
her viewers as visually mediated trauma.12 Kaplan explains: “vicarious trauma-
tization may be a component of witnessing, but instead of only intensifying 
 10 Inguun Økland, “Menneskekjærlig document,” Aftenposten, October 25, 2012. Bjørn 
Sørensen writes about a “påklistret ettertanke,” Britt Sørensen sees the images as “påtren-
gende” and “overtydelig,” and Økland considers the references to July 22nd inappropri-
ate, using the words “vondt,” “melodramatisk” and “uforpliktende.”
 11 E. Ann Kaplan, Trauma Culture. The Politics of Terror and Loss in Media and Literature 
(New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2005), 123.
 12 Ibid., 91 – 92.
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the desire to help an individual in front of one, witnessing leads to a broader 
understanding of what has been done to victims, of the politics of trauma being 
possible”.13 Vicariously traumatized Olin, in turn, produces a visual correlative to 
“the subjective, emotional, and visual experience of trauma” 14 – the dream that 
is passed on to the viewers of her film. In terms of aesthetics, trauma aesthetics 
tend to reflect the way in which traumatized people experience their memories 
of trauma – memories that are repressed, but surface by means of the subcon-
scious, through dreams and various forms of dissociation and fragmentation.
There is another important aspect to Olin’s linking the national trauma of 
July 22nd with the refugee situation, pertaining to grief and precariousness. In 
addition to blurring the boundaries between “us” and “them”, and asking us to 
broaden our perspectives on young victims who need our help, Olin taps into 
recent cultural memories by inserting iconic black- white photographs docu-
menting the public grief expressed after July 22nd into her dream sequence. We 
thus move from a personal, participatory mode to a more expository film mode 
as Olin shows us stills commemorating the grief felt after the Oslo Massacre, in 
particular photographs of flowers placed all over the city, and of people in tears.
Turning to the aftermath of July 22nd, Olin reminds her viewers of their val-
ues of tolerance and compassion – values that were attacked on July 22nd and 
strongly expressed and reasserted in the following weeks. As Svein Østerud puts 
it in his introduction to an anthology on July 22nd: “Official Norway countered 
the one- man terror of July 22nd with appeals for more democracy and more 
openness. By supporting common values and through political engagement the 
fight against terror was to be won”.15 These are values that Olin wants viewers to 
keep in mind when watching the film about her refugee boys. As documentary 
film theorist Bill Nichols puts it, the documentary maker has to know “how to 
enlist an audience’s pre- existing values and beliefs for specific ends”.16 Yet, in 
addition to reminding us of what are widely perceived as national, Norwegian 
values and virtues, Olin also taps into strong emotions of grief and vulnerability. 
As such, her opening can be viewed as an extraordinary example of creating a 
counter- narrative to the media’s dominating us- them portrayals. This is done 
 13 Ibid., 123.
 14 Ibid., 125.
 15 Svein Østerud “‘Oslo, 22. juli 2011,” in 22. juli. Forstå – forklare – forebygge, ed. Svein 
Østerud (Oslo: Abstrakt forlag, 2012), 13. “Det offisielle Norge møtte enmannsterroren 
22. juli med appeller om mer demokrati og mer åpenhet […]. Gjennom oppslutning 
om felles verdier og gjennom politisk deltakelse skulle kampen mot terroren vinnes” 
(my English translation).
 16 Nichols, Introduction to Documentary, 98.
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based on what Butler reminds us is our common “grievability” and precari-
ousness.17 Clearly Olin and Butler are of the same opinion that we are not just 
individual beings, or singular social groups, such as nations; instead all human 
lives are interdependent. As Butler puts it regarding the aftermath of 9/11:
“War seeks to deny the ongoing and irrefutable ways in which we are all subject 
to one another, vulnerable to destruction by the other, and in need of protection 
through multilateral and global agreements based on the recognition of shared 
precariousness”.18
Olin uses July 22nd not only to evoke feelings of guilt, reminding us that our 
grief and concern is distributed unequally, or unjustly – we mourn our “own” 
children, but seem not to care about those of other nations. She also uses 
July 22nd to remind us of our common vulnerability, and to stress the fact that 
although precarity is distributed unequally, we all live precarious lives. As indi-
viduals, we are part of greater social networks, and also within our nations we 
are bound to people “whom one never chose and never knew”.19
Framing the Oslo Massacres as a national moment of grief and vulnerabil-
ity, evoking tolerance, compassion and non- violence, Olin seeks to situate us 
once more in a situation of strong affect supporting a stance of non- violence. 
She then uses this as a platform to expand the circle of concern, to make us 
see young, male asylum seekers as equally vulnerable, grievable and human. It 
becomes an example of a film, as Nichols would put it: “activating our predis-
positions and tap[ping] into emotion we already have toward certain values 
and beliefs” to enhance its “affective powers”.20
Memory and Media
As indicated above, Jan Assmann’s distinction between communicative and 
cultural memory may provide a key to why critics were uncomfortable with 
Olin’s use of July 22nd. We are, in fact, left in what seems to be an uncomfort-
able borderland between communicative and cultural memory – or worse yet, 
 17 Butler coins the term “grievable” to discuss how we find the loss of some human lives 
worthy of grief while the loss of lives of others seems not to affect us.
 18 Judith Butler, Frames of War. When Is Life Grievable? (London: Verso, 2010), 43.
 19 Ibid., 179.
 20 Nichols, Introduction to Documentary, 97 – 98.
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between three types of memory: individual, communicative and cultural.21 Most 
significantly this is an issue of time compression. As Assmann summarizes it, 
a communicative memory lasts 80 – 100 years (three to four generations) and 
has not yet been institutionalized.22 It is expressed informally through every-
day conversation, through vernacular language.23 Yet, July 22nd and its after-
math were quickly institutionalized, with the media focusing on the speeches 
and reactions of the heads of the most significant national institutions: the 
prime minister Jens Stoltenberg and the royal family. As representatives of 
an “official Norway”, Østerud points in particular to Jens Stoltenberg’s advo-
cating democracy, openness, and humanity 24 as well as crown prince Håkon 
Magnus who stated that “the streets are filled with love and compassion”.25 In 
addition came an abundance of celebrity artists, and as Unni Langås explains 
in her recent book on trauma in Norwegian literature: “The poems that were 
sung and written after July 22nd advocated unity and love (or compassion) as 
a collective response”.26
Viewed from the perspective of media studies, this expression of collec-
tive grief and reassertion of common values constituted the second phase of 
mediatisation and news coverage of the event. The first phase, in Svein Brurås’ 
analysis of the mediatisation of July 22nd, consisted of direct reporting on 
the shocking event – a phase that lasted a little less than 24 hours – when it 
became clear exactly how many had died.27 The second phase started on the 
23rd of July and was that of comforting, stabilizing, and assuaging the nation 
through arranged media events. The media took on a ceremonial and unify-
ing role – broadcasting performances like the rose demonstration (“rosetog”), 
 21 Jan Assmann, “Communicative and Cultural Memory,” in A Companion to Cultural 
Memory Studies, ed. Astrid Erll and Ansgar Nünning (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2010), 109. 
Assman’s main focus is on communicative versus cultural memory, but he also discusses 
three types of memory as individual, social, and cultural.
 22 Ibid., 113.
 23 Ibid., 117.
 24 Østerud, “22. Juli,” 10, 14.
 25 Ibid., 13. “gatene er fylt av kjærlighet” (my English translation).
 26 “Diktene som ble sunget og skrevet etter 22. juli, mante til samhold og kjærlighet som 
et kollektivt svar.” Unni Langås, Traumets betydning i norsk samtidslitteratur (Bergen: 
Fagbokforlaget Vigmostad & Bjørke, 2016), 12. (my English translation).
 27 Svein Brurås, “‘Det er en tid for alt.’ Nyhetsdekning i tre faser,” in Mediene og terrorak-
sjonen. Studier av norske mediers dekning av 22. Juli, ed. Svein Brurås (Oslo: Unipub, 
2012), 13. In his discussion of media events, Brurås refers mainly to: Daniel Dayan and 
Elihu Katz, Media Events. The Live Broadcasting of History (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1992).
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memorials, and funerals. This phase lasted two to three weeks and was charac-
terized by a tone of gravity and veneration.28 It was a phase when the nation’s 
broadcasting corporations and social institutions cooperated to unite people 
and create a social common understanding of the traumatic event.29 During a 
third phase, critical, investigative journalism set in, which had previously been 
considered inappropriate.30
If we examine these three media phases through the lens of Assmann’s divi-
sion between communicative and cultural memory, we see a set of potential 
clashes. Whereas communicative memories pertain to a time structure consist-
ing of nearly a century, encompassing three or four interacting generations, cul-
tural memories pertain to an absolute past, or at least one that extends beyond 
the aforementioned 80 years. The cultural memory is mediated ceremonially, 
in a “classical” or “otherwise formalized language”, while the communicative 
memory is a living, embodied memory, communicated in a vernacular lan-
guage, informally, through genres of everyday communication.31 A conceptual 
problem arises when a traumatic event is treated as a cultural memory within 
a mere 24 hours through ceremonial communication; July 22nd was, as Brurås 
points out, already considered “historical” at this early stage. It may then seem 
irreverent or gratuitous for a filmmaker – who is not just talking in an infor-
mal everyday setting, but making a film, aimed at a national audience – to 
locate the traumatic event within the sphere of an individual or communicative 
memory, relating it through a personal dream. In addition, the second phase 
is about rebuilding a sense of unity within a specific community, in this case 
Norway. It is about “our” loss, grief, trauma, and standing united in the face of 
terror. It may then seem “wrong” and improperly transgressive of boundaries 
to involve those who are conceptualized as not part of “us” in this memory. 
Yet, as I have argued, this may nevertheless be understood in the context of 
trauma and trauma aesthetics, building precisely on dissociations, fragments, 
and new associations appearing through the subconscious of a vicariously 
traumatized filmmaker.
 28 Ibid., 13, 18, 20.
 29 Ibid., 14, 18.
 30 Ibid., 21.
 31 Assmann, “Memory,” 117.
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Black- and- White Photographs
A similar, yet less problematic, collapse of the border between the personal and 
the public arises with Olin’s use of iconic photos. Jens Ruchatz distinguishes 
between the photograph as externalization and trace. A central point is that 
“private photographs tend to be used as traces […] whereas collective mem-
ory favours photographs that support a symbolical reading and thus can be 
appropriated for externalization”.32 Public photographs may serve an iconic 
role: “the term ‘photographic icon’ […] designates pictures that attract strong 
collective attention and emotional reactions”, and “iconic photographs fore-
ground symbolic values”.33 When Olin inserts black- and- white stills of grief 
expressed in Oslo immediately after the massacres, they are presented as some-
thing that could be personal photographs. After all, Olin informs us that she, 
herself, was there with her daughter. As a filmmaker she may very well have 
brought her camera. At the same time, we recognize the scenes as those from 
the second phase of media coverage. We know they symbolize the common 
grief and values of democracy and tolerance that were reasserted as a reaction 
to the act of terror. Again, with Assmann we might say that the boundaries 
between individual, communicative, and cultural memory are blurred. When 
this caused less of a critical reaction, however, it may be because it came across 
as less “melodramatic”, “overstated”, and “intrusive” since it to a lesser degree 
tapped into something that was clearly an individual memory. In terms of affect, 
it set the stage for feeling connected through a common sense of vulnerability 
without also guilt- tripping viewers.
It furthermore ties in with the film’s overall use of black- and- white stills. After 
the opening sequence, the film follows Olin’s young male refugees, especially 
three Afghans and an Iraqi Kurd, allowing us to witness their past and present 
traumas as well as their intermittent hopes for a brighter future. Throughout 
the film, Olin employs the aforementioned aesthetics of trauma. She uses black- 
and- white stills and extreme close- ups of faces and body parts to interrupt 
the flow of her film, and she uses uncanny disassociations between voices and 
bodies as trauma victims narrate their primary traumas. The black- and- white 
still photography has been interpreted as providing a sense of sadness, gloom, 
 32 Jens Ruchatz, “The Photograph as Externalization and Trace,” in A Companion to Cul-
tural Memory Studies, ed. Astrid Erll and Ansgar Nünning (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2010), 
372.
 33 Ibid., 374.
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and fear.34 They may, however, also have to be understood in terms of trauma. 
The first time, for instance, Olin uses black- and- white stills is when Kurdish 
Goli is deported and loses hope for the future, stating that he would rather die 
in the process of fleeing, than live in Iraq. The stills showing him sitting in the 
airplane, interrupt the flow of the film and appear to mirror an inner state of 
mind in which life at best, is put on hold. The inner state of mind appears to 
be Goli’s as well as, empathically and vicariously, Olin’s.
The fourth and final main story presented in the film belongs to Husein, a 
refugee from Afghanistan. Here, too, Olin uses an elaborate aesthetics of trauma 
including the black- and- white stills, extreme close- ups of faces and (scarred) 
body parts, as well as uncanny dissociations between voices and bodies. When 
Husein’s application for asylum is turned down, the rejection evidently consti-
tutes a new trauma, evoking the memories of his prior trauma, an incident in 
which all his family members – except his brother Hassan who accompanies him 
to Norway – were killed and during which he was stabbed with a bayonet. In a 
live recording in colour we hear Husein narrating his account to Olin in a bro-
ken, soft voice. When Husein gets to the point in his story in which everything 
turns black and he wakes up at the hospital with severe injuries, he pauses for 
a moment. To reflect his traumatized state of mind, Olin continues to show 
him sitting quietly. Meanwhile his account is further narrated as a voice over, 
still using Husein’s voice. The effect is uncanny and jarring as body and voice 
are disassociated. How can Husein talk without moving his lips? What does 
this cinematic technique mean? On the one hand, Husein appears to dissoci-
ate himself from his own story, which is accentuated as being simultaneously 
unspeakable and spoken. In shock, he seems mentally alienated from his own 
body. The scene thus provides a visual correlative to the experience of trauma – 
with its “terrifying dissociations and splitting”, the “uncanny intertwining of 
inside and outside”, and the “crossing of borders normally held firm in ordinary 
life”.35 At the same time, the cinematic technique may reflect Olin’s own sense 
of vicarious trauma – which, as in the case of Goli, she passes on, “leaving the 
situation uncertain or to be deduced by the viewer”.36
 34 Økland, “Menneskekjærlig document.” Kjersti Juul, “Vond og bevegende film,” Vårt 
Land, October 25, 2012.
 35 Kaplan, Trauma Culture, 125.
 36 Ibid., 125.
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An Open- Wound Ending – Memories of Comfort
The ending of the film, in which Olin once more frames the refugee crisis as a 
crisis of children, evokes a sense of injustice and guilt as well as a sense of com-
mon precariousness. In a final scene, she again taps into Norway’s collective 
memory, this time by juxtaposing homeless refugee children in Athens, sleep-
ing in public places with and without their families, with a classic Norwegian 
lullaby, Margrethe Munthes “Dear God, I am well taken care of ”.37
Earlier in the film we have seen similar bedtime scenes accompanied by 
Greek folk music. Now the soundtrack brings the scenes home, so to speak, yet 
the well- known lullaby is performed in an unfamiliar version, sung in a dreary 
and melancholy manner (arranged by Rebekka Karijord and performed by the 
Stockholm Boys’ Choir). What this song evokes in the viewer is presumably a 
parent singing the lullaby in the intimacy of a child’s bedroom. The safe child – 
through a simple hymn – thanks God for his love and everything else he has 
given the child, and prays that God will keep looking after the child and her fam-
ily. Olin, by contrast, uses a version full of musical and intertextual dissonance, 
compared to the traditional version. In addition, the visual context enhances an 
uncomfortable sense of contrast between the viewer’s musical associations and 
the images on the screen. There is no bedroom for these children, and neither 
God nor anybody else seems to be giving them and their families what they 
need. The combination of song and imagery creates cognitive dissonance and 
psychological discomfort. In this way, the film’s participatory, affective mode 
has what Kaplan calls an open- wound ending.
According to Kaplan, an open- wound ending may urge viewers to take an 
active, ethical stance on the matter: “Art that takes trauma for its topic but does 
not allow the spectator so easily to ‘survive’ the protagonist’s death or wound, 
refuses the safe closure that melodrama perhaps vainly seeks”.38 Such films 
have “power to move the audience ethically, to expose the structure of injustice 
and to invite viewers to take responsibility for related specific injustice” (ibid.). 
Clearly, Olin’s film mobilizes audience emotions of guilt, precariousness, and 
injustice, suggesting that the primary way to heal the wound is to act politically. 
The last point is made as the open- wound affective framing of De andre is fol-
lowed by the expository framing anchoring the film in several articles from the 
UN Convention of the Rights of the Child with which Norwegian government 
institutions is not complying, according to Olin.
 37 “Kjære Gud jeg har det godt” (my English translation).
 38 Kaplan, Trauma Culture, 135.
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Conclusion
Overall, the film was well received, also by those who were otherwise critical to 
Olin’s references to the Utøya Massacres. Bjørn Sørenssen, for instance, writes 
in the film journal Montages that:
“De andre is an appeal that mobilizes rather than satisfies emotions. While similar 
films are content to leave the viewer in a teary catharsis, Olin sets out to use emo-
tions politically. Instead of just pointing at the sad fact that we live in an evil world, 
she directs a clear appeal at her audience, demanding action”.39
Sørenssen’s conclusion is that this makes the film “entirely necessary in the 
Norwegian asylum debate”.40 The film, in addition, is important from several 
other perspectives. It illustrates the public function of documentaries as a 
counter- voice to other media presentations (on refugees); it builds on trauma 
aesthetics that have attracted new interest internationally after 9/11; and it 
enters into a Scandinavian discourse on guilt and privilege with a focus on 
guilt as well as guilt feeling. As such it constitutes a unique voice that assumes 
the point of view of the Other without fearing anything but the integrity – not 
the collapse – of the Self. Yet as I indicated at the beginning of this article 
Olin’s voice is just one of many; a good deal of these express ambivalence 
regarding Scandinavian guilt, while others express a more explicit defence of 
Scandinavian privilege.
From the point of view of memory studies, it is interesting that crossing 
the boundaries between representing individual, communicative, and cultural 
memories may prompt audience discomfort – probably more so upon the film’s 
immediate release than now, five years later. Conversely, we may turn the prob-
lem around and ask whether Assmann’s distinction between the three types 
of memory remains valid, once the event remembered is of such critical mag-
nitude as is an act of terror. This is an act that government institutions, artist 
celebrities, and the media in general devote vast amounts of energy to quickly 
consolidate and provide meaning as a cultural memory. Assmann’s three cat-
 39 Bjørn Sørenssen in Montages, November 5th, 2012. “De andre er en appell som mobi-
liserer, heller enn å tilfredsstille følelser. Der lignende filmer nøyer seg med å etterlate 
tilskueren i en tårevåt katharsis, satser Olin på bruke [sic.] følelsene politisk. I stedet 
for bare å påpeke det sørgelige faktum at vi lever i en ond verden, retter hun en klar og 
tydelig appell til tilskuerne med krav om handling” (my English translation).
 40 Ibid., “helt nødvendig i den norske asyldebatten” (my English translation).
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egories nevertheless help explain the sense of discomfort that may arise when 
contemporary media contribute to a collapse between classifications that have 
traditionally been kept distinct for generations.
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Uta Bretschneider
Flight and Expulsion after World War II as Collapse: 
Official and Individual Memories in Eastern Germany
In the spring of 2016 the Sudetendeutsche Landmannschaft, an organisation of 
German expellees from Bohemia, changed their by- laws. The “right to home-
land” and their goal of “winning back” was taken out of the statutes.1 This sym-
bolic step occurred more than seven decades after the end of World War II. 
The change in the statutes was both a political shift (that was criticised on the 
one hand and welcomed on the other) and a symptom of the current German 
‘culture of remembrance’ concerning flight and expulsion.
In 1945, around 14 million Germans were affected by the forced migration 
out of Germany or German- settled territories in Eastern Europe, such as Silesia, 
East Prussia, Pomerania and Bohemia. They experienced the end of the war as 
the beginning of a collapse. Over four million refugees or expellees wound up 
in the Soviet Occupied Zone. They made up a quarter of the population there, 
yet they were only able to hang on to their status as a distinct group for a very 
short time. The “resettler policy” (Umsiedlerpolitik) was a firm assimilation 
policy marked by repression. It aimed at a one- sided adjustment of the new 
arrivals to the receiving society and negated their particular body of experience. 
In this policy the authorities aimed to gain quick social cohesion, or some-
thing even stronger: a mostly homogeneous society based on their ideological 
perspective. In this “socialistic” society (Sozialistische Gesellschaft) there was 
neither space for thousands of people hoping to leave the country and return 
home to Eastern Europe nor for groupings that did not accept the legitimacy 
of the political system. And so, only a few years after the end of World War II 
the so- called “resettlers” (Umsiedler) were declared to be integrated.
Against this background, this paper focuses on the individual and collective 
modes of remembrance concerning flight and expulsion after World War II.2 
 1 See e. g., “Sudetendeutsche verzichten auf ‘Wiedergewinnung der Heimat’,” Zeit online, 
February 2016, http://www.zeit.de/gesellschaft/zeitgeschehen/2016-02/vertriebene- 
sudetendeutsche- verzicht- wiedergewinnung- heimat.
 2 The data (qualitative interviews, records, and contemporary journals) were collected 
inter alia during the research on the doctoral dissertation project “Vom Ich zum Wir?” 
(2011 – 2014), which analyses the processes of integration of the “resettlers” in the context 
of transformation in rural areas of the Soviet Occupied Zone/GDR; Uta Bretschneider, 
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Changes and challenges of memory in the unique setting of the Soviet Occupied 
Zone and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) are analysed, and the fol-
lowing questions are approached: How successful had the displacement from 
the public been? How do contemporary witnesses who have experienced flight 
or expulsion in childhood remember this time now? And what was the impact 
of the German reunification – the so- called Wende – in the years 1989 and 1990 
on the processes of remembrance?
“Resettler Policy”
In the closing days of World War II, millions of Germans fled from the German 
or German- settled territories in Eastern Europe as the eastern front moved 
closer and closer. Soon, the flight merged into the wild expulsion that contin-
ued even after the allies’ Potsdam Conference in the summer of 1945.
Belongings, packed in haste by the so- called resettlers, soon disappeared in 
the confusion of the flight westward – whether through plundering, exchange, 
or sale. Upon reaching their final destination, they had as good as nothing.
Against the background of a newly formed bureaucracy and an infrastructure 
destroyed by the war, it was determined that the survival of these people had 
to take priority. Often it was the native population that assisted with food or a 
place to stay in the direst situations. Help from the state only came gradually. 
The most important institution was the Central Administration for German 
Resettlers (Zentralverwaltung für deutsche Umsiedler).3
It was already determined in the autumn of 1945 that the refugees and expel-
lees were to be officially designated as “resettlers” in the Soviet Occupation Zone. 
The terminology reduced the forced migration of people in their millions to 
a “resettlement”. It masked the involuntariness of having to leave their homes 
and was intended to emphasise the irreversibility of the situation.4
In 1947, the Socialist Unity Party (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands)5 
politician Paul Merker offered a definition of the term:
‘Vom Ich zum Wir’? Flüchtlinge und Vertriebene als Neubauern in der LPG (Leipzig: 
Leipziger Universitätsverlag, 2016), 23 – 31.
 3 Manfred Wille, “Die Zentralverwaltung für deutsche Umsiedler. Möglichkeiten und 
Grenzen ihres Wirkens (1945 – 1948),” in Sie hatten alles verloren. Flüchtlinge und Ver-
triebene in der Sowjetischen Besatzungszone Deutschlands, ed. Manfred Wille, Johannes 
Hoffmann, and Wolfgang Meinicke (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1993), 27 – 54.
 4 Bretschneider, ‘Vom Ich zum Wir’?, 23 – 31.
 5 Socialist Unity Party (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands).
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“Resettlers are those people, who, due to international decisions, had to leave their 
places of origin because they are German – to the extent that these areas now lay 
outside the current German border – and are now being taken in as resettlers in 
the areas of today’s German occupation zones”.6
The politics of language concerning flight and expulsion was ideologically 
and symbolically heavily laden. Within a few years, the “resettlers” were pro-
claimed to be “new citizens” (Neubürger) and then finally “former resettlers” 
(ehemalige Umsiedler).
“Resettler” was a euphemism. The terminus was introduced to avoid words 
like “expellees” or “refugees” (Vertriebene und Flüchtlinge) or, as they were called 
in the Western part of Germany, “homeland expellees” (Heimatvertriebene). 
“New citizens” described the progress of integration and “former resettlers” 
marked the process of assimilation as complete. At the beginning of the 1950s, 
integration was already declared to be successfully completed. The existence 
of a particular group of people with broken biographies, no belongings, and 
the desire to return was negated.
As examples, the “resettler”-political program comprised financial support, 
preferred credit grants, participation in land reform, and also included special 
support for job re- training. Paul Merker outlined the goals for 1947 as follows:
“The fact that we are nearing the end of the resettlement has to serve as an occasion 
to force us to review our collective experiences and to find ways of promoting the 
assimilation of the resettlers in their new homes along with a merging with the 
native population. This should be done to facilitate the final naturalization, and to 
provide them with housing, furniture, and suitable employment”.7
Merker’s proposal makes it clear that the “resettler policy” in the Soviet Occupa-
tion Zone – and after 1949 in the GDR – was above all an assimilation policy, the 
goal of which was rapid integration into the so- called receiving society. However, 
due to the collapse of the national socialist regime and the so- called anti- fascist 
democratic revolution, this process came at a time of profound transformation: 
the so- called receiving society was in a flux. This meant that everyone, long- time 
natives and new arrivals alike, had to deal with various forms of adjustment. 
In the process, especially for the “resettlers”, there dominated a “compulsion 
 6 Paul Merker, Die nächsten Schritte zur Lösung des Umsiedlerproblems (Berlin: Dietz, 
1947), 24.
 7 Ibid., 7.
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for the future”.8 They were not to look back; instead, they were to invest all of 
their energies into building the new – socialistic – society. According to histo-
rian Michael Schwartz, the efforts towards making certain themes taboo were 
“all the more effective, in that [they] not only concentrated on repression, but 
also on ideological indoctrination”.9 It contained an “anti- fascist loaded ‘guilty 
conscious’ and produced a corresponding self- control […]”.10 Those “resettlers” 
who were susceptible to socialist ideas gained social rise, but they paid for it 
with their personal lack of the past. The integration history, therefore, is to be 
understood as a “necessary and long- term history of conflict”. 11
Until the end of their lives, many “resettlers” hoped for a de facto return 
to their so- called “old homeland” (alte Heimat). There were more than a few 
who always kept a packed suitcase on hand – they wanted to be ready at all 
times for the return trip to their home region. Even political decisions, such 
as the recognition of the Oder- Neisse border by the GDR in 1950, were hardly 
able to shake their determination. On the one hand, there was a refusal by the 
“resettlers” to settle into their new surroundings; on the other, the “strangers” 
were marginalised and discriminated against again and again.
In the first few years of the post- war period, the refugees and expellees were 
competitors for scarce resources, such as food, accommodation and work. 
In addition, various daily habits became symbols of “being strangers”. There 
often followed – after their experience of total collapse and professional and 
social relegation – the realisation of not being wanted. Although, as Germans, 
the “resettlers” belonged to the same nationality as the locals, they were often 
labelled “gypsies” or “Russians”. In doing so, the locals denied them solidarity. 
For many years the “resettlers” remained “foreigners”. Only in the long- term 
(inter alia through generational change) could the tension be attenuated.
Nevertheless, the so- called process of integration was brought – at least 
officially – to a formal end in September 1950 with the Act for the Continued 
Improvement of the Situation of the Former Resettlers (Gesetz über die weitere 
Verbesserung der Lage der ehemaligen Umsiedler in der Deutschen Demokratischen 
 8 Michael Schwartz, “Umsiedlerpolitik in der Krise? Das Vertriebenenproblem in der 
Gründungsphase der DDR 1948 – 1950,” in Das letzte Jahr der SBZ. Politische Weichen-
stellungen und Kontinuitäten im Prozeß der Gründung der DDR, ed. Dierk Hoffmann 
and Hermann Wentker (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2000), 186.
 9 Michael Schwartz, “‘Zwangsheimat Deutschland.’ Vertriebene und Kernbevölkerung 
zwischen Gesellschaftskonflikt und Integrationspolitik,” in Nachkrieg in Deutschland, 
ed. Klaus Naumann (Hamburg: HIS Verlag, 2001), 133.
 10 Ibid.
 11 Ibid., 146.
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Republik). Only five years after the end of World War II, the refugees and expel-
lees were officially considered to be integrated. The so- called resettler prob-
lem (Umsiedlerproblem), at least in official contemporary interpretation, was 
solved.12 A veritable mythology of a successful integration was staged, dissem-
inated, and politically manipulated. Consequently, the refugees and expellees 
then disappeared from official statistics.
Example Case: The Moor Family’s Way to Thuringia
The example of a family (the pseudonym ‘Moor’ has been given) is chosen here 
to illustrate the “resettler policy” and the individual processes of adaption. The 
following is based on interviews with the two daughters of the Moor family: 
Bärbel Lohner (born Moor) and Ingeborg Lösch (born Moor). At the beginning 
of 1945, Gertrud Moor fled with her mother and her three children from the area 
around Landsberg an der Warthe (today, Gorzów Wielkopolski in Poland). At 
first they set out in a westerly direction, but then soon returned to their house, 
which in the meantime had been plundered. They were finally driven out for 
good in May, 1945. They landed in a camp somewhere in Brandenburg. Then 
the Moors were shipped off to Thuringia in a freight wagon. Until the father 
was released from a prisoner- of- war camp in 1948, they lived in a village in 
the south of Thuringia.
On June 18th, 1948, the Moor family arrived in Kloster Veßra, a small village 
in the south of Thuringia with approximately 300 inhabitants, and there they 
took over a land reform farm that had failed. At this point the Moors belonged 
to the ten new farm families in the village who were settled in the area of the 
former manorial farm estate.
In September of 1945, a land reform was introduced in the Soviet Occupied 
Zone. Owners of property larger than 100 hectares, as well as the (supposed) 
profiteers of national socialism, were dispossessed without compensation. Their 
possessions – land, buildings, livestock, and agricultural equipment – fell to the 
agricultural land fund and were newly distributed. Thus, 210,000 new farms 
were created, each containing between five and ten hectares of land. In addition 
to this, numerous small pieces of land were distributed as garden allotments. 
 12 Michael Schwartz, “Staatsfeind ‘Umsiedler’,” in Die Flucht. Über die Vertreibung der 
Deutschen aus dem Osten, ed. Stefan Aust and Stephan Burgdorff (Bonn: Bundeszen-
trale für politische Bildung, 2003), 224 – 235.
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Among the new farmers were more than 90,000 “resettled” families.13 The goal 
was the destruction of traditional hierarchies and the elimination of the great 
land owners and their families. The new farmers (neubauern) were to be ‘planted’ 
as a new social group in the villages. Furthermore, the land reform served to 
ensure the food supply. Not least of all, this was intended as a form of aid for 
the “resettlers” towards becoming self- sufficient. The land reform, therefore, 
can be seen as one of the state measures to support the refugees and expellees.
Bärbel remembers an episode from a period in the beginning: a sack of 
wheat that had been allocated to the family for the seed was instead imme-
diately ground into flour. At that moment, bread was more important than 
seed for the next year.14 This example illustrates that taking over a land reform 
business may have promised – in the best case – a secure existence in the long 
run, but the lack of basic necessities in the beginning still had to be overcome.
After only five months for construction, the Moor family moved into their 
farm house in October of 1948. There still remained no electricity and the walls 
were not yet painted. Furniture was collected piece by piece.15 For Erich Moor, 
who had been working as a butcher with a small farm in his home village, the 
land reform – and therefore, the possibility of a “land grab” (Landnahme)16 – 
had particular significance. It meant a return to the older, more familiar ways 
of doing things they had known before the war.17
However, running an agricultural business in Thuringia meant a host of other 
challenges to confront. Among other problems, for example, the Moors had to 
become accustomed to the different soil and weather conditions. They had to 
adapt themselves to the area. In the interview with Ingeborg, she emphasised 
 13 Altogether, the expropriation encompassed 3.3 million hectares of land. 560,000 people 
were involved in the land distribution: Michael Schwartz, Vertriebene und “Umsiedler-
politik”. Integrationskonflikte in den deutschen Nachkriegs- Gesellschaften und die Assi-
milationsstrategien in der SBZ/DDR 1945 – 1961 (Munich: De Gruyter, 2004), 652.
 14 Lohner, Bärbel (born Moor), born in 1940. She was driven out of the Landsberg an der 
Warthe district, Brandenburg (today Gorzów Wielkopolski, Poland) along with her 
family (her father was a prisoner of war). After many stops along the way, they landed 
in Kloster Veßra (Thuringia) in 1948. Interview by the author Uta Bretschneider, Novem-
ber 4, 2011, line 203.
 15 Lösch, Ingeborg (born Moor), born in 1939. She was the sister of Bärbel Lohner and 
was driven out of the Landsberg an der Warthe district, Brandenburg (today Gorzów 
Wielkopolski, Poland) along with her family (her father was a prisoner of war). After 
many stops along the way, they landed in Kloster Veßra (Thuringia) in 1948. Interview 
by the author Uta Bretschneider, May 12, 2011, line 5.
 16 Christoph Hein, Landnahme (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2004).
 17 Interview by the author Uta Bretschneider and Ingeborg Lösch, 2011, line 5.
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that her parents had proved – in the long term after overcoming enormous 
problems – that they could run a business by themselves, and that they were 
indeed farmers despite their numerous set- backs.18 In any case, the Moor family 
was able to stabilise their farm business. What sounds like one of those often- 
told stories of success was indeed a story of failure and individual struggle. 
Erich Moor, for example, refused until the end of his life to be buried far from 
his home. We will return to the Moors later.
Policy of Forgetting
“Historical memory is always a political act”.19 Of course, this also applies in 
particular to the avoidance of historical remembrance. Making certain themes 
taboo was widely practised in the GDR. Here, the “alliance between regime and 
memory”,20 as described by the cultural expert Aleida Assmann in reference 
to forced forgetting, is particularly relevant – that is, the refugee and expellee 
interest groups that emerged in West Germany as important associations of 
remembrance were forbidden in the GDR. At first, they fell under the so- called 
coalition ban that the four occupation zones had passed in 1945.21 Until the sum-
mer of 1948, there was a general ban for the refugees and expellees to establish 
coalitions. It was thought this ban would help to stabilise the political system 
as well as the borders in the East. At the end of the 1940s, however, this ban was 
lifted in West Germany. In the GDR it remained in effect.22 On top of this, the 
 18 Ibid., line 13.
 19 Edgar Wolfrum, “Erinnerungskultur und Geschichtspolitik als Forschungsfelder. Kon-
zepte – Methoden – Themen,” in Reformation und Bauernkrieg. Erinnerungskultur und 
Geschichtspolitik im geteilten Deutschland, ed. Jan Scheunemann (Leipzig: Evangelische 
Verlagsanstalt, 2010), 15.
 20 Aleida Assmann, Erinnerungsräume. Formen und Wandlungen des kulturellen Gedächt-
nisses (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1999), 138.
 21 Heike Amos, Vertriebenenverbände im Fadenkreuz. Aktivitäten der DDR‐Staatssicher-
heit 1949 bis 1989 (Munich: De Gruyter, 2011), 27.
 22 “Gesetz zum Schutze des Friedens vom 15. Dezember 1950,” law text, accessed Septem-
ber 6, 2017, http://www.verfassungen.de/de/ddr/friedensgesetz50.htm; Michael Schwartz, 
“Vertriebenenproblem und Umsiedlerpolitik in der SBZ/DDR,” Friedrich- Ebert- Stiftung, 
accessed September 6, 2017, http://www.fes.de/magdeburg/pdf/6_10_14_schwartz.pdf; 
Heike Amos, Die Vertriebenenpolitik der SED 1949 bis 1990 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 
2009), 257; Ute Bretschneider, “Zwangsmigration und Neubeheimatung. ‘Umsiedler’ 
als ‘Neubauern’ in der SBZ/DDR,” in Aufbrechen, Arbeiten, Ankommen. Mobilität und 
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West German associations for the “homeland expellees” (Heimatvertriebenen) 
were designated in East Germany as backward- looking and revanchist – which 
to a large extent they actually were.23 The ‘Remembering Culture’ on the one 
side and the ‘Forgetting Culture’ on the other side of the inner- German bor-
der served a key function in the propaganda battle of the Cold War. Historian 
Edgar Wolfrum assessed the situation as follows:
“For the Federal Republic, the GDR was always the negative- comparison society. 
For their part, the GDR could never entirely pull themselves away from the magnet 
field of the great western brother, although the SED-Regime permanently strove 
to. The SED-Regime tried to offset their lack of democratic legitimation through 
a secondary legitimacy – and it is here where the development of a socialist his-
torical picture played a crucial role”.24
And within this picture, the “resettler’s” history, their experiences, fears, and 
the harm done were mostly excluded. Although they initially disappeared from 
official statistics in the 1950s, they did not disappear from the GDR media. It 
is with this that the historian Bill Niven speaks of a “supposed taboo” 25 ‒ that 
is, for years researchers stated that the theme was completely taboo. However, 
subsequent years have offered the knowledge that it was a taboo with certain 
gaps. Even if the “resettlers” did not entirely disappear from East German 
media, the mode of their presentation was nevertheless strictly prescribed: a 
history of achievement was presented. This consisted of economic as well as 
social integration, which corresponded to professional and personal success. 
This is illustrated above with the example of the Moor family. The fact that a 
particular person was profiled as a “resettler” only underscored the achievement 
of reconstruction and therefore increased the overall balance of success.26 This 
Migration im ländlichen Raum seit 1945, ed. Rita Garstenauer and Anne Unterwurzacher 
(Innsbruck et al.: Studienverlag, 2015), 37 – 52.
 23 The book “Kreuzritter in Trachten” was published in the GDR in 1984 against Western 
German associations of the so- called Heimatvertriebenen. Its language represents typi-
cal elements of the Cold War period and shows the GDR’s attitude towards the Western 
German resettler policy: Werner Flach and Christa Kouschil, Kreuzritter in Trachten. 
Organisierter Revanchismus und seine Macher (Leipzig: Urania- Verlag, 1984).
 24 Wolfrum, “Erinnerungskultur und Geschichtspolitik,” 25.
 25 Bill Niven, “On a supposed taboo: Flight and refugees from the East in GDR film and 
television,” German life and letters 65, no. 2 (2012): 216 – 236.
 26 Uta Bretschneider, “‘Die Bodenreform wurde auch für sie die Rettung.’ ‘Umsiedler’ als 
Neubauern in der zeitgenössischen Presse (1945 – 1960),” in Fremde – Heimat – Sachsen. 
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was to be especially emphasised since the number of “resettlers” that had fled 
East Germany to West Germany up to 1961 offered a more obvious explanation: 
among the total of 2.7 million so- called “Republic refugees” (Republikflüchtlinge), 
no less than 900,000 were former refugees and expellees from the German or 
German- settled territories in Eastern Europe.27
The order to write about success stories and the enforcement of an offi-
cial speaking and memory ban was only partially successful on the private 
level. Although the “resettlers” were supposed to be transformed into “people 
without a past”,28 they nevertheless used forms and means of private memory, 
founded niches, or created their own individual scopes of action.29 In many 
cases, therefore, the circles of friends and family provided areas for remem-
bering. One interviewee thus distinguished between public and inner- family 
recollections:
“So, amongst ourselves, when we were all together, we would talk about everything. 
Here, there were no taboos. However, on the outside, it was very noticeable; I would 
like to say, it was like a ban because you had to keep quiet about it. You couldn’t 
say anything. Because, if someone did say something, then there was immediate 
trouble. Therefore, in the outside world, we did not dare to say too much about 
the flight or the expulsions – no way”.30
Neubauernfamilien in der Nachkriegszeit, ed. Ira Spieker and Sönke Friedreich (Beucha 
and Markkleeberg: Sax- Verlag, 2014), 369 – 396.
 27 Schwartz, “Vertriebenenproblem und Umsiedlerpolitik.” According to the differing 
statistic data, see also: Helge Heidemeyer, Flucht und Zuwanderung aus der SBZ/DDR 
1945/1949 – 1961. Die Flüchtlingspolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland bis zum Bau der 
Berliner Mauer (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1994), 44; Michael Schwartz, “Kriegsfolgelasten 
und ‘Aufbaugesellschaft’. Vertriebene, Bombengeschädigte und Kriegsbeschädigte in 
den langen fünfziger Jahren der DDR,” in Vor dem Mauerbau. Politik und Gesellschaft in 
der DDR der fünfziger Jahre, ed. Dierk Hoffmann (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2003), 184 – 185.
 28 Uta Bretschneider, “Menschen ohne Vergangenheit? Zum Umgang mit Flucht und Ver-
treibung in der SBZ/DDR,” conference paper presented at “Unsichtbares Gepäck. Zur 
Bewältigung von Kriegs- und Fluchterfahrungen seit 1945,” Project at Museum Fried-
land, September 18 – 19, 2014, Friedland.
 29 The illegal meetings of “Umsiedler” in the zoo of Halle are well- known, but everyday 
situations offered possibilities of communication as well.
 30 Peters, Rudolf, (born 1940). Fled with his family in January 1945 from Waldheide, Silesia 
(today Świętoszyn, Poland). After many stops along the way, they settled in Altenhain 
(Saxony). Interview by the author Uta Bretschneider, March 8, 2013, line 59.
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For many areas of life in the GDR, such a double standard of speaking was 
typical. This form of communication strategy was in particular a result of the 
regime’s surveillance system. A focus for the State Security Service always 
included the “resettlers”. This hampered attempts at speaking of memories and 
experiences all the more.31
The partial taboo, with which the forced migration at the end of World 
War II was stamped, ran throughout public life in the Soviet Occupation Zone 
and the GDR. Forms of remembrance such as monuments, commemorations, 
and associations with a focus on regional identity were banned. The emotional 
baggage of over four million people – their experiences, customs, traditions, 
values, and biographical development – was to have as little influence on the 
new society as possible.
The only exception to references to the past concerned their professional 
qualifications and training, which were absolutely needed (and used) for build-
ing the new socialist society after the war. A processing of the flight experience 
beyond the private context hardly occurred and, as a result, there came no treat-
ment. The emergence of any sort of identity promotion – or at least of any sort 
of ‘identity- stabilising communities of remembrance’ – was therefore prevented. 
The flight and expulsion experience was undesirable as an aspect of identity.
Historian Günther Lottes has stated that:
“In totalitarian systems, memory is quite simply decreed. There exists a prevail-
ing (and official) memory that can assert itself through broadly reaching control. 
Alternative memories are either not allowed, or, in the best case, are marginalised”.32
This finding precisely corresponds to the ‘policy of forgetting’ in the Soviet 
Occupation Zone and the GDR.
 31 Heike Amos, “Feindliche Organisationen. Die Sicht des MfS auf die Vertriebenenver-
bände in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland,” Zeitschrift des Forschungsverbundes SED‐
Staat 20 (2006): 20 – 35.
 32 Günther Lottes, “Erinnerungskulturen zwischen Psychologie und Kulturwissenschaft,” 
in Erinnerung, Gedächtnis, Wissen – Studien zur kulturwissenschaftlichen Gedächtnis-
forschung, ed. Günter Oesterle (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2005), 180.
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Culture of Remembrance
It was not until the 1980s that the situation of the GDR’s policy of forgetting 
would gradually start to relax. This would prove to have an impact on the Moor 
family story: after the death of her husband in the early 80s, Gertrud Moor 
sold the farm house to the new open- air museum in Kloster Veßra. She then 
moved to a small city close by. The “resettler’s” farm house became a museum. 
Today, it is still a part of the Open- air Museum Kloster Veßra. It has been pre-
served and essentially remains the same as it was presented 30 years ago. The 
house does not explain the Moor family’s history, with all its twists and turns; 
instead, it shows how a small farming establishment looked in the 1950s. With 
this, the stereotype of the success story of the “resettlers” in the GDR is perpet-
uated – that is, in accordance with contemporary terminology, they became 
‘normal citizens’ within a very short period. In coming years, the exibition is 
to be supplemented by quotations from the Moor’s daughters and by further 
information according to the GDR’s resettler policy.
Individual memories are based on personal experiences that are influenced 
by external factors such as the politics of memory in restrictive state systems, 
and they can compete, contradict, or complement one another.33 Simultaneously, 
there occurs a sort of ‘over- formation’ of one’s own existing memories through 
hearing the stories of others, and through official memory narratives as they 
were told, for example, by monuments and in official memorial ceremonies, as 
well as through media. These meanings of history, situations, experiences, and 
stories then seep into one’s own memory bank. In these processes, a changing 
political imprint (such as after the end of the Cold War period) also changes 
parts of the personal ideas of memories. Memories are always in a state of flux. 
In addition, there occurs reinterpretations and re- codings shaped by subsequent 
experiences because we are constantly looking back from a current present to 
an occurred present.34 With the passing of time and subsequent life experiences, 
an experience will be assessed and told differently than it would be directly 
after the event. For this reason, so many native witnesses, for example, in our 
present topic remember the integration of the so- called resettlers as seamless 
and largely free of conflict:
 33 Assmann, Erinnerungsräume, 16.
 34 Angela Keppler, “Soziale Formen individuellen Erinnerns. Die kommunikative Tradi-
erung von (Familien)Geschichte,” in Das soziale Gedächtnis, ed. Harald Welzer (Ham-
burg: HIS Verlag, 2001), 137.
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“Since the resettlers were so quickly taken in by us into our village life, we did not 
have any trouble. Although it often happened that the resettlers stole things, we 
ourselves never had any trouble with that. They were able to integrate themselves 
without being offended, either religiously or any other way. They were very hard- 
working and that was very much respected by the villagers”. 35
Here, all of the points of conflict, disputation, and confrontation have fallen 
into oblivion. The interview partner is today still recounting the myth of rapid 
integration. And – as most of the interviewees – she uses the topos of the acqui-
sition of recognition through work. At the same time, this also reflects the self- 
perception of many expellees as “poor but hard- working”.
Only with the end of the SED state in 1989 could flight and expulsion in 
the eastern part of Germany also become a public “place of memory” (Erinne-
rungsort),36 as defined by the French sociologist Pierre Nora. Homeland trips, 
associations, monuments, and publications established themselves as memory 
and media forms. In the beginning, however, they found many of the estab-
lished practices of similar organisations in West Germany to be very strange. 
The traces of the 40 years of GDR’s policy of forgetting are not to be removed 
in a relatively short period.
Aleida Assmann believes that a memory culture, in reference to traumatic 
events, ceases after about a 15- to 30-year period.37 In the territory of the former 
GDR it lasted for more than four decades. Only after the upheaval of 1989/90 
was work on the catching up of memory able to begin. In particular, it was the 
former “resettler children” – a group who had previously distanced themselves 
from the ‘expellee status’ of their parents – who became actively engaged in 
examining their past.38 Thus, a new “remembering space” unfolded.39 Now an 
explanation of state repression in the memory culture was possible.
However, the new possibilities nonetheless had to consider and adapt to the 
changes in the collective German situation of the time. Furthermore, it can be 
 35 Schenk, Jutta, born 1941 in Kloster Veßra (mother was a housewife and part- time farmer, 
as well as a seasonal worker on the estate). Parents took over a new farmstead in 1945 
and were founding members of the agricultural cooperative “Vorwärts” (“onwards!”) 
in Kloster Veßra in 1953. Members of cooperative until resigning in 1965 and moving 
out of Kloster Veßra. Interview by the author Uta Bretschneider, May 10, 2011, line 302.
 36 Pierre Nora, Zwischen Geschichte und Gedächtnis (Berlin: Wagenbach, 1990).
 37 Aleida Assmann, Der lange Schatten der Vergangenheit. Erinnerungskultur und Geschichts-
politik (Munich: Beck, 2006), 28.
 38 Schwartz, “Vertriebenenproblem und Umsiedlerpolitik.”
 39 Assmann, Erinnerungsräume.
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assumed that the process involved in the establishment of the theme into public 
memory culture to this day is yet to be completed. Currently, the generational 
change in reference to the ‘memoria’ is showing itself to be particularly active, 
reaching down to the grandchildren of the “children of flight and expulsion”.40
On the one hand, it will likely lead to a partial loss in meaning, while on the 
other it may lead to a new- codification and likewise to a new engagement of 
changed memory keepers and media. Thus, the homeland books of the expellees, 
in which mental maps, photographs and documents are gathered together, will 
more than likely find their form onto Internet sites. Even the practice of taking 
‘home trips’ (Heimatreisen) has changed. For some time now, the grandchildren 
of the refugees and expellees have been researching the regions of their family’s 
origin in Eastern Europe from the point of view of a tourist.41
Around the year 2000 there was much talk about a “memory boom” as well as 
“Pastifying”.42 In general, what goes for remembrance culture also largely applies 
to the thematic areas of flight and expulsion – that is, the memory landscape 
is still growing. It has been transforming and changing since the reunification 
of Germany. The anniversary of the end of World War II in particular has been 
accompanied with a veritable memory boom. In the eastern part of Germany 
today things may now be expressed, which had previously not been allowed. 
However, it should not be forgotten that the one memory of flight, expulsion, 
and the new beginning in the Soviet Occupation Zone does not exist.
The statute alterations by the Sudetendeutsche Landsmannschaft, as described 
at the beginning of this paper, is a further symptom that the memory of (and 
the dealing with) flight and expulsion is constantly in flux – even, and espe-
cially, over the 70 years since the end of World War II.
Not least of all, the character of the process embodied by the memorial cul-
ture is shown by the establishment of a new memory marker in the year 2015. 
Since this time, the 20th of June has been known as the “Memorial Day for 
the Victims of Flight and Expulsion” (Gedenktag für die Opfer von Flucht und 
Vertreibung). The introduction of this national Memorial Day was preceded by 
protracted and tedious debates dating back to 2011.The opponents argued that 
there was no need to offer memory spaces to this topic. They saw a danger of 
 40 Silke Satjukow, Kinder von Flucht und Vertreibung (Erfurt: Landeszentrale für Politische 
Bildung Thüringen, 2007).
 41 Sabine Marschall, “‘Homesick tourism’: Memory, Identity and (be)longing,” Current 
Issues in Tourism 18, no. 9 (2015): 876 – 892.
 42 Wolfrum, “Erinnerungskultur und Geschichtspolitik,” 14; Pierre Nora, “Gedächtniskon-
junktur,” Transit. Europäische Revue 22 (2002): 18 – 31, here 18 – 19.
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revanchist tendencies becoming strong again. The Memorial Day, one could 
say, is a controversial “memorial in time”.43
However, this has hinted at a new dimension of the commemoration of the 
forced migration in 1945, as this date is also simultaneously known as “World 
Refugee Day”. Therefore, this pushes the memory of the collapse of 1945 – and 
the fate of the German refugees and expellees – into a transnational and a tran-
stemporal connection. In addition, it can be seen that those who experienced 
flight and expulsion at the end of World War II have not been known to show 
great empathy for the millions of people who are refugees today. In truth, it is 
just the opposite: the witnesses of that time have developed various narrative 
patterns in order to distance themselves from the refugees of today. However, 
that is a topic for a separate paper.
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Philipp Wagner
Death at Sea as Accident or Disaster: The Case of the 
Missing Shipwreck in Lars Sund’s En lycklig liten ö (2007)
In 2015 a global public was confronted with the effects of the European Union’s 
migration politics. An increasing number of sunken boats and drowned 
migrants in the Mediterranean Sea came to be acknowledged as the so- called 
‘European Migrant Crisis’ and caused temporary medial attention on the events. 
In particular, the picture of Alan Kurdi, a drowned boy lying on the beach, 
became iconic at the time and was widely disseminated through both traditional 
and social media. The incident of Alan Kurdi’s death illustrates that nowadays 
new kinds of “moral spectatorship” emerge in a transnational public sphere 
provided by the Internet’s social networks. Aesthetic traditions are thereby still 
relevant when it comes to appeal audiences in social media.1 In the case of the 
recent events in the Mediterranean, the shipwreck motif can be considered the 
most important tradition and reference point. This paper aims to approach 
the shipwreck motif in the context of the ‘European Migration Crisis’ from a 
literary studies perspective.
European art and literature have depicted ships in distress for centuries. 
One notable outcome of this long history is that shipwrecks became “potent 
metaphors for some supposed larger truth such as the state of the nation, the 
workings of Providence, or the human condition”, as defined by the literary 
scholar Carl Thompson in his introduction to the anthology Shipwreck in 
Art and Literature: Images and Interpretations from Antiquity to the Present 
Day.2 Théodore Géricault’s painting The Raft of the Medusa (1818/19), Daniel 
Defoe’s novel Robinson Crusoe (1719) and Homers Iliad are prominent exam-
ples. Brigitte LeJuez and Olga Springer, who are also from the field of literary 
studies, even go so far as to say the shipwreck motif, with regard to its meta-
 1 Mette Mortensen and Hans- Jörg Trenz, “Media Morality and Visual Icons in the Age of 
Social Media: Alan Kurdi and the Emergence of an Impromptu Public of Moral Spec-
tatorship,” Javnost: The Public 23, no 4 (2016): 348 – 349.
 2 Carl Thompson, “Introduction,” in Shipwreck in Art and Literature: Images and Inter-
pretations from Antiquity to the Present Day, ed. Carl Thompson (London: Routledge, 
2013), 2.
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phorical potential, is “atemporal and universal”.3 When faced with this schol-
arly praise of the motif ’s potential, we are also intrigued by artistic and literary 
reactions to shipwreck in the Mediterranean today. It would take more than 
one paper to answer this question. Alternatively, one particular text, which 
configures the motif of shipwrecks with regard to Europe’s migration poli-
tics in the Mediterranean Sea, is the main focus: the novel En lycklig liten ö 
[A Happy Little Island] by the Finland- Swedish author Lars Sund.4 The novel’s 
publication date shows that the ‘European Migrant Crisis’ cannot be reduced 
to the events of 2015.
Sund’s novel is set on a fictional island in the Archipelago on Finland’s Coast. 
Almost 100 water corpses are found on the island’s beach. Their origin remains 
a mystery, because there is no news about a missing ship and the corpses are 
hard to identify. The reactions of the island’s inhabitants are the main theme 
of the novel. Life in a maritime environment causes the inhabitants to become 
used to people dying at sea – for example, in the case of minor accidents. As 
more and more corpses arrive, a new feeling of discomfort spreads and theo-
dical as well as existential questions are raised. Given the number of victims, 
a disaster must have occurred. Classical coping mechanisms fail in the face 
of this particular incident, because the search for the wrecked ship proves to 
be unsuccessful.
For this reason, En lycklig liten ö is analysed here with regard to its con-
figuration of the shipwreck motif. First, two frames to interpret the usage of 
shipwrecks in art and literature from the theoretical discourse within cultural 
studies are outlined. In both cases, the mode of perspective presented to the 
audience has interpretative consequences for the classification of a shipwreck 
event as either an outstanding disaster or a mere (usual) accident. It depends 
on whether the position of spectator 5 or observer 6 is taken. After a short dis-
cussion of ways to perceive and interpret shipwrecks, the medialisation and 
communication of such events is thematised. Furthermore, the specificalities 
 3 Brigitte Le Juez and Olga Springer, “Introduction: Shipwrecks and Islands as Multi-
layered, Timeless Metaphors of Human Existence,” in Shipwreck and Island Motifs in 
Literature and the Arts, ed. Brigitte Le Juez and Olga Springer (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 3.
 4 Lars Sund, En lycklig liten ö (Helsinki: Söderström, 2007). All Swedish quotes are my 
own translation.
 5 Hans Blumenberg, Schiffbruch mit Zuschauer. Paradigma einer Daseinsmetapher, 6th edi-
tion (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2014).
 6 Burkhardt Wolf, “Schiffbruch mit Beobachter. Zur Geschichte des nautischen Gefahren-
wissens,” in Die Unordnung der Dinge. Eine Wissens- und Mediengeschichte des Unfalls, 
ed. Christian Kassung (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2009), 19 – 48.
60 Philipp Wagner
Open-Access-Publikation im Sinne der CC-Lizenz BY-NC 4.0
of the narrator in Sund’s En lycklig liten ö are examined. It is important to note 
that Sund’s narrator is inspired by Walter Benjamin’s 7 1936 theoretical Essay, 
The Storyteller [Der Erzähler], which gives to the reader a special twist to his 
position as mediator. A close reading demonstrates the narrator’s attempts to 
provide an alternative point of view on shipwrecks for the reader. The outcome 
is a configuration of the shipwreck motif that opens up a new perspective on 
literature’s role in coping with collective traumas in today’s media culture. In 
this article it is argued that Lars Sund’s Novel En lycklig liten ö promotes a per-
spective of agency for the reader.
Spectators of Disasters or Observers of Accidents? 
Perspectives on Shipwrecks from Cultural Studies
One of the most prominent books on the iconic and metaphoric significance 
of shipwrecks in the field of cultural studies is Hans Blumenberg’s (2014 [1979]) 
Schiffbruch mit Zuschauer [Shipwreck with Spectator], a philosophical essay on 
the phenomenon of shipwrecks. The essay also offers a short history of ideas 
about shipwrecks, which makes it a central reference point within academic 
discourse dedicated to the topic.
In the present context Blumenberg’s remarks on the peak of shipwreck depic-
tions in the 18th century are most relevant here. Blumenberg argues that during 
the enlightenment metaphors from the field of theatre were combined with 
the notion of shipwreck as a philosophical thought experiment. The modern – 
mostly metaphorical – understanding of shipwrecks was thereby coined.8 It is 
important to note that a spectator [Zuschauer] in German is an aesthetic cate-
gory and is thought of as being part of an audience. In the scenario described by 
Blumenberg, the spectator watches the wrecking of a ship from a safe distance 
similar to people in chairs at a theatre or cinema. The event of a shipwreck, 
therefore, has characteristics of a thrilling show with a moral. Such shows are 
intended to remind the spectator of their safety. A good show should give rea-
son for the contemplation of life’s challenges. For this reason, Blumenberg has 
a specific scenario in mind: the shipwreck figures act as a metaphor for the 
precarity of life. While safe, the position of the spectator grants the opportunity 
 7 Walter Benjamin, “The Storyteller: Reflections on the Works of Nikolai Leskov,” in The 
Novel: An Anthology of Criticism and Theory 1900 – 2000, ed. Dorothy J. Hale (Malden, 
Mass.: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 362 – 378.
 8 Blumenberg, Schiffbruch mit Zuschauer, 51.
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to draw lessons about the constitution of human life. In this way, the wrecking 
of a ship in the eyes of a spectator is always a disaster.
Blumenberg’s history of ideas offers an initial method to frame shipwrecks 
for cultural analysis. Pictures and narratives where shipwrecks feature as dis-
asters intend to depict life changing moments. In literature, shipwreck scenes 
can easily rely on this metaphorical background. Shipwrecks function as nar-
ratological devices to indicate turning points within a story.9 This function 
applies the “shipwreck- with- spectator” scenario in a condensed form: the 
horrors of a shipwreck are sufficient as explanation for extreme changes in a 
protagonist’s way of life.
In the German discourse on shipwrecks a second method of framing 
an analysis on the cultural significance of them has occurred. The literary 
scholar Burkhardt Wolf 10 outlined in his paper Schiffbruch mit Beobachter the 
“shipwreck- with- observer” scenario, which provides an alternative perspec-
tive in cultural studies:11 Being a “Beobachter” is something different to being 
a “Zuschauer”, because “Beobachter” means observer. Observers are different, 
because they have an analytical task. The observer is searching for the traces 
of a shipwreck; he is also safe but not at all interested in entertainment. For 
this reason, the observer only counts the evidence of a shipwreck, because 
they want to calculate real risks and thereby avoid these risks in the future. 
It is the observer’s social task to evaluate and clarify security questions. The 
wrecking of a ship always features in the observer’s perspective as an accident. 
If the wrecking of a ship is an accident, then there might be mistakes that can 
be fixed. Accidents happen in routines and these routines can be improved.12
The scenario described by Wolf merely occurs on an extratextual level. It 
is nevertheless important in analysing depictions of shipwrecks in literature, 
because it underlines a parallel approach towards the scene of a shipwreck in 
modern times. Wolf focuses on the mnemonic function of texts. This function 
means that literary texts contain and distribute important memories. Rather 
than being a reminder of the precarity of life, the telling of shipwreck narratives 
 9 Thompson, “Introduction,” 5 – 7; Le Juez and Springer, “Introduction,” 2.
 10 Wolf, “Schiffbruch mit Beobachter.”
 11 In total Wolf offers four categories for the classification of shipwreck scenarios. He favours 
the “shipwreck- with- observer” scenario, but also includes Blumenberg’s “shipwreck- 
with- spectator” scenario. Besides these two, Wolf develops the “shipwreck- without- 
spectator” scenario and the “shipwreck- without- witnesses” scenario: Ibid., 22. The 
former means a dramatic account of a shipwreck missing, while the latter describes a 
case where almost no trace and only short records exist.
 12 Ibid., 38 – 39.
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shows a need for revision. Using the example of Homer’s Odyssey,13 Wolf argues 
that a literary text itself could be used as a tool in this revision. This ancient 
Greek text can be considered a source of knowledge with regard to seafaring. 
Going to sea is then considered something quite ordinary and not primarily a 
transgression of natural boundaries, as Blumenberg suggests.14
Based on the theoretical scenarios just presented, a shipwrecking is either a 
disaster or an accident. The classification depends on which perspective applies. 
‘Disaster’ and ‘accident’ are not interchangeable terms. In his cultural history 
of disaster, Katastrophen: Eine Kulturgeschichte vom 16. bis ins 21. Jahrhundert, 
historian Francois Walter explains that accidents are a phenomenon of indus-
trialisation.15 Accidents occur under daily routines and in working processes – 
they can be avoided by optimisation. On the other hand, disasters have an older 
history that originally connected them to the thought of a divine incident: if 
something ends in a disaster, the reason could be metaphysical. Furthermore, 
a disaster could be God’s punishment for human wrong- doing.16 Similarly, 
Walter suggests that the occurrence of World War I blurs the dividing line 
between these categories. As the first transnational catastrophe, World War I 
is considered to be caused by humanity itself and not by nature or God alone. 
The consequence still today is that feelings of guilt have a collective dimension, 
not an individual one.17
The Medialisation and Communication of Disasters
At the beginning of the 21st century a cultural pessimism about the role of media 
in the perception of disasters can be noted. Walter argues that the medialisation 
of disasters is the major cultural technique to cope with collective traumas.18 
For Walter, novels and especially movies are very helpful in processing disas-
trous events. During the 20th century, this cultural technique was increasingly 
used and in Walter’s opinion led to reduced effectiveness: limited to a screen, 
the medialisation of disasters nowadays lacks aesthetics and theodicy. The 
 13 Ibid., 12 – 21.
 14 Blumenberg, Schiffbruch mit Zuschauer, 9.
 15 François Walter, Katastrophen: Eine Kulturgeschichte vom 16. bis ins 21. Jahrhundert 
(Stuttgart: Reclam, 2010), 158.
 16 Ibid., 52.
 17 Ibid., 180.
 18 Ibid., 183.
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public is left in a state of disorientation and uncertainty.19 One can apply to 
Walter’s opinion the two perspectives on shipwrecking offered by Blumenberg 
and Wolf.20 Walter would certainly agree that the “observer” perspective, as 
described by Wolf, is the dominant method of perceiving disasters in all media 
nowadays. Not only shipwrecking, but every kind of disaster is more or less 
treated like an accident. Consequently, every difference in the representation 
of real and imaginary disasters on the level of visual media, especially, makes 
for example television news and motion pictures almost indistinguishable. For 
Walter, a feeling of safety is no longer guaranteed, because neither the observer 
nor the spectator is able to identify disastrous events as dangerous and process 
the experience accordingly.
In a less alarming tone than expressed by Walter 21 but also with concern for 
today’s handling of traumatic events by the media, is the Collaborative Research 
Centre 923, “Threatened Order – Societies under Stress” at the University of 
Tuebingen (funded by the German Research Foundation DFG, 2011 – 2015).22 
The Collaborative Research Centre was established in 2011 for the purpose of 
researching scenarios of threats, their social impact from a cultural studies 
perspective, and aims for new approaches to understand rapid social change.
One conclusion presented by the Collaborative Research Centre from the 
first funding period is that researching threats means evaluating how societies 
communicate them. The discourse about threats is labelled by the Collaborative 
Research Centre as threat- related communication (“Bedrohungskommunika-
tion”). According to the historians Ewald Frie and Mischa Meier 23 (from the 
team at the Collaborative Research Centre), a special focus on the conditions 
of success of such threat- related communication should be the object of study, 
because its establishment goes hand in hand with the declaration of threats 
by certain actors. Once a threat is declared, it is communicated in an effective 
manner, rapidly receives more attention than other topics, and discussions 
are mainly focused on arguments about (the lack of) time.24 These identified 
 19 Ibid., 285.
 20 Blumenberg, Schiffbruch mit Zuschauer; Wolf, “Schiffbruch mit Beobachter.”
 21 Walter, Katastrophen.
 22 The Collaborative Research Centre, “Threatened Order – Societies under Stress” con-
tinues its work in a second funding period from 2015 – 2019.
 23 Ewald Frie and Mischa Meier, “Bedrohte Ordnungen. Gesellschaften unter Stress im 
Vergleich,” in Aufruhr – Katastrophe – Konkurrenz – Zerfall. Bedrohte Ordnungen als 
Thema der Kulturwissenschaften, ed. Ewald Frie and Mischa Meier (Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck, 2014), 1 – 30.
 24 Ibid., 20 – 25.
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steps of communicating threats could be used to structure and compare case 
studies as well as to identify recurring patterns. The Collaborative Research 
Centre aims for such patterns, especially, in order to provide a data basis for 
future projects on the optimisation of threat- related communication patterns.25
The role of media has to be evaluated, as the corresponding arguments by 
Frie and Meier 26 and Walter 27 show. Both sides focus primarily on the news 
coverage. Literary Studies, however, can see this interest in medialisation as a 
chance to take a closer look at the literary representations of news and disas-
ters. Literature, as a special form of media, has the potential for medial self- 
reflection. The variety of narrative devices and their creative combination is 
literature’s strength. In this way, the analysis of motifs and their configuration – 
for example, the shipwreck – is of special interest.
Literature has a crucial part in shaping the way disasters are remembered. 
Astrid Erll, a scholar of literature and memory studies, argues in her introduc-
tion to Memory in Culture:
“The level of configuration is […] the key to literature’s role as a medium of cultural 
memory. It is here, that literary works bring together, reshape and restructure real 
and imaginary practices of remembering and forgetting. With their transition into 
the literary text, elements of cultural memory are separated from their original 
contexts and can be combined and arranged in novel ways, into new and different 
memory narratives”.28
On the one hand, in literature it follows that the recurring patterns of threat- 
related communication in the sense of “real and imaginary practices of remem-
bering and forgetting” might be present and identifiable. On the other hand, 
there is always the possibility that these patterns are also altered in literature 
in a lasting way. The “new and different memory narratives” result from such 
alterations and can be analysed by paying attention to the structures and meth-
ods of presentation in a literary text. This approach is favoured in the following 
close reading of Lars Sund’s 29 novel.
 25 Ibid., 27.
 26 Ibid.
 27 Walter, Katastrophen.
 28 Astrid Erll, Memory in Culture (Houndsmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 154.
 29 Sund, En lycklig liten ö.
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Storytelling against Death: The Importance  
of the Narrator in Lars Sund’s En lycklig liten ö
Already, the motto of Lars Sund’s 30 En lycklig liten ö indicates that this novel 
was written with some consciousness about literature’s self- reflexive potential 
and therefore offers a solid case to trace the configuration of the shipwreck 
motif. In Walter Benjamin’s 31 The Storyteller, the following is quoted in Swedish 
translation at the beginning of the novel: “Death is the sanction of everything 
the storyteller can tell”.32
At first glance, Benjamin’s essay seems as culturally pessimistic as the recent 
research about media and disaster. The essay is written under the impression 
of World War I. This war was still a historical singularity for Benjamin, and he 
argues that this singular event initiated the decline of narrating. For Benjamin, 
narrating consists mainly of the exchange of lived experience, but the war 
proved that lived experience is false. Nobody could imagine the war as it was 
on the basis of his or her previous lived experience.33
Benjamin claims that the emergence of information contributes to the decline 
of narrative. When everything is information and therefore a verified fact, not 
much remains (and might be fictionalised by the imagination of a narrator). 
The presence and accessibility of news media devalues the social relevance of 
narrative.34 These assumptions by Benjamin might be considered proof for 
Walter’s 35 analysis of the historical development of news coverage and the per-
ception of disasters in the 20th century. On the other hand, Benjamin follows 
another agenda in his essay. A culturally pessimistic commentary on the state 
of today’s world, as it is presented at the end of Walter’s History of Disaster, is 
not what Benjamin is aiming for. Rather, he sets out in an attempt to reanimate 
narrative by making a poignant argument: narrative is not supposed to die; 
narrative is alive by telling about death and mortality.36
In keeping with Benjamin, the social relevance of narrating is kept alive in 
the modern form of the novel. Novels, then, are an instrument of survival for 
 30 Ibid.
 31 Benjamin, “The Storyteller.”
 32 “Döden ger sanktion åt allt som berättaren kan skildra.”
 33 Benjamin’s argument could be considered confirmation for Walter’s thesis, that World 
War I was a historical turning point for the perception of disasters, as mentioned above 
(Walter, Katastrophen, 180; Benjamin, “The Storyteller,” 362 – 363).
 34 Benjamin, “The Storyteller,” 365 – 366.
 35 Walter, Katastrophen.
 36 Benjamin, “The Storyteller,” 373.
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the modern individual. Reading about another person’s life and death is what 
enables the modern individual to go on with his own life:
“The novel is significant, therefore, not because it presents someone else’s fate to us, 
perhaps didactically, but because this stranger’s fate by virtue of the flame which 
consumes it yields us the warmth which we never draw from, our fare. What draws 
the reader to the novel is the hope of warming his shivering life with a death he 
reads about”.37
In Benjamin’s view, the novel does not primarily have an educative function. 
Benjamin would probably refuse an all- too- clinical understanding of literature 
as ‘medicine’ to cope with collective traumas. In any case, Benjamin would not 
assume that recovery from trauma is possible; rather, the novel nourishes the 
hope of the modern individual to not be alone in the world.
Therefore, Benjamin does not aim for the optimisation of threat- related 
communication. From his point of view, identifying patterns for a better under-
standing of social change is not a main goal from a literary studies perspective 
on the narrator. The approach to literature as presented by the “shipwreck- 
with- observer” scenario would also be beyond the scope of such a perspective. 
Information about historical circumstances are secondary when it comes to close 
reading and its focus on structures and modes of presentation. Alternatively, 
Benjamin might favour the “shipwreck- with- spectator” scenario, because the 
‘thrill’ of the show might nourish hope for the modern individual. Speaking 
less in a metaphorical sense, one could also say that presenting an old motif 
in a new and altered way might appeal to a novel’s audience as well as provide 
a thought- provoking impulse.
Looking out for the Shipwreck in Lars Sund’s En lycklig liten ö
Lars Sund’s 38 novel En lycklig liten ö offers an interesting case with regard to the 
frames outlined in analysing cultural representations of shipwrecks, because an 
actual shipwreck is missing in the story. Neither the “observer” nor the “spec-
tator” scenario is easily applicable; rather, feelings of disorientation and uncer-
tainty in today’s medialised world are addressed in the novel using a complex 
 37 Ibid.
 38 Sund, En lycklig liten ö.
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narrative structure – inspired by Benjamin’s 39 The Storyteller – and references 
to several mythological and religious plot elements.
A complex and multi- referential piece of literature is already indicated by 
the novel’s original title: in Swedish, the title En lycklig liten ö sounds similar 
to the term ‘Lycksalighetens Ö’, which means fortunate island. The title bears 
another meaning besides the air of an idyll. This could be read as an important 
hint to ancient myths, where the fortunate isles are paradise- like places. Access 
to these mythological islands is exclusive to the not- living, who earned their 
place there through an exemplary or heroic lifestyle.40 Therefore, the island in 
the novel might not only be a place for a happy community, but might also be 
associated with an otherworld.
The novel starts with a separated introduction. In this introduction the mak-
ing of the following story is located on a computer screen. Rather than being 
just a technical device for receiving information, the computer screen is thereby 
also presented as a site of production. A third- person narrator describes how 
a person – called the scribe [“skrivaren”] – creates an imaginary world. In this 
way, the reader is presented at least two different possible sources for the story: 
a) the narrator, and b) the scribe. The narrator is the source of the story. This 
source does not seem to be identical to a second entity in the text, the so- called 
scribe; otherwise, the narrator would not, for example, talk about the scribe 
in the third person. On the other hand, it is apparent that the scribe writes the 
story. As indicated by the job description, his task is writing only. A scribe’s 
profession was always just to copy or lay down the words of others. Overall, 
the reader does not know who is responsible for the story that has been told.
This complex narrative structure becomes even more confusing because of 
an added layer of references, especially to the Bible. For example, the first sen-
tence of the introduction echoes Genesis: “In the beginning, the screen was 
blank and empty and the scribe’s fingers rested on the keyboard”.41 Analogies 
like this are expanded on throughout the following pages of the introduction. 
As the text proceeds, a description is given of how the scribe types and in doing 
so first creates the sky of an imaginary place. Then the sea is created before 
the land, and the plants and all the animals come into being Finally, the first 
human in the narrative is set in place and called Adam. The introduction ends 
 39 Benjamin, “The Storyteller.”
 40 Volkmar Billig, Inseln. Geschichte einer Faszination (Berlin: Matthes & Seitz, 2010), 
27 – 28.
 41 “I begynnelsen låg datorskärmen öde och tom och skrivarens fingrar vilade på tang-
entbordet.” Sund, En lycklig liten ö, 7.
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with Adam lying unconscious on the beach. The scribe or the narrator or both, 
therefore, have explicit god- like features in this story.
Following the introduction, the first chapter begins with an e- mail that 
contains a police report about the discovery of a male corpse. It is easy for the 
reader to conclude that the corpse is the deceased Adam, who is known from 
the introduction of the novel.
There are several e- mails in the narrative, which are marked typographically. 
These e- mails enable the narrator to show his ambiguity and his detachment 
from the scribe as in the scene, for example, where the narrator comments on 
the e- mails written by a policeman:
“With the help of electronic devices, we can intercept and read his messages in the 
police’s internal network, even if such an act is illegal and the scribe risks a charge 
for hacking. Sheriff Riggert von Haartman’s thoughts we are by contrast not able 
to intercept with electronic or other devices. We can’t see through his eyes”.42
In this quote, the narrator explicitly claims he is not identical to the scribe, 
because only the scribe could face prosecution for hacking. At the same time, 
the narrator includes the reader using the personal pronoun “we” in his mis-
deeds of privacy violation. By using “we”, the narrator implies that he witnesses 
scenes in the novel along with the reader. Furthermore, the narrator states his 
inability to give insight into the policeman’s thoughts. The narrator’s statement 
about his inability to look inside the head also shows the unreliability of the 
narrator. In other instances, the narrator is able to tell completely what the 
characters are thinking about.
Throughout the novel in its entirety, the narrator uses markers of reality to 
provide a feeling of familiarity with the narrated world in a two- fold way. On 
the one hand, the narrator refers to a contemporary state of technology and 
consequently, to the daily life of the reader. On the other hand, he addresses 
the collective memory. It is part of the narrative strategy in Lars Sund’s En lyck-
lig liten ö to confront the reader with elements of the past. Several disastrous 
events such as the sinking of the ferry Estonia for example, and also the reac-
tor breaking down in Chernobyl occurred in the narrated world. This strategy 
 42 “Med hjälp av elektronisk utrustning kan vi fånga upp och läsa hans meddelanden i 
polisens interna datornät, trots att ett dylikt förfarande är lagstridgt och skrivaren ris-
kerar åtal för dataintrång. Länsman Riggert von Haartmans tankar är vi däremot inte 
i stånd att uppfånga med elektroniska eller andra medel. Vi kan inte se genom hans 
ögon.” Ibid., 125.
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becomes most apparent in a chapter about the dreams of the island inhabit-
ants.43 At this point in the story the islanders show a clear tendency towards 
racist attitudes as more and more corpses arrive on the island.
Accordingly, when a politician dreams of being visited by a man speaking 
German, a reference to the Shoah might at first be implicit for the reader: “KD 
Mattson dreamed about a man with a white long beard and black suit, who 
entered his kitchen, bowed and uttered: Wie Sie sind, waren wir auch einmals 
[sic!]. The man bowed again and just stood and waited”.44 The phrase ‘like you, 
we once have been’ could be understood as a comparison to the population of 
Nazi Germany, which may be the most present entity of collective memory at 
this point in the narration. Close to the end of the novel another explanation 
is revealed in a speech by a chaplain:
“On medieval pictures that depict the devastating plague you see often the dead 
greeting the still- alive with the words: ‘Like you, we once have been. Like us, you 
will once be’. In front of Death we humans are all alike, death is our common fate 
no matter where we are from, which skin color we have, what language we speak. 
We all have the right to be treated equal, regardless being dead or alive”.45
The sentence in German, which is already familiar to the reader from the dream-
ing scene, is reproduced in Swedish by the chaplain. This central sentence is fol-
lowed by another: “Like you, we once have been. Like us, you will once be”. Both 
sentences together point to the universality of death, as the chaplain explains. 
It is the tradition of the late medieval Dance of Death that comes into play 
and is reactivated in order to advertise the ideas of equality and Christian love.
As a motif, the Dance of Death is far more important than the shipwreck in 
Lars Sund’s En lycklig liten ö. This twist is important to note – that is, tension 
is built up through the entire novel as the search for the missing shipwreck 
 43 The corpses in this chapter are called “strangers.” The term “strangers” marks not only 
the alterity between the living and the dead but also the opposition between the island’s 
‘own’ people and the ‘others’ from outside the island.
 44 “KD Mattsson drömde om en karl med vitt tovigt skägg och svart kostym, som steg in 
hans kök, bugade sig och yttrade: Wie Sie sind, waren wir auch einmals [sic!]. Mannen 
bugade sig en gång till och ställde sig att vänta.” Sund, En lycklig liten ö, 145 – 146.
 45 “På medeltida bildar som skildrar pestens härjningar ser man ofta de döda hälsa de 
ännu levande med orden: ‘Såsom ni är har vi också varit. Såsom vi är ska ni också bli’. 
Inför döden är vi människor lika, döden är vårt gemensamma öde oberoende av vari-
från vi kommer, vilken hudfärg vi än har, vilket språk vi än talar. Vi har alla rätt att bli 
behandlade lika, oavsett om vi är döda eller levande.” Ibid., 278.
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is followed. The reader accompanies the characters and probably identifies 
with them, as one is likely to want to know the reason for the corpses on the 
beach. While identifying with the characters and searching for a metaphysical 
or technological reason, the reader is free to choose to take either the role of 
the “spectator”,46 the “observer” 47 or both alternately. Descriptions of an awful 
disaster are nevertheless missing, so the reader as a spectator may become 
disappointed from time to time. Hard evidence, which enables the avoidance 
of further accidents, is also not present in the narrative. Every investigation 
performed by an observer leads to nothing.
Regardless of with whom the reader identifies and which role is taken, the 
active search for an explanation may result in frustration. An explanation is 
already given in the introductory chapter, when the first dead body is created 
by the scribe without any shipwreck. In this god- like act the first character is 
simply created without life.
Even if death is omnipresent in the entire novel and, according to its motto, 
giving sanctions to everything the narrator might tell, the assumption of a pes-
simistic world view would not fit. Rather, the exposure of the Dance of Death 
motif points more towards an attempt to create a memento mori through the 
telling of this story. For a memento mori, not only is consciousness regarding 
death central, but remembering the dead also becomes a meaningful demand. 
In the context of the novel this demand is executed by way of the several refer-
ences to collective memory. These references are crucial for the configuration 
of both motifs: the Dance of Death and the shipwreck.
At the same time, the novel follows Benjamin’s essayistic thought that memory 
is the opposite to death and therefore an important part of narration. According 
to Benjamin, a narration always contains memory, which has a counteracting 
effect on the power of death: “Only by virtue of a comprehensive memory can 
epic writing absorb the course of events on the one hand and, with the pass-
ing of these, make its peace with the power of death on the other”.48 Through 
traditions, as Benjamin continues, an intertextual web is created, which entails 
memory and is characteristic of literature. The narrator’s speech in En lycklig 
liten ö can be considered a plea for the social relevance of literature, because the 
traditions of the shipwreck and Dance of Death motif, and also their human-
istic potential are reactivated.
 46 Blumenberg, Schiffbruch mit Zuschauer.
 47 Wolf, “Schiffbruch mit Beobachter.”
 48 Benjamin, “The Storyteller,” 370 – 371.
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The Prospect of Agency for the Reader
Lars Sund’s 49 novel En lycklig liten ö offers what the news on the screen lacks, 
according to Francois Walter’s 50 cultural history of disaster. The several refer-
ences to religious motifs open up theodical questions – for example, why does 
evil exist in this world? Why do people have to suffer? And why do the god- like 
narrator and scribe create a paradisiacal ‘happy little island’ just to confront its 
inhabitants with the horror of death? Herein the aesthetic dimension arises: 
the nominated questions result on the one hand from the novel’s intertextual 
references to the Bible; on the other, the explicit comments on the almightiness 
of the writer are part of a metaperspective on narrativity. The novel provides 
such a perspective in order to highlight problems of contemporary news cov-
erage and threat- related communication. For example, one journalist in the 
story even doubts her profession. In place of informing people, she has the 
feeling of contributing to a never- ending flood of Information: “Besides, I have 
started wondering, if reporting has any benefit. Sure, people become indig-
nant, if one exposes injustice and suffering, but they forget so quickly. We are 
overwhelmed by information, but at the same time it seems that we know less 
and less”.51 This journalist expresses a feeling of powerlessness. It seems that the 
narrator of the novel literally takes the reader by the hand in order that they 
overcome their feelings of disorientation and uncertainty. The use of “we” by 
the narrator draws the reader up to the level of his metaperspective – to see the 
events ‘from above’. Nevertheless, the reader faces a complex narrative structure 
that calls attention to the way these events are represented. It remains unclear 
whoever tells the story. Therefore, the theodical question – traditionally tied 
to disasters like shipwrecks – gets transformed in Lars Sund’s En lycklig liten ö. 
The question is not who or what is responsible for the suffering; rather, it is 
who or what is causing attention to it. A question such as this points towards 
an analysis of the ways threats and disasters are communicated, as suggested 
by the Collaborative Research Centre – that is, “threatened order”.52 However, 
the metaperspective offered by the novel is not necessarily a good source for 
generalisations regarding such communication, because it imitates this com-
 49 Sund, En lycklig liten ö.
 50 Walter, Katastrophen.
 51 “Dessutom har jag börjat undra om alla reportage tjänar någonting till. Visst blir folk 
upprörda när man exponerar orättvisor och lidande, men de glömmer lika snabbt. Vi 
överöses med information, men samtidigt verkar det som om vi vet allt mindre.” Sund, 
En lycklig liten ö, 243.
 52 Frie and Meier, “Bedrohte Ordnungen.”
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munication for aesthetic purposes. As an alternative, the novel offers an essay-
istic approach, which is in keeping with Benjamin’s 53 thoughts on narrating.
In En lycklig liten ö the narrator draws from collective memory in several ways 
to pose and transform theodical questions. At the same time, the traditions of 
the shipwreck and Dance of Death motif are revived and configured. A close 
reading illustrates that the reader can neither take the role of the ‘spectator’54 
nor the ‘observer’55. Mortality levels the hierarchy between the ‘spectator’/‘ob-
server’ and the victims of a sinking ship. This levelling of hierarchies confronts 
the reader with his/her own agency, because without the established roles the 
reader must actively look for a new perspective to take hold of. Perhaps the 
memento mori even motivates one to engage politically with the issue of the 
drowning migrants in the Mediterranean Sea. A change of perspectives is the 
prospect, which fictional genres like the novel can provide.
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Florian Peters
Rethinking History and Memory in the Transformation Era:  
How Solidarity’s Struggle for History  
Shaped Recent Polish Conflicts over the Past
“The best thing would be if we never had to hear about that guy anymore”.1 
This recent comment on Lech Wałęsa by Jacek Bartyzel, a Polish sociologist 
and former activist of the anti- communist opposition movement, may come 
as a surprise for many who remember the legendary Solidarity chairman and 
Nobel Peace Prize laureate as an icon of Polish self- liberation from communist 
rule. But Bartyzel is anything but alone with this view: since new documents 
on Wałęsa’s cooperation with the communist state security service surfaced 
in January 2017, right- wing media and academics supporting the current gov-
ernment of Jarosław Kaczyński’s “Law and Justice” (PiS) party have launched 
a full- blown smear campaign against the country’s former president. Taking 
opportunity of the long- known fact that Wałęsa, then a politically inexperi-
enced 27-year- old electrician, had been registered as informer “Bolek” by state 
security after the bloody crushing of the Gdańsk uprising in December 1970, 
and deliberately ignoring that he had terminated cooperation by 1976 at the 
latest, they eagerly attempt to question his place in history books.2
What is at stake in these attacks on Wałęsa is much more than the personal 
integrity of the erstwhile Solidarity leader; it is the established legacy of the 
democratic opposition movement of the 1980s as a whole. Thus, the campaign 
reflects a fundamental division in Polish society about how the collapse of 
communism and the creation of post- socialist Poland are to be interpreted 
and remembered. While liberals take pride in Poland’s leading role in the fall 
of Eastern European communism and see the unprecedented Round Table 
negotiations between government and opposition representatives in 1989 as 
 1 Jacek Bartyzel, “Oni bronią siebie, swojej fałszywej legendy,” wPolityce.pl, February, 
2017, http://wpolityce.pl/polityka/325780-prof- bartyzel- o- obroncach- walesy- oni- bronia- 
siebie- swojej- falszywej- legendy.
 2 Wałęsa had apparently tried, more or less skilfully, to outwit state security, but still got 
entangled in its nets, at least temporarily. For a matter- of- fact review of new informa-
tion on Wałęsa’s early cooperation with the security service, see Jan Skórzyński, “Od 
informatora do kontestatora. Akta “Bolka” – próba lektury,” Wolność i Solidarność 9, 
(2016), 7 – 25.
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the door opener to peaceful transition throughout the region, more and more 
conservatives tend to believe that the Polish way out of communism was in 
fact overshadowed by treason. They take the Round Table talks for an elite 
conspiracy driven by secret police and the subsequent economic “shock ther-
apy” for a betrayal of the heroic anti- communist workers’ upheaval staged by 
Solidarity in 1980/81.3
Although such views have only gained the status of a government- supported 
master narrative after the coming to power of PiS in 2015,4 they are by no means 
new. Already back in 1989, more radical opposition activists felt betrayed by 
the Solidarity elites’ decision to negotiate with the communists, because they 
were longing for a true anti- communist revolution that would see the “com-
mies” hanging on the trees rather than sitting at negotiation tables. Additional 
doubts were raised by the hardships of the neoliberal transformation pursued 
by the first non- communist government of Tadeusz Mazowiecki and Leszek 
Balcerowicz, which struck most harshly the industrial working class employed 
in big state factories, while offering a lot of new business opportunities for for-
mer communist nomenclature members. As David Ost has pointed out, social 
conflicts aroused by the economic transformation failed to find representation 
in the emerging political culture of post- socialism, so popular anger frequently 
turned into clashes over identity issues.5 History and memory, which had been 
major fields of political combat between the opposition movement and the 
communist party- state before 1989, resurfaced as a divisive political cleavage at 
the end of the 1990s, when right- wing parties throughout East- Central Europe 
promoted lustration as a means to bring to an end the anti- communist revo-
 3 For an overview of the divisive politics of memory of 1989 throughout East- Central 
Europe, see James Mark, Muriel Blaive, Adam Hudek, Anna Saunders, and Stanisław 
Tyszka, “1989 After 1989. Remembering the End of State Socialism in East- Central 
Europe,” in Thinking through Transition. Liberal Democracy, Authoritarian Pasts, and 
Intellectual History in East Central Europe After 1989, ed. Michal Kopeček and Piotr 
Wciślik (Budapest and New York: CEU Press, 2015), 463 – 503.
 4 In August 2016, the official promotional website Poland.pl run by the Polish Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs with the objective to show foreigners “all that is fascinating, extraor-
dinary and beautiful about our country”, did not hesitate to publish an English version 
of the lengthy article, “A controlled revolution” by Rzeczpospolita journalist Konrad 
Kołodziejski, who explained that there may have even been something like a revolution 
in 1989, but if so, it was initiated and controlled by the KGB aiming at securing economic 
power for the communist elites: Konrad Kołodziejski, “A controlled revolution,” Poland.
pl, August, 2016, https://poland.pl/politics/foreign- affairs/controlled- revolution/.
 5 David Ost, The Defeat of Solidarity: Anger and Politics in Post- communist Europe ( Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2005).
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lution that many of their voters considered unfinished before.6 Evidently, this 
cleavage continues to provide resources for right- wing populists like Viktor 
Orbán in Hungary and Jarosław Kaczyński in Poland until today: both suc-
ceeded in channelling unfulfilled ambitions by promising a radical break not 
only with communism, but also with anything looking or seeming alike – that 
is, the whole post- socialist democratic system allegedly built on compromise 
with “the reds”, including former opposition leaders and liberals who had been 
ready for such temporary compromises.
In order to understand why such radical re- interpretations of the Polish way 
out of communism – which may seem to be obscure conspiracy theories when 
seen from outside – indeed appear convincing to noticeable parts of Polish 
society, I propose a closer look at how Poles perceived history and memory 
on the eve of the transformation era. During the 1980s, which saw both the 
most powerful collectivist mass mobilisation in contemporary European his-
tory (1980/81) and the swiftest turn to a neoliberal transformation strategy 
(1989), social perceptions and concepts of historical agency had been seriously 
challenged and reconfigured. I argue that these radical shifts in perception of 
the ongoing crisis have set the stage for the ways Poles think of the transfor-
mation era to date.
My point of departure, therefore, is the considerable change taking place 
in Polish society during the last decade of state socialism, which separates 
Solidarity of 1980/81 from the Round Table transformation in 1989, but which 
is hardly present in the liberal master narrative of national self- liberation that 
has been dominating Polish public discourse for the last 25 years. If you walk 
through the main exhibition of the flagship European Solidarity Centre, which 
was opened in Gdańsk in 2014, you will experience a smooth trajectory of pro-
gress leading from Solidarity in 1980 to the “triumph of freedom” in 1989 (as 
the exhibit’s final room is called). The years of martial law and thereafter, when 
Solidarity had been effectively crushed and the underground opposition was 
fading, are presented in a mode of dramatic suspense – that is, as a time of per-
sistence, not of transition and reconfiguration. Yet, Solidarity in 1989 was not 
the same as it had been before martial law. From a trade union deeply rooted 
in collectivist working class culture, it had transformed into a political move-
ment dominated by reform- minded liberal intellectuals. It is this improbable 
evolution from collapse to victory, and the ambiguous and contradictory devel-
 6 James Mark, The Unfinished Revolution: Making Sense of the Communist Past in Central- 
Eastern Europe (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010).
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opments that made it possible, that have made these years of crisis a subject of 
political contestation to date.
Instead of suggesting a story of the betrayal of “true Poles” by liberal intellec-
tuals, or indulging in speculations on a conspiracy between opposition leaders 
and the communist secret service (as it is commonplace in right- wing discourse), 
I propose an investigation into the fissured evolution of the contemporary inter-
pretation frameworks of social change, which I consider crucial for the course 
of events preceding 1989. They become most obvious when focussing on his-
tory and memory culture, the political significance of which makes for much 
of the specificity of the demise of communism in Poland. More generally, this 
approach tries to illuminate how the remembrance of the past can influence 
the construction of political agency, and how both modes of remembering and 
concepts of historical change may change in response to crisis.
Solidarity’s Struggle for History
Historical consciousness had been at the cradle of Solidarity. While vast major-
ities of society in the Soviet Union under Brežnev, in “normalised” Czechoslo-
vakia under Husák, or in the GDR under Honecker experienced late socialism 
as an era of stagnation where “everything was forever, until it was no more”, as 
Alexei Yurchak has put it retrospectively,7 the Polish opposition movement could 
build upon markedly different perceptions of time and historicity prevalent in 
Polish society. By modelling itself on the experiences of Polish uprisings and 
resistance movements from the 19th century to communist times, it succeeded 
to break up what Václav Havel had considered the most important means of 
power in late socialism: the omnipresent feeling of timeless powerlessness.8 
History facilitated the integration of diverse social groups like workers and 
intelligentsia, and helped to articulate the widespread but somewhat diffuse 
discontent stemming from the deep economic crisis in a genuinely political 
way. Since the late 1970s, the rather elitist counter- culture of drugi obieg (second 
circulation) pioneered in replacing experiences of powerlessness by offering 
podmiotowość (subject agency) to its participants, and from August 1980 mil-
lions of Poles from all spheres of society were provided with a sixteen- month 
 7 Alexei Yurchak, Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More: The Last Soviet Gener-
ation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006).
 8 Vaclav Havel, The Power of the Powerless (1978), accessed January 23, 2018, http://
vaclavhavel.cz/showtrans.php?cat=clanky&val=72_aj_clanky.html&typ=HTML.
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experience of collective agency by the nationwide grass- roots movement of 
Solidarity. Historical remembrance became part and parcel of the struggle 
between the opposition movement and the communist regime.9
The urge to defy the state’s monopoly on interpreting national history was not 
a compensatory side effect of oppositional activities – quite the contrary. When 
opposition activists dared to make their first steps out of private flats into the 
public space of Polish cities, they did so by organising alternative remembrance 
ceremonies dedicated to Poland’s Independence Day, to the Warsaw Uprising 
of 1944, and to the Gdańsk Workers’ upheaval of December 1970.10 When the 
Gdańsk shipyard workers started to negotiate with regime representatives in 
August 1980, one of their first demands was to erect a monument for their col-
leagues killed ten years before.11 When sociologists asked rank- and- file members 
of the “independent, self- governed trade union”, which had been established 
after the Gdańsk agreements, about Solidarity’s most burning issues, 77 % of 
respondents answered that the union should give special priority to spreading 
“knowledge on the true history of Poland”. Support for this goal was only slightly 
outnumbered by postulates for “economic reform” (80 %) and “sovereignty 
of the country” (79 %). In contrast, both the core issues of Eastern European 
dissidents, human and civic rights, and typical labour objectives like material 
advancements and self- governance by workers, ranked considerably lower.12
Generally speaking, Solidarity supporters did not dream of liberal democracy 
or even capitalism, nor did they reject socialist values, especially working- class 
values. Rather, they sought to combine the latter with religious and national 
elements in an eclectic melange, advocating some kind of “socialism with a 
divine face”.13 Solidarity was not a lobby group for economic or political inter-
 9 Jan Kubik, The Power of Symbols against the Symbols of Power: The Rise of Solidarity 
and the Fall of State Socialism in Poland (University Park: Penn State University Press, 
1994); Barbara Törnquist- Plewa, The Wheel of Polish Fortune: Myths in Polish Collective 
Consciousness during the First Years of Solidarity (Lund: Lund University, 1992).
 10 Kubik, Power of Symbols, 163 – 182; Aandrzej Friszke, Czas KOR-u. Jacek Kuroń a geneza 
Solidarności (Krakow: Znak, 2011), 458 – 473.
 11 Florian Peters, Revolution der Erinnerung. Der Zweite Weltkrieg in der Geschichtskultur 
des spätsozialistischen Polen (Berlin: Ch. Links Verlag, 2016) 120 – 121.
 12 These opinion polls were carried out in August 1981 by a group of Warsaw sociologists 
involved with the union’s Centre for Social Research: Andrzej Radźko, Sprawy pod-
stawowe w oczach członków Związku. Badania opinii członków Związku sierpień 1981 
(Warsaw: Ośrodek Badań Społecznych, 1981), I.
 13 Michał Łuczewski, “Solidarność: socjalizm z boską twarzą,” in Polska Solidarności. 
Kontrowersje, oblicza, interpretacje, ed. Jacek Kloczkowski (Krakow: Ośrodek Myśli 
Politycznej, 2011), 217 – 244.
79Rethinking History and Memory in the Transformation Era
Open-Access-Publikation im Sinne der CC-Lizenz BY-NC 4.0
ests of particular societal groups, but conceived of itself as a collective subject 
of history. It called for no more or no less than the restoration of its right to 
self- governance – primarily in the sphere of production, but at least implic-
itly on a national level too. Its historical thinking was inclusive, collectivist 
and deeply rooted in the linear concept of history characteristic of modernity. 
When philosopher and priest Józef Tischner preached to the delegates of the 
first nationwide congress of Solidarity in September 1981 that “at the turning 
points of history, the basic truths are common ones”, it was more than obvi-
ous to everyone present that the pure existence of the union was to be seen as 
such – a “turning point of history”.14
Consequently, most union members would have had great difficulty in under-
standing the taunting undertone of Timothy Garton Ash’s contemporary assess-
ment that “Solidarity’s best product were monuments”, whereas its achievements 
in terms of economic reform and manifest material improvements turned out 
meagre.15 For millions of Solidarity supporters, the monument projects initiated 
by the union immediately after its legalisation, especially the Monument of the 
Fallen Shipyard Workers erected at the gates of the Gdańsk Lenin shipyard in 
December 1980, were much more than just symbolic representations of past 
events; rather, they bridged the past and present by reassuring the notion of 
the historicity of present events. By establishing a direct link between Solidarity 
and Polish national history, these monuments served as permanent manifesta-
tions of the historic subjectivity of the movement. Their purpose was to counter 
the state monopoly on history, which was rightly considered a cornerstone of 
state socialism’s “superstructure”. It is no wonder, then, that the gigantic crosses 
erected in Gdańsk and Poznań did not fall short of the monumentality typical 
for state socialist cultures of remembrance.
But Solidarity’s remarkable commitment to history resembled communist 
references to the past not only with regard to aesthetics. Ironically enough, it 
drew heavily from a concept of collective agency that had been most ardently 
promoted by Marxism – before it had been frozen in the authoritative dis-
course of late socialism. Communists always strove to legitimate their rule in 
historical terms, and they did so with special devotion in Poland, consistently 
mixing up national and class elements.16 Their efforts in historical legitimation 
 14 Józef Tischner, “Czas zakorzenia,” AS. Agencja Solidarności 40 (1981), 26 – 28.
 15 Timothy Garton Ash, The Polish Revolution: Solidarity 1980 – 82 (London: Cape, 1983), 
278.
 16 Marcin Zaremba, Komunizm, legitymizacja, nacjonalizm. Nacjonalistyczna legitymizacja 
władzy komunistycznej w Polsce (Warsaw: Trio, 2001).
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reached new peaks towards the end of the 1970s, since both the future- oriented 
promises of Stalinism and the presentist paradigm of consumer socialism had 
failed. Solidarity challenged communist politics of history with a fresh belief in 
collective agency, but essentially it shared the party’s deeply collectivist vision 
of history. Both communist and oppositional master narratives merged class 
and nation into one single principal subject of historical change, with the work-
ing class as a prime mover, but the nation gradually getting the upper hand.17
The more polarised the political conflict between Solidarity and the party- 
state grew, the fiercer both sides competed for the title of the better advocate 
of the Polish nation by referring to traditional heroic- martyrological narra-
tives. Namely, the communist regime sought to link the national self- image of 
Polish fighting “for your and our freedom” to the foundation myth of “People’s 
Poland” based on Soviet liberation from fascism as well as on the “regaining” 
of former German territories in the West and North. Oppositional counter- 
narratives emphasised the long- standing Polish tradition of resistance against 
any foreign domination and demanded investigation into the so called “blank 
spots” in Polish- Soviet history. Instead of questioning the way Polish commu-
nists approached history, the opposition activists fought for the integration of 
new elements into the old discursive framework. Most notably, they sought to 
integrate Soviet oppression (like the massacre of Katyń) into the martyrological 
narrative that was until then focused on Nazi oppression, and also to include 
the record of the non- communist Armia Krajowa into the heroic narrative of 
Polish wartime resistance.
This polarisation of official and alternative politics of history grew even deeper 
after general Jaruzelski’s imposition of martial law in December 1981, which 
effectively crushed Solidarity as a working- class mass organisation. The forced 
retreat of the opposition from open labour unionism to clandestine structures 
suggested diverse references to experiences in Polish national history deemed 
more or less comparable, especially to the underground resistance movement 
during the Second World War. At the same time, the sudden fall of Solidarity 
reinforced romanticist notions of continuous fighting in spite of successive 
material defeats. These historical references gave consolation and offered a 
shelter for intellectual retreat, thus contributing significantly to the remarkable 
persistence of the opposition spirit throughout the 1980s.
 17 The insightful discussion of nation and class as converging subjects of post- Stalinist his-
torical narratives by Pavel Kolář, Der Poststalinismus. Ideologie und Utopie einer Epoche 
(Cologne: Böhlau, 2016), 143 – 177.
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On the other hand, the generals of Jaruzelski’s martial law regime did not 
even attempt a substantial roll- back in the politics of history, but rather reacted 
to the evident lack of popular support with a further shift from socialist tra-
ditions towards the national paradigm. In reaction to bottom- up initiatives 
that had popped up in 1980/81 and demanded adequate remembrance of the 
Warsaw Uprising of 1944, the Jaruzelski regime tried to take over the initiative 
and allowed for various activities in this field. Among these was a large- scale 
photo exhibition with ambient sound and light installations, which attracted 
more than two million visitors in 1982 and the erection of the iconic Monument 
of the Little Insurgent at the Warsaw Old Town walls in 1983. The competition 
between official and alternative remembrance culminated in sustained quarrels 
on the establishment of a museum and a prestigious monument for the upris-
ing.18 While the monument was finally erected in 1989, the museum was not 
opened until 2004, after future Polish president Lech Kaczyński had launched an 
initiative to fulfil this idea. There is good reason to conclude that the struggles 
and the overall convergence of interpretations during the last decade of state 
socialism were crucial in facilitating the ascension of the Warsaw Uprising to 
an undisputed cornerstone of post- socialist politics of remembrance.
The Rise of Memory as a Response to Crisis
For the time being, however, the competing historical narratives contributed to 
deepen the impasse Polish society found itself in after martial law: the regime 
was in power but lacked popular support to cope with the deep economic and 
social crisis, while the underground opposition succeeded in retaining the 
myth of Solidarity but remained unable to challenge the regime’s power base. 
As time passed since the suppression of the legal Solidarity union and hopes 
for its reconstruction dwindled, the underground’s incessant references to the 
national insurrection tradition tended to turn into empty pathetic formula, 
thus increasingly resembling the phraseology of party- state rituals of remem-
brance. The efforts of both sides to outperform the other in terms of historical 
remembrance turned increasingly compensatory and showed but a lack of real 
political options and ideas. History had transformed from a major instigator 
of social mobilisation to a symptom of stagnation.
Around the middle of the decade, the reactions to the evident crisis of the 
opposition’s political project started to diverge: some fractions of opposition 
 18 Peters, Revolution der Erinnerung, 311 – 337.
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supporters barricaded themselves in grim defence of the national collective 
they had seen embodied in Solidarity and demonstrated their anti- Soviet rad-
icalism with increasing ostentation. Others grew more and more weary of the 
deadlocked national- romantic conceptions of past and present prevalent in 
both official and alternative culture. Intellectual elites as well as some of the 
younger opposition activists disbanded the revolution myth repeated by the 
older generation and resorted to new, individualist conceptions of identity 
and historical agency. The discovery of “I” offered an attractive way out of the 
clear- cut distinctions of “them” and “us”.
This paradigm shift had varied disguises: it became visible in the grow-
ing appeal of subcultures like rock and punk, in ironic attitudes cultivated 
by art students at the happenings of the Pomarańczowa Alternatywa (Orange 
Alternative), but also in the graffiti and slogans painted onto the walls of Polish 
towns. An attentive observer stated that, while political slogans had definitely 
dominated up until the mid-1980s, “nowadays it is individuals who doodle on 
the walls, longing to express their individualism”.19 The radical rejection of any 
collectivist concept of agency was summarised by a slogan painted on a Gdańsk 
wall in 1989: “There won’t be any revolution here – down with everybody!”.20
A more sophisticated way of opposing the collectivism cultivated by the 
older opposition milieus was developed by intellectuals, who adapted ideas of 
neoliberal thinkers like Friedrich August von Hayek or Milton Friedman and 
propagated individual entrepreneurship as a way to regain agency vis- à- vis 
the overwhelming power of the communist state.21 This shift of attention to 
economic problems went along with a resolute rejection of both revolutionary 
conceptions of collective action and the historically- grounded underground 
rhetoric dominant during martial law. Instead, opposition liberals like the 
Cracow philosopher Mirosław Dzielski and the Gdańsk liberals group led 
by Donald Tusk argued for a compromise between the opposition and the 
communist regime, which was to be based on economic liberties rather than 
on political freedom. Others, like historian of ideas Marcin Król, adapted the 
concept of “civil society” that circulated among Western social scientists of the 
 19 The anonymous author conceded that this trend did not affect the issues of “erotics, ado-
lescence, military service and football,” the frequency of which, as could be expected, was 
not subject to any noteworthy changes: R., “Czas alternatywy. O napisach na murach,” 
Brulion (1989): 144 – 145.
 20 Ibid., 145.
 21 Konrad Knoch, Pisma liberalne drugiego obiegu w Polsce w latach 1979 – 1990 (Warsaw: 
IPN, 2015) 233 – 234, 261 ff.
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time, and envisaged it as a realm of fresh air sharply opposed to the musty fug 
of “historic- symbolic community”. As Król put it in a 1987 essay:
“A person who has once breathed in fresh air, who has learned to live as a citizen, 
may admittedly be ready to visit a Polish historic- symbolic stage performance one 
more time, but the time he has to spend between church and national theatre will 
be empty and lost for him”. 22
While this intellectual re- orientation marked a turning away from history as 
a dimension of present- day politics, it added momentum to individualist and 
subjectivist approaches to the past that transcended the frames of national col-
lectivity. One of the most visible aspects of this change was the distinct trend 
to rediscover the forgotten history and culture of the Polish Jews in the second 
half of the 1980s.23 Many students and young academics began to learn Yiddish, 
delved into Jewish literature, or got involved in cleaning up Jewish cemeteries. 
Sociologist Paweł Śpiewak explained in a clear- sighted contemporary article:
“First of all, the new generation longs to be free and feels free – from tradition, 
from the heritage of their ancestors, from the sanctuaries of their fathers. […] 
The young people who submerge into Jewish culture also want to be free from 
celebrating Polishness, from its priests and iconoclasts. […] They want to be 
inside this culture the same way they want to get to know the cultures of India 
or America; they want to know Judaism the same way they want to get to know 
Buddhism or medieval Christian mysticism. They want the world to be their 
home, not Poland”.24
These young Poles consciously disengaged themselves from the notion of histor-
ical continuity, which dominated both official and alternative visions of history. 
They did not cling to the concept of history as a linear, meaningful link between 
past, present, and future, but conceived it as a loose combination of manifold 
individual experiences, the directions and ends of which were neither defined 
nor known. Rather than heroes and martyrs, whose posthumous fame rested 
upon their outstanding contributions to their own collectivities, their inter-
est instead was directed towards the victims of history. In short, the nascent 
 22 Marcin Król, “Inny kraj,” Res Publica (1987): 23.
 23 Michael C. Steinlauf, Bondage to the Dead: Poland and the Memory of the Holocaust 
(Syracuse: University Press, 1997), 98 – 106.
 24 Paweł Śpiewak, “Dlaczego Żydzi,” Res Publica (1987): 20.
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remembrance of Polish Jewry and the Holocaust in late socialist Poland can 
be seen as a precursor of the emergence of a self- reflective, victimising culture 
of memory. Paralleling similar processes taking place in Western Europe and 
North America at the same time, this new, subjectifying mode of referring to 
the past challenged the universalistic, objectifying concept of history, which 
had been characteristic of modernity by that time.25
Indeed, developments in Poland were partly instigated by impulses from 
abroad as, for example, Claude Lanzmann’s controversial documentary Shoah, 
which was screened in Polish cinemas (partly even on public television) and 
sparked a heated public debate in 1985.26 In order to arouse more than an indig-
nant defensive reaction, however, such impulses had to meet with endogenous 
change inside Polish society and genuine readiness for open debate. And for that 
matter, the established discursive order began to erode in the second half of the 
decade. While regime propagandists continued to present themselves in their 
newly- acquired favourite role as faithful defenders of the honour of the Polish 
nation, debates were more complicated in the opposition milieus. Opposition 
intellectuals like Jan Józef Lipski repeatedly argued for transcending limited 
national perspectives on difficult issues of the national past, but their position 
was not at all commonplace within the opposition movement. This became 
evident when literary critic Jan Błoński, in a now famous essay published in 
the liberal Catholic weekly Tygodnik Powszechny in January 1987, called for a 
self- critical re- evaluation of collective Polish witnessing and bystanding of 
the Holocaust.27 Błoński’s most pronounced opponent in the ensuing debate 
was not a regime historian, but the renowned Solidarity advocate Władysław 
Siła- Nowicki, who sought to defend the good name of the Polish nation in a 
 25 Reinhart Koselleck, “Geschichte, Historie,” in Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Historisches 
Lexikon zur politisch- sozialen Sprache in Deutschland, Vol. 2: E-G, ed. Otto Brunner, 
Werner Conze, and Reinhart Kosselleck (Stuttgart: Klett- Cotta, 1975), 593 – 717; Martin 
Sabrow, “Erinnerung als Pathosformel der Gegenwart,” in Der Streit um die Erinnerung, 
ed. Martin Sabrow (Leipzig: Akademische Verlags- Anstalt, 2008), 9 – 24; Enzo Traverso, 
Gebrauchsanweisungen für die Vergangenheit. Geschichte, Erinnerung, Politik (Münster: 
Unrast, 2007).
 26 Piotr Forecki, Od Shoah do Strachu. Spory o polsko- żydowską przeszłość i pamięć w 
debatach publicznych (Poznań: Poznańskie, 2010), 132 – 149; Piotr Forecki, Reconstructing 
memory: The Holocaust in Polish public debates, trans. Marta Skowsronska (Frankfurt: 
Lang, 2013).
 27 Jan Błoński, “Biedni Polacy patrzą na Getto,” Tygodnik Powszechny 2 (1987): 1, 4; Antony 
Polonsky, ed. “My brother’s keeper?,” Recent Polish debates on the Holocaust, trans. Insti-
tute for Jewish Studies (London: Routledge, 1990), 34 – 52.
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way not dissimilar to rationales typically used by the nationalist wing of the 
communist party.28
Such unexpected cleavages running across the regime- opposition divide 
showed that the battle lines of Solidarity’s struggle for history had definitely 
started to disperse. They indicated the change that came along with the trans-
national paradigm shift from history to memory. The calling into question 
of the classical universalistic understanding of history and its partial substi-
tution by the particularistic counter- concept of memory was to have major 
consequences for the Polish conflict so firmly entrenched in historical frames 
of interpretation. While Solidarity of 1980/81 can be seen as a last attempt at 
historical revolution rooted in the symbolic universe of modernity, the subtle 
revolution of individualist memory was in fact about to shake the foundations 
of that symbolic universe.
It is important to note here that this new approach to the past did not render 
the dominant collectivist modes of remembrance obsolete – quite the contrary. 
In contrast to the collective struggle for history led by Solidarity in 1980/81, 
the emergence of memory was anything but a mass phenomenon. Its humble 
beginnings and subtle symptoms were limited mainly to the academic intel-
ligentsia, whereas the public sphere continued to be dominated by homoge-
nising collectivist master narratives. The function of history as a reservoir of 
collectivist identity patterns in Polish society had by no means come to an end 
in the late 1980s. Underground publications on historical topics enjoyed last-
ing popularity amongst anti- communist audiences, public conflicts over sig-
nificant historical monuments continued with undiminished rigour, and the 
clash over the Katyń massacre grew fiercer than ever after the establishment 
of a Polish- Soviet commission of party historians in 1987.29 Rather than initi-
ating a smooth transformation, the discovery of individualism established a 
new line of differentiation and conflict within the opposition, and within soci-
ety in general. Not everybody shared the joy Marcin Król felt about living in a 
“world without form, the future of which I do not know”,30 and not everybody 
rated individual liberties so high that he was ready to abandon collectivist cer-
tainties known for decades. Tadeusz Łepkowski, a Warsaw historian actively 
supporting Solidarity, commented on the ambivalence of these new prospects: 
 28 Ewa Koźmińska- Frejlak, “Świadkowie zagłady – Holocaust jako zbiorowe doświad-
czenie Polaków,” Przegląd Socjologiczny 49, no. 2 (2000): 181 – 206; Forecki, Od Shoah 
do Strachu, 149 – 165.
 29 Peters, Revolution der Erinnerung, 248 – 274.
 30 Król, “Inny kraj,” 24.
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“The world, which was perceived in two colours in the age of revolution [in 
1980/81], more precisely: as black- and- white, slowly becomes colourful, but 
the dominant colour is grey”.31
Still, the rise of individualist concepts of agency proved instrumental in 
overcoming black- and- white perceptions of past and present conflicts. Namely, 
the concept of civil society offered a bridge over the deep gap between com-
munist and non- communist elites by marginalising the notion of historicity 
of change that had prevailed before. Conceptualising social change not as the 
outcome of collective action but as the object of permanent negotiation amongst 
competing players, civil society complied with the growing yearning for indi-
vidual liberties and served as a means of neutralising the historical overload 
of the current political conflict. Its implicit promise was tempting for anyone 
tired of the deadlock of antagonistic collectivities based on national- historical 
imagery: history in general, and revolution all the more, would be superseded 
by an ever- progressing balancing of particularistic interests. Significantly, in 
Poland it was not the democratic opposition but the party leadership and its 
intellectual masterminds who had the major share in putting the concept of 
civil society onto the political agenda in the run- up to the Round Table nego-
tiations.32 Since the ideological core values of socialism had been embodied 
more plausibly by Solidarity in 1980/81, the communist party evidently lacked a 
meaningful idea of collective agency that would have transcended the defence 
of its own power. What, therefore, could be more obvious than to drop the old 
disavowed legitimation frames in favour of a dehistoricising model that prom-
ised to outmanoeuvre the opposition’s superior collectivist identity narrative?
Hence, Solidarity’s struggle for history and the rise of memory and civil 
society in the late 1980s provided both necessary and sufficient preconditions 
for negotiations and compromise at the Round Table. On the one hand, it was 
the persistence of historically grounded oppositional identities that finally 
forced the Jaruzelski regime to accept the Solidarity representatives as nego-
tiation partners, although they had been defeated in terms of power politics 
long before. On the other hand, the window of opportunity to overcome the 
cleavage stemming from collectivist historical culture did not open until the 
individualist backlash against the omnipresence of that culture had gained 
momentum. Only the dialectic interaction of both factors added up to a setting 
 31 Tadeusz Łepkowski, “Rewolucja polska 1980 roku,” Warszawskie Zeszyty Historyczne 3 
(1989): 25.
 32 Paweł Stefan Załęski, Neoliberalizm i społeczeństwo obywatelskie (Toruń: Naukowe Uni-
wersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika, 2012), 122 – 141.
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that facilitated a peaceful, evolutionary transition from authoritarian socialism 
to parliamentarian democracy and capitalism.
History Returning
The interplay of collectivist and individualist concepts of historical change that 
had eventually proved successful in paving the Polish way out of state socialism 
did not, however, resolve the inherent contradictions between them. Moreover, 
the essential contributions of both approaches, and therefore the legitimacy 
of both collectivist beliefs in history and individualist confidence in memory 
have hardly been recognised by their respective opponents. Instead, two con-
tradictory narrations of what was decisive for the change brought about in 
1989 emerged, as did two divergent claims to the recognition of agency – and 
to power.
This conflict, the aftermath of which we observe today, was no doubt deep-
ened by the predominantly elitist character of the Polish transformation. It is 
no wonder that almost nobody speaks of the Polish events of 1989 as a revolu-
tion – in striking contrast to the talk on “peaceful”, “velvet” or “singing” revo-
lutions in East- Central European neighbouring countries. Unlike the Solidarity 
rising in 1980/81, the Polish transformation of 1989 was in fact accompanied by 
a very low level of democratic mass participation. The Round Table negotia-
tions took place in an atmosphere of societal exhaustion and were carried out 
mainly, as Włodzimierz Borodziej put it, by “tired men around 60”.33 Even the 
first semi- free elections of the 4th of June 1989, which were to add the ultimate 
spark to the collapse of state socialism in Poland and, subsequently, all over 
Eastern Europe, did not attract more than 62 % of eligible voters to the ballot 
boxes. This profound demobilisation of society prevailed not only during the 
epoch- making months of 1989 but also throughout the years to come.
Under these circumstances, former opposition activists turning into dem-
ocratic politicians and government officials were happy to avoid the effort to 
moderate between the identity frames and expectations that had been raised 
by the collectivist insurgence of the early 1980s and the individualist concepts 
that came to dominate public discourse later. Instead of reviving Solidarity’s 
substantial legacy in deliberative democracy practices, the new government took 
 33 Włodzimierz Borodziej, “Vom Warschauer Aufstand zum Runden Tisch. Politik und 
Gewalt in Polen 1944 – 1989,” in 1989 und die Rolle der Gewalt, ed. Martin Sabrow (Göt-
tingen: Wallstein, 2012), 303.
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advantage of the leap of faith to the Solidarity myth that had been built up since 
1980 in order to push through the radical transformation strategy advocated by 
Leszek Balcerowicz.34 The absence of major protests to the project of “building 
capitalism” from scratch enabled many members of the new elite to keep quiet 
about the rapid ideological transition to (neo)liberalism they had gone through 
in the late 1980s. In effect, triumphalist myths of national resurrection and a 
“return to Europe” took hold, which precluded a serious debate over the mul-
tifaceted legacies of Solidarity and the Round Table negotiations. This created 
a fertile ground for distrust and suspicion not only amongst those who expe-
rienced a less smooth passage from old to new socio- economic realities, but 
also amongst numerous rank- and- file members of the opposition movement, 
many of whom still adhered to the hopes and ideals that had mobilised them 
into action in 1980.35 Soon, such suspicions were to be purposefully nourished 
and exploited by the political right.
In the long run, the trust in the timeless rationalities of the market prescribed 
by the shock therapists did not keep its promise of transcending antagonistic 
interests and resolving social problems by an “invisible hand”, that is, outside 
the sphere of politics. Neither did liberal intellectuals succeed in offering a 
consistent narrative of the transformation era that would have integrated the 
regaining of political and individual freedom with the loss of economic secu-
rity and the depreciation of lifetime achievements experienced by a broad 
section of Polish society. Consequently, seemingly old- fashioned, collectivist 
perceptions of agency and identity reappeared with considerable might a dec-
ade later. And again, it was history that returned to the centre of Polish polit-
ical debates.36 The controversies over the role of Poles as bystanders and, to a 
smaller degree, even co- perpetrators of the Holocaust, which had been initiated 
by Błoński and others in the late 1980s, resurfaced fiercer than ever with Jan 
Tomasz Gross’ book on the Jedwabne pogrom at the turn of the century. The 
first PiS government of the Kaczyński brothers (2005 – 2007) spared no effort to 
make “historical policy” (polityka historyczna) a founding element of the self- 
proclaimed “Fourth Republic”. Under the impression of the tragic crash of the 
 34 For (self-)critical retrospective appraisals from contrary political positions see Marcin 
Król, Byliśmy głupi (Warsaw: Czerwone i Czarne, 2015), 34 – 37; Karol Modzelewski, 
Zajeździmy kobyłę historii. Wyznania poobijanego jeźdźca (Warsaw: Iskry, 2013), 399 – 405.
 35 Adam Mielczarek, “Przemiany roku 1989 w oczach szeregowych działaczy podziemia,” 
in Interpretacje upadku komunizmu w Polsce i w Europie środkowo- wschodniej, ed. 
Krzysztof Brzechczyn (Poznań: IPN, 2011), 251 – 62.
 36 Paweł Machcewicz, Spory o historię 2000 – 2011 (Krakow: Znak, 2012).
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Polish presidential plane at Smolensk in 2010, PiS radicalised its manichaeic 
interpretation of national history even further before the party’s returning to 
power in 2015, now openly resorting to dubitable conspiracy theories, where 
“traitors” and hidden evil seem to be responsible for everything. Simultaneously, 
the heated emotions and the antagonistic styles of debating and politicising 
history well known from the opposition- regime conflict of the last decade 
of state socialism resumed their prominent places in Polish political culture.
No less than in the 1980s, recent Polish quarrels over the past reveal a 
clear division between traditionalist parts of society holding fast to a heroic- 
martyrological narrative of Polish history, and liberals showing more openness 
towards accepting responsibility for negative or disturbing aspects of the past 
and advocating historical reconciliation with former enemies. These competing 
attitudes towards the past can be traced back to the collectivist notion of his-
tory and the individualist concept of memory respectively. The origins of this 
cleavage are to be found in the contrary conceptions of historicity and social 
agency, which divided the inclusive, collectivist project of Solidarity in 1980/81 
from the elitist, individualist outlook of the Round Table transformation. For 
those remaining in the revolutionary paradigm of 19th century historicism, 
the negotiated transformation from communism to democracy lacked the 
stark systemic break they had hoped for. For others, the “triumph of freedom” 
seemed so impressive that they did not even feel the need to engage with the 
experiences of powerlessness, which returned now in a capitalist disguise, as 
the social world people were familiar with rapidly broke apart due to shock 
therapy and deindustrialisation. As long as a viable arrangement between the 
notions of history and memory coined during Polish transformation is out of 
sight, their contradictory legacies will persist.
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Mariëlle Wijermars
Framing the Revolution: Memory and the Medialisation 
of Crisis in Loznitsa’s Maidan and The Event
In times of political crisis, the experience and memory of previous crises can 
“premediate” 1 the understanding of its causes, significance and expected out-
comes. Memories of, for example, revolutionary upheavals and the concom-
itant experience of the collapse of political order can, at the same time, pro-
vide the basic framework for initial attempts to memorialise the ongoing or 
recently concluded crisis and may influence how its meaning is interpreted. 
To examine the complex interplay between the memory of collapse and the 
interpretation and initial memorialisation of a recent state of crisis, this chapter 
explores the dynamics between two documentary films by Ukrainian director 
Sergei Loznitsa: Maidan (Maidan 2014) and The Event (Sobytie 2015). While the 
first film documents the street protests in Kiev in 2013 – 2014 and their tragic 
unfolding, and thereby forms an early contribution to the memorialisation of 
“Euromaidan”, the latter, through a montage of archival footage, revisits the 
mass protests in the Soviet city of Leningrad during the August 1991 Putsch. 
This failed coup- d’état by communist hardliners against Secretary- General 
Mikhail Gorbachev, in an attempt to halt his reformist policies, is generally 
seen as having dealt a final blow to the authority of the Soviet government; it 
was the point of no return that culminated – within several months – in the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union and the independence of Ukraine.
The two films are worthy of our attention in their own right for their cine-
matic qualities; yet, it is particularly productive to read them in combination. 
In this approach, I take a cue from the director himself: Loznitsa had come 
across the Soviet- era archival footage already some years earlier but, in his 
opinion, the events in Ukraine invested the images with particular significance 
(“Q&A session” 2016).2 Indeed, it was the most recent Maidan revolution that 
inspired him to revisit the revolution of 1991 in The Event. As I demonstrate 
in this chapter, in the hands of Loznitsa, documentary footage shot on the 
 1 Astrid Erll, “Literature, Film, and the Mediality of Cultural Memory,” in Cultural Mem-
ory Studies: An International and Interdisciplinary Handbook, ed. Astrid Erll and Ansgar 
Nünning (Berlin and New York: De Gruyter, 2008), 389 – 398.
 2 Sergei Loznitsa, “Q&A session.” Interview on Rotterdam Film Festival, January 30, 2016.
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eve of the Soviet Union’s collapse is turned into a means of understanding the 
origins and nature of the 2014 Ukrainian crisis and of assessing the possible 
outcomes of Euromaidan.
My analysis is guided by the following set of questions: In what way does 
watching The Event influence our understanding of Maidan (the film) and 
Maidan (the crisis)? why does Loznitsa feel that it is necessary to revisit this 
particular episode in history to fully assess contemporary political conflict 
and vice versa, how does approaching the films in combination affect how we 
can or should interpret the political message of The Event? Directing attention 
to the depiction of information flow and medialisation during both crises, I 
argue that the reworking of the memory of a previous state of emergency in 
The Event serves to validate the Euromaidan revolution as a grassroots revolu-
tion by positing it – in the perception of Loznitsa – in contrast with the top- 
down revolution of 1991.
The following chapter is structured as follows: first, I provide a brief account 
of the two crises, how they are remembered and their significance for Ukraine; 
second, I introduce both films in more detail, where I place them within the 
context of the (documentary) oeuvre of Loznitsa and the filmmaker’s preoc-
cupation with memory, witnessing and revisiting the past; third, I delve deeper 
into how the films (re)mediate the respective political crises; and finally, I focus 
on the chemistry between both historical events, which are brought about by 
Loznitsa, and his framing of the two revolutions.
Two Revolutions
During the August 1991 Putsch, the most dramatic and well- known confron-
tations took place in Moscow where Boris Yeltsin, the president of the Russian 
Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR), led a civil resistance to oppose 
the governmental takeover. While Gorbachev was held under house arrest in 
his holiday residence on Crimea, the coup- makers – having declared them-
selves the State Committee of the State of Emergency (GKChP)3 – launched an 
armed attack on the parliament building (the White House) to where Yeltsin 
and his supporters had retreated. In the subsequent confrontation with the civil 
defenders of the White House, three men were killed. Within two days from 
its beginning, the coup collapsed and Gorbachev returned to power. The epi-
sode nevertheless severely destabilised the Soviet Union. In fact, the attempted 
 3 Gosudarstvennyi komitet po chrezvychainomu polozheniiu.
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coup was a landslide event in terms of political and public opinion in several 
of the Soviet Republics (Estonia and Latvia declared their independence dur-
ing its course) including Ukraine, where it marked a political turning point. 
The general stance on the question whether to pursue independence was, for 
a long time, more ambiguous in Ukraine than in the Baltic States, for instance. 
But on the 24th of August, some days after the failed coup, the Ukrainian Soviet 
Socialist Republic legislature voted in favour of the declaration of independ-
ence. According to Serhii Plokhy:
“The event that triggered the change of heart among the conservative deputies of 
the Ukrainian parliament and, in time, throughout the world was the hard- liners’ 
coup against Mikhail Gorbachev in Moscow on August 19, 1991”.4
In the subsequent popular referendum, organised on the 1st of December, an 
overwhelming majority voted in favour of independence, whereas in March that 
year some 70 percent had voted to remain part of a (reformed) Soviet Union.5 
As Plokhy points out, the failure of the Putsch and Yeltsin’s role in its collapse 
had demonstrated the weakness of the Union’s center vis- à- vis its republics, in 
particular Russia. With power relations now shifted in favour of the Russian 
president, the appeal of remaining part of the Union was diminished.6
Seeking an improvement of the republic’s economic situation was the dom-
inant driving force behind popular support for independence, combined to 
lesser or larger extent with nationalist convictions and a desire for ideological 
freedoms in different regions. The subsequent economic collapse and protracted 
process of political transformation, which dashed the hopes for significantly 
improved living conditions and freedoms, meant that the revolution of 1991 
soon came to be viewed in a more negative light. In part, such discussions also 
questioned the nature of the revolution itself:
“Was Ukrainian state independence, gained in 1991, a culmination of decades (or 
even centuries) of a ‘national- liberation’ struggle by Ukrainian patriots? Or was 
it merely a present granted by largely external events and persons? Was it libera-
tion from the Soviet- Russian yoke and the attainment of a ‘natural’ nation- state 
status for an objectively existing distinct Ukrainian nation, or was it a historical 
 4 Serhii Plokhy, The Gates of Europe: A History of Ukraine (New York: Basic Books, 2015), 
318.
 5 Ibid., 320.
 6 Ibid., 319.
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tragedy, […] because it separated not just a single communist state but tore apart 
an ‘authentic’ Slavic nation composed of Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarussians?”.7
In Russia, the memory of August 1991 and the hopes for democratisation it 
represented – iconised by the image of Yeltsin standing on top of a tank near 
the White House – were equally quickly tarnished, especially in October 1993, 
when Yeltsin himself ordered Russian tanks to fire at the White House after 
dissolving the Russian Supreme Soviet.8
On the 20th anniversary of the Putsch and Ukraine’s independence, their 
commemoration was once again overshadowed by a revolution that, as it had 
by then become apparent, failed to deliver on its promises: Ukraine’s 2004 
Orange Revolution. Mass protests, which erupted in response to fraud in the 
presidential elections, had prevented Viktor Yanukovych from taking power 
back then, and the presidential seat was occupied instead by the reformist, 
westward- leaning Viktor Yushchenko. By 2010, however, Yanukovych became 
president and restored the presidential republic, thereby undoing the “victory” 
of 2004. Meanwhile, the country’s socio- economic state was poor: “Given the 
hopes and expectations and grim socioeconomic reality twenty years after 
independence, the twentieth anniversary was more of a somber milestone 
than a cause for celebration”.9
It should be noted that the memory landscape in Ukraine in recent years is 
particularly dynamic – that is, there are marked regional differences and, while 
there is a noticeable top- down dynamics of memory politics and relatively little 
space for alternative narratives, the regime changes that have marked recent 
Ukrainian politics have also involved dramatic turns in how Ukraine’s Soviet 
past is interpreted.10 These largely alternated between staunchly anti- Soviet posi-
tions, in particular under President Yushchenko, and more centrist tendencies:
“Even if one could argue that during Yushchenko’s tenure the national mnemonic 
field was particularly contentious, during all periods (pre- Orange revolution, the 
Orange period, and post- Orange revolution) the mnemonic field was fractured 
 7 Oxana Shevel, “Memories of the Past and Visions of the Future: Remembering the Soviet 
Era and its End in Ukraine,” in Twenty Years After Communism: The Politics of Memory 
and Commemoration, ed. Michael Bernhard and Jan Kubik (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2014), 149 – 150.
 8 Kathleen E. Smith, Mythmaking in the New Russia: Politics and Memory during the Yelt-
sin Era (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), 30 – 56.
 9 Shevel, “Memories of the Past,” 151.
 10 Ibid., 152, 158.
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and contentious due to the consistent articulation of two distinct, coherent, and 
contradictory historical narratives by elite actors who saw themselves as proprie-
tors of the ‘true’ vision of the Ukrainian past”.11
The renegotiation of memory, most importantly in connection to the Soviet 
past, was also a central element of Euromaidan – the protests that erupted in 
November 2013 following Yanukovych’s decision to postpone the signing of 
the Association Agreement with the European Union. Among other things, 
these actions targeted the remaining visual traces of the Soviet Union. Indeed, 
“[a] symbolic farewell to the Soviet past – the demolition of remaining mon-
uments to Lenin, more than hundred altogether, in a few weeks – accompa-
nied the Revolution of Dignity” (the name given to the most recent protests).12 
Yet, the conflict on memory is but one aspect of the mass protests on Kiev’s 
Independence Square and elsewhere in Ukraine, and of their violent repression 
by state security forces (the Berkut) in February 2014. Having finally succeeded 
in overthrowing the government on the 22nd of February (Yanukovych had by 
then fled the country), the protests had claimed some 100 lives.13
Loznitsa and the Negotiation of Cultural Memory
The unfolding of Ukraine’s most recent revolution is documented in Maidan – 
a largely uncommented and rather slow montage of footage that Loznitsa and 
his team of two additional camera operators shot of the events as they were 
unfolding – from the very beginning of the street protests through their violent 
outcome. A total volume of some 100 hours of film was edited back to a run-
ning time of two hours. In extremely long, static takes – at times resembling 
security- camera footage – the camera takes on the role of observer. The chosen 
style suggests impartiality, which imparts the documentary with an authori-
tative feel; it appears to be documenting the uprising, rather than interpreting 
it. The viewer witnesses the events as they unfold, including the less eventful 
moments, particularly during the first half of the film. While directorial deci-
sions such as camera placement, choice of depicted locations, persons and 
 11 Ibid., 158 – 159.
 12 Plokhy, The Gates of Europe, 352.
 13 For a detailed account and analysis of the events, see, e. g., David R. Marples and Fred-
erick V. Mills Ukraine’s Euromaidan: Analyses of a Civil Revolution (Stuttgart: Ibidem 
Verlag, 2015).
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objects, subtly guides the viewers’ perception of the shown events, the static 
placement of the camera reinforces its position of documenting rather than 
taking part in the action. People are often seen from the back and the view is 
repeatedly blocked. An hour into the film’s running time the outcome of the 
civil protest remains open. Consequently, the sense of uncertainty of those who 
participated is mirrored in the pacing of the documentary. It also expresses 
Loznitsa’s own experience of making the film:
“Usually, when I start with a documentary, I build the entire structure of the film 
in my imagination. I know how that film begins, how the story will develop, and 
how it ends. The work on Maidan was completely different. I received new mate-
rials almost every day during January and February, while the tensions rose, the 
number of victims increased; and I edited the film, not knowing how it would end”.14
Only some minimal framing for understanding in the direction in which the 
confrontation is developing is provided through the titles of the film’s four 
parts – Prologue, Triumph, Armed Conflict and Postscript – and occasional 
written commentary.
The protracted tension span also sprouts anticipation; or, as one reviewer 
characterised the film’s poetics:
“Hewn from massive wide shots that reach for the panoramic qualities of a Bruegel 
painting, it’s a grimly optimistic account of a popular revolution and the building 
of a national consciousness, increment by increment”.15
This reviewer, evidently, was persuaded by the political conviction embedded in 
Loznitsa’s narration of Euromaidan. Notwithstanding, one of the finesses of the 
film that greatly contributes to its persuasiveness is its soundtrack: consisting of 
more than 100 separate tracks, the final mix “‘match[es]’ the action on screen 
and direct[s] our gaze without overwhelming the image with a soundtrack”.16
 14 Sergei Loznitsa, “Chto takoe ‘Maidan’? Vopros, otveta na kotoryi u menia eshche ne,” 
interview by Svitlanda Shapoval, Cultprostir, July 2, 2014, http://cultprostir.ua/ru/post/
sergey- loznica- chto- takoe- maidan- vopros- otveta- na- kotoriy- u- menya- esche- net.
 15 Nick Bradshaw, “Different Drums,” Sight & Sound 25, no. 3 (2015): 26 – 29; emphasis 
added.
 16 Lilya Kaganovsky, “Maidan by Sergei Loznitsa,” Slavic Review 74, no. 4 (2015): 895; Ser-
gei Medvedev, “Getting the News on ‘Vremia’,” interview by Bill Keller, in Russia at the 
Barricades: Eyewitness Accounts of the August 1991 Coup, ed. Victoria E. Bonnell, Ann 
Cooper, and Gregory Freidin (Armonk and London: M. E. Sharpe, 1994), 301 – 307.
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The lack of narrative drive towards an inevitable climax sets Loznitsa’s 
work apart from other Euromaidan documentaries, such as Netflix’s Winter 
on Fire: Ukraine’s Fight for Freedom (Evgeny Afineevsky, 2015), as does his 
restraint in showing graphic imagery and violence. For example, in Loznitsa’s 
documentary there are two moments when a person appears to get (fatally) 
wounded. On the first occasion, a group of people is shown at a distance as 
they drag away a lifeless person whilst protecting themselves from sniper fire 
with shields. On the second occasion, a group of Berkut special police forces 
is shown on a roof. Moments later, one of them collapses. In both instances, 
details are difficult to make out; the exact nature and severity of the injuries 
is not visible. While there is little difference between how the casualty on the 
side of the protesters and the shot Berkut officer are shown, the fact that the 
camera is often positioned behind or on the side of the protesters (possibly 
informed by the accessibility of these spaces to the cameramen) imparts the 
film with implicit partiality.
The depiction of the events in the Netflix documentary Winter on Fire is the 
exact opposite in many respects. The poster of the film is highly suggestive: a 
young girl, dressed in Ukrainian national wear and seen from the back, con-
fronts a solid rank of riot police carrying interlinked shields. The opposition is 
fortified by the black- and- white depiction of the armed forces in contrast to the 
girl’s vividly coloured red- and- white dress and yellow- and- blue garland with 
flowy ribbons (the colours of the Ukrainian flag). The film’s subtitle, “Ukraine’s 
Fight for Freedom”, reinforces the suggestion of innocence, excessive violence 
and national liberation. Edited for maximum emotional effect, Winter on Fire 
includes graphic depictions of wounded civilians; they are shown in close- up, 
the blood on their faces beaming in saturated red. This type of imagery is 
absent from Loznitsa’s Maidan. Rather than displaying individual drama, the 
filmmaker is preoccupied with the concerted action of the masses – on the side 
of the protesters and on the side of their adversary. This focus on the collective 
rather than the individual is central to Loznitsa’s interpretation of Maidan, and 
thereby his contribution to its memorialisation: the political crisis of Maidan 
is envisaged as the emancipation of the Ukrainian nation. It should be stressed, 
however, that Loznitsa’s depiction of Maidan and Ukraine’s “united nation” is, to 
a certain extent, idealised and artificially homogenous. For instance, Loznitsa’s 
contribution to the formation of the memory of the Maidan crisis excludes 
some of the less appealing aspects of the protests, including the controversial 
involvement of far- right groups. The absence of graphic depictions of violence, 
then, may also be seen as presenting a ‘cleaner’ image of this supposed birth of 
a political nation than is corroborated by reality.
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The second documentary, The Event, premiered the following year and is 
clearly intended to complement the Maidan documentary. It consists of a 
compilation of archival footage that was shot in Leningrad by local camera-
men during the August 1991 Putsch. Loznitsa crafted his understanding of the 
Soviet era civil protest from three hours of raw materials. Similar to in Maidan, 
the documentary images act as an enabler in witnessing a historic moment in 
time and to a certain extent transfer onto the viewer the experience of “being 
there”. While the images of the 1991 standoff in Moscow are engraved into the 
collective mind, the fact that half a million people also gathered on Leningrad’s 
Palace Square in anti- governmental protest has largely been forgotten. It is an 
event that largely failed to develop into a mnemonic event. The documentary, 
therefore, remediates a well- established memory of imminent political col-
lapse while at the same time adding a new chapter to it. Notwithstanding the 
significance of The Event in altering common perceptions of 1991, and drawing 
attention to events that occurred outside the capital city, my argument here 
is that the compilation film is as much about contemporary Kiev as it is a re- 
examination of the Soviet Union’s demise.
Loznitsa adopts a similar approach in both films: there is no main hero, no 
narrator or voice- over, no interviews; all indications about what is going on 
derive from in situ sound recordings and a handful of title cards indicating the 
main events. While the films are certainly not devoid of a political message, 
to which I will return, the filmmaker refrains from applying an interpretative 
frame throughout. Instead, he invites the viewer to reach their own conclusions. 
To a certain extent, the documentaries thereby mimic the experience of the 
people shown on screen: you hear what they would have been able to hear and 
see what they would have been able to see. As already noted, the pacing of both 
films reproduces this sense of uncertain outcomes. In an interview, Loznitsa 
indicated that his goal was to “bring the viewer to Maidan and give him the 
opportunity to experience 90 days of revolution”.17 The same is perhaps even 
more true for The Event, where the camerawork enhances the feeling of being 
part of the action to an even greater extent. Whereas in Maidan the camera is 
typically placed at the same height as the crowd but located at a slight distance – 
placing the viewer in the position of an observer – in The Event, the camera 
predominantly weaves its way through the crowd. The persons who step aside 
to allow the cameraman to pass them by are visibly less accustomed to being 
filmed than we are today: they look straight at the camera, that is, they look 
the viewer straight in the eye. Such instances of “direct eye contact” are rare in 
 17 Loznitza, “Chto takoe ‘Maidan’?”
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Maidan where no one is surprised to see a cameraman or, for that matter, to be 
filmed. But apart from being an interesting observation about changed societal 
realities, the resulting cinematic suggestion of integration into the masses and 
first- person experience is crucial for the film’s viewer experience and therefore 
potential to serve as a memory text.
The productions exemplify the two styles that define Loznitsa’s work as a doc-
umentary filmmaker. On the one hand, he produces films that silently observe 
and document the present, such as the film Portrait (2002) that consists of long 
takes of residents of the Russian countryside looking towards the camera. On 
the other hand, Loznitsa re- examines the past and its representation through 
a montage of archival film, for example in Blockade (2005), which is about the 
siege of Leningrad, and Revue (2008), a compilation of 1950s and 1960s Soviet 
propaganda newsreels. While markedly different in method, subject material 
and aesthetics, in the case of Loznitsa both styles are equally motivated by a 
drive to bear witness, to document, revisit and relive both past and present. 
The long takes and strong visual emphasis should therefore not be mistaken 
for an absence of intention.18 Instead, as Denise Youngblood has argued with 
respect to the compilation film Blockade, Loznitsa shows:
“not the past ‘as it was’, but, like all histories, a carefully constructed version of that 
past. […] By relying on images to the virtual exclusion of words, Loznitsa seeks to 
maximize the viewers’ engagement with the material and minimize directorial intent”.19
In the context of (re)framing the two revolutions that have had major conse-
quences for contemporary Ukraine, this emotional engagement is instrumental 
in communicating the filmmaker’s take on their politics.
(Re)mediating Political Crisis
As has been argued by Astrid Erll and Ann Rigney:
“[…] most memorial media [on the one hand] strive for ever greater ‘immediacy’. 
The goal is to provide a seemingly transparent window on the past, to make us 
 18 Erin Alpert, “The Visual in Documentary: Sergei Loznitsa and the Importance of the 
Image,” Studies in Documentary Film 7, no. 2 (2013): 139.
 19 Denise J. Youngblood, “A Chronicle for Our Time: Sergei Loznitsa’s ‘The Blockade’,” 
Russian Review 66, no. 4 (2007): 697.
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forget the presence of the medium and instead present us with an ‘unmediated 
memory’. On the other hand, this effect is usually achieved by the recycling and 
multiplication of media”.20
These opposing tensions are evidently at work in The Event. One aspect it seeks 
to obscure from the viewer is the fact that, as a remediation of archival foot-
age, the film constitutes a double framing of the crisis: both in the process of 
filming (which events are recorded and in what way) and in the process of 
producing the montage from these recordings by Loznitsa (which scenes are 
selected, how are they combined and sequenced, and what elements are omit-
ted or emphasised).
The fact that the images of the Leningrad protest are not well known endows 
the filmmaker with relative freedom in how he chooses to present them; he is 
bound to a lesser extent to their medialised image and common perceptions. 
Connecting the images shown to those parts of the cultural memory that are 
widely- known is, however, important in ensuring the viewer’s comprehension 
of the narrative, as well as in inviting them to reflect on the political crisis on a 
more abstract level. The soundtrack is instrumental in establishing this connec-
tion: the music of the Swan Lake ballet returns on crucial turning points as the 
political crisis unfolds. During the Putsch, state TV was firmly in the hands of 
the coup- makers. As all regular programming was cancelled, it showed the ballet 
piece repeatedly, interspersed with official statements. Here, Swan Lake serves 
as a “memory cue” 21 that associates the unknown images showed to collective 
memories of the Putsch and, more broadly, the collapse of Soviet Union. For 
those who lived through the events, the soundtrack may also trigger individual 
memories of those eventful days. The observer perspective, suggested by the 
way the camera moves through the crowds (noted above), can, in the absence 
of established memorialisation of the protest, come to mimic or substitute ver-
nacular memory; through the “eyes” of the camera, the individuals protesting 
in Leningrad are reinscribed into the greater (visual) narrative of the Putsch.
As (re)mediations of political crises, the films’ focus on the role of the masses 
(self- organised or not), rather than of individuals, is significant for the political 
 20 Astrid Erll and Ann Rigney, “Introduction: Cultural Memory and its Dynamics,” in 
Mediation, Remediation, and the Dynamics of Cultural Memory, ed. Astrid Erll and Ann 
Rigney (Berlin and New York: De Gruyter, 2009), 4.
 21 Alin Coman, Adam D. Brown, Jonathan Koppel, and William Hirst, “Collective Memory 
from a Psychological Perspective,” International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society 
22, no. 2 (2009): 128.
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interpretations they imply. The emphasis on the collective is, in fact, embed-
ded in the Russian title of The Event: the word “sobytie” etymologically derives 
from “being together”. To be able to claim that the events amount to a popular 
revolution there first must be a concerted mass. In Maidan, in particular, this 
results in a fascinating investigation of how individual life trajectories intersect 
and interlace with big history:
“[…] what’s emphasised […] is the number of levels on which we live: as micro-
scopic, anonymous elements of vast historical narratives; as members of symbolic 
constructs such as nations, resistance movements and ‘sides’ of a conflict; as pri-
vate individuals moving through our own subjective and enclosed dramas; and 
as social creatures in continual physical and emotional negotiation with others. 
By depicting these various conditions of existence in parallel, Loznitsa’s film is 
also able to inhabit several diverse functions simultaneously. It is a dispassionate, 
close- range journalistic account of a succession of events, but also a delicate, even 
whimsical portrait of small- scale human interactions; it’s a document of specific 
incidents, but also a timeless evocation of human reactions, both large and small, 
to crisis conditions”.22
The documentaries draw attention to a particular aspect of the crowds that 
bears direct connection to the role of media in cultural memory formation and, 
when juxtaposed, is particularly insightful in understanding the fundamental 
difference between the two civil protests. In one of the shots included in Maidan, 
people hold up their mobile phones in lieu of candles at the funeral procession 
in commemoration of those who died during the conflict. Each light, however, 
represents much more: it stands for direct access to information; moreover, from 
multiple sources. It stands for a direct means of communication and therefore 
a means of political mobilisation. Each light represents a recording device and 
a means for immediate sharing of images with the rest of the world. While we 
are now accustomed to this reality, the comparison with the archival images 
from 1991 serves as a potent reminder of the tremendous impact of immedi-
ate medialisation of political crisis that has been enabled by the revolution in 
communication technology. The Event, in fact, revolves around communica-
tion and information flows; the issue of obtaining and fighting to get hold of 
information about what is going on runs as a thread through the film. With the 
television showing the Swan Lake ballet on repeat, the archival footage shows 
how people took to the streets to gather information from other sources. They 
 22 Hannah McGill, “Maidan,” Sight & Sound 25, no. 3 (2015): 83 – 84.
103Framing the Revolution
Open-Access-Publikation im Sinne der CC-Lizenz BY-NC 4.0
are shown standing around in groups listening to the radio, and reading pam-
phlets and other sparse documents that are being handed out.
During the Putsch, Soviet media faced severe difficulties in continuing their 
operations. As Iain Elliot, the Associate Director of Radio Liberty who was in 
Moscow at the time, recounted in September 1991:
“[…] some newspapers that immediately decided to defy the junta’s ban found that 
they lacked the means to publish a normal issue – and not, in most cases that I 
heard about, because there were tanks barring the way to the printing presses. More 
often it was simply that the responsible official for the formerly Party- controlled 
newspapers refused to provide the keys, and since access to copy machines was 
still severely restricted, it was not always a simple matter to run off several thou-
sand leaflets or brief ‘emergency’ issues of a newspaper. Even obtaining supplies 
of Xerox paper required considerable initiative”.23
Access to cameras to record the ongoing events was equally obstructed.24 In 
Leningrad, in a similar vein, the leaflets that were produced on the few remain-
ing copy machines that had not yet been seized or blocked by the authorities 
became one of the principle means in disseminating information during the 
“almost complete information blackout, with the radio and TV continuously 
spreading lies”.25 As Valerii Kuchner – the then editor of the weekly newspaper 
Rossiiskie vesti – recalls, the limited number of leaflets they could produce were 
eagerly devoured by the underinformed audiences:
“I remember taking a stack with me to Kalinin Prospect, and people simply tore 
them out of my hands. I believe the reason few people got hold of these leaflets 
is that they would quite literally tear them apart, trying to yank them out of one 
another’s hands”.26
 23 Iain Elliot, “Three Days in August: On- the- Spot Impressions,” reprinted in Russia at the 
Barricades: Eyewitness Accounts of the August 1991 Coup, ed. Victoria E. Bonnell, Ann 
Cooper, and Gregory Freidin (Armonk and London: M. E. Sharpe, 1991), 292.
 24 Medvedev, “Getting the News,” 302.
 25 Valerii Zavorotnyi, “Letter from St. Petersburg,” in Russia at the Barricades: Eyewitness 
Accounts of the August 1991 Coup, ed. Victoria E. Bonnell, Ann Cooper, and Gregory 
Freidin (Armonk and London: M. E. Sharpe, 1994), 153.
 26 Valerii Kucher, “A Russian Reporter Remembers the Coup,” interview by Mikhaleva, 
in Russia at the Barricades: Eyewitness Accounts of the August 1991 Coup, ed. Victoria E. 
Bonnell, Ann Cooper, and Gregory Freidin (Armonk and London: M. E. Sharpe, 1992), 
327.
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The image that Loznitsa sketches through his selection of images and editing in 
The Event suggests that this search for information actually was a major driver 
behind the mobilisation; people amassed on the streets of Leningrad not (only) 
to protest the Putsch, but to be informed about what was happening and learn 
what to do next. Flash forward to Maidan, in the highly- medialised reality of 
contemporary Ukraine, it was not the lack of but the free flow of information 
that, quite to the contrary, facilitated mobilisation. The documentaries testify 
to this transition from a complete lack of information to an information over-
load and the accompanying difficulty of assessing the credibility of sources. 
Located on opposite sides of the spectrum, both conditions can equally result 
in uncertainty regarding what is going on.
Throughout his documentary works, as well as in the two films explored here, 
Loznitsa demonstrates acute awareness of the significance of making record-
ings – that is, what is documented can be remembered, revisited, re- examined. 
The Event, for instance, explicitly features shots of the few cameramen and 
photographers that were on the scene. In Maidan, the frame is at times buzz-
ing with photographers, cameramen and journalists. Since our understanding 
of events tends to change over time, documenting them allows for post fac-
tum reflection on these traces to reassess these occurrences and their conse-
quences. Such a reassessment is clearly one of the aims of The Event. Through 
subtle hints (for instance in the title cards), Loznitsa argues that, despite the 
mass protest and notwithstanding the Soviet Union’s collapse, political reality 
remained effectively unchanged. As political changes unfold that supposedly 
radically altered political reality, the soundtrack plays the light- hearted Dance 
of the Little Swans – a subtle but unmistakable commentary that, in reality, was 
simply business as usual. What appeared to be the rupture of established power 
structures later turned out to be only a concealed continuation of these very 
structures – a position that can be challenged. As the director has remarked 
on several occasions, he believes the 1991 revolution was staged from above.27 
The people were given their freedom, and that gift has since been taken back. 
The reason why nothing changed, Loznitsa appears to suggest, is that the Soviet 
people did not fight for their freedom – a suggestion that resonates with the 
classic heroic narrative of popular revolution.
 27 E. g., Loznitsa, “Q & A Session.”
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Framing the Revolution
Taken together, the documentaries can be seen as an attempt to understand 
the nature of civil protest: they explore the dynamics and driving forces deter-
mining when, why and how large masses of people choose to gather to defy 
the political structure and demand change. Several elements return in both 
films and support their visual correspondence: the large crowds and speak-
ers addressing them, barricades, banners and slogans, and musicians playing 
songs connecting to the political situation of the moment. In The Event, the 
past at times feels particularly topical, for instance in the repeated invocations 
of fascism to denounce the coup- makers. The intensity of the protest, however, 
is rather different. As they are mobilised in protest, the Leningrad crowd is 
largely passively awaiting what will happen next. The apparent lack of agency 
is quite the opposite to the seemingly organically self- organised networks of 
protesters on Maidan – from those who stand at the front lines of the confron-
tation to those who are organising food supplies. If we accept my hypothesis 
that The Event is not simply about the protest in 1991 but rather about reaching 
a greater understanding of conditions in contemporary Ukraine, then the jux-
tapositioning of the two films is intended to attest to a fundamental change in 
mentality. The Leningrad crowd is uncertain, hesitant, and lacking experience 
of protesting. The inclusion of Viktor Tsoi’s emblematic song “We are waiting 
for change” in the soundtrack is highly suggestive in this respect. The protesters 
on Maidan, to the contrary, are shown as dedicated and organised. Most of all, 
they are framed as a people united. I agree with Lilya Kaganovsky, who states:
“Loznitsa is attempting to document a revolution not simply on the streets of 
Ukraine but in the Ukrainian people, a profound change taking place in Ukrainian 
society. This is simultaneously an anticolonial revolution,28 a ‘mental’ revolution 
against Russian power, and an anti- Soviet revolution that attempts to finally dis-
mantle the Soviet state inside every individual”.29
According to Loznitsa, then, the two films represent history coming full circle: 
a historical process of liberation and national emancipation that began dur-
ing the final days of the Soviet Union has only now come to full fruition on 
 28 The application of postcolonial theory in relation to post- Soviet states is not without 
its critics, and in the context of this chapter it may be more productive to depart from 
the opposing notions of imperialist/nationalist.
 29 Kaganovsky, “Maidan by Sergei Loznitsa,” 895.
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the streets of Kiev.30 A revisiting of the memory of collapse becomes a visually 
persuasive argument in support of the claim that the Maidan revolution was 
“the real deal”; that, contrary to the 1991 revolution, it was a bottom- up revo-
lution driven by a united people. The allegation of top- down orchestration of 
protest during the 1991 attempted coup- d’état is not without foundation. In an 
interview conducted on the 26th of August 1991, the then mayor of Leningrad 
(and later first mayor of St. Petersburg), Anatolii Sobchak, describes his involve-
ment in organising a mass rally with factory workers from the Putilov metal- 
working plant:
“And at six o’clock in the morning, I went to the Putilov factory. I managed to 
arrive before the shift started. There, at the factory gate, a car with a megaphone 
was already waiting. We held a rally. […] As I was leaving, a large group of the 
Putilov workers, three or four thousand, was already marching down Stachechnyi 
Prospect [literally the Avenue of Strikes]. […] We decided that people should go 
back to their places of work by 1:00 PM. That was exactly what happened. There 
were no no- shows”.31
As was already mentioned, the unity and bottom- up self- organisation of Ukrain-
ians taking part in Euromaidan, as it is presented by Loznitsa, obscures inner 
divisions within this ‘emergent nation’, as well as the involvement of contro-
versial groups.
Some critics have suggested that The Event should instead be read as a call for 
protest in Russia. In this reading, the revisiting of the “failed” revolution of 1991 
has the aim of inspiring the Russian people to follow the Ukrainian example of 
Maidan. While it is difficult to deny that the film has a political message that 
(also) pertains to Russia, I propose a more nuanced reading. When approached 
in combination with the film Maidan, The Event argues that effective politi-
cal change is only possible when freedom is demanded and fought for by the 
people, who are, moreover, willing to sacrifice what they have to achieve it. In 
an interview, Loznitsa has commented on this apparent need of sacrifice and 
commemoration of victims in consolidating fundamental change:
 30 Loznitsa, “Q & A session.”
 31 Anatolii Sobchak, “The Breakthrough: The Coup in St. Petersburg,” interview by Moscow 
News, August 26, 1991, reprinted in Russia at the Barricades: Eyewitness Accounts of the 
August 1991 Coup, ed. Victoria E. Bonnell, Ann Cooper, and Gregory Freidin (Armonk 
and London: M. E. Sharpe, 1994), 224.
107Framing the Revolution
Open-Access-Publikation im Sinne der CC-Lizenz BY-NC 4.0
“I could have ended the film differently. For instance, there was a festival, where 
Yuriy Lutsenko rejoicingly declared: ‘We have won’. But to me that constitutes nei-
ther an ending, nor an important event. The farewell to the fallen was an event. It 
was necessary to pay tribute to their memory. The farewell to each of the fallen at 
the confluence of an enormous number of people – that is very important, espe-
cially to stop the processes of destruction in culture”.32
Loznitsa does not grant such a moment of closure to his representation of the 
events of 1991. In my opinion, The Event, therefore, rather confronts its audi-
ence with a fundamental dilemma: has the passive mentality that it uncovers 
changed sufficiently since 1991 for a direct confrontation with the powers that 
be (as happened on Maidan) to be possible? Has the awareness spread that 
one is responsible for one’s own fate, or are the Russian people still waiting for 
change? Loznitsa’s apparent support for (heroic) self- sacrifice as a means of 
political change leaves the possibility of gradual reform (which may involve 
less personal suffering and material losses) beyond consideration. With the 
benefit of hindsight, it is fair to argue that the expectations of the what can 
be achieved through conflict and violent confrontation should be tempered.
The failed August 1991 Putsch is not typically used as a frame of reference for 
interpreting Euromaidan. In this chapter, I have demonstrated how Loznitsa 
employs the reworking of the memory of this previous state of emergency in 
The Event to validate the Maidan revolution as a grassroots revolution, contrary 
to the top- down revolution of 1991. The experience of the revolution that cul-
minated in the collapse of the Soviet state is reinterpreted in such a way that it 
assists in overcoming the situation of crisis in recent memory. My analysis of 
the dynamic resonance between Maidan and The Event illustrates how the expe-
rience and memory of a previous collapse of political order premediates inter-
pretations of the causes and significance of a current political crisis. Drawing 
upon the framework provided by the memory, initial attempts to explain and 
memorialise the ongoing or recently concluded crisis take place. By reframing 
the mass protest in Leningrad on the eve of the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union, Loznitsa effectively frames the revolution of Maidan.
 32 Andrii Portnov, “Sergei Loznitsa: ‘Evropeiskaia tsivilizatsiia zabyla, chto takoe sush-
chestvovanie v khore’,” Histor!ans, March 31, 2015, http://www.historians.in.ua/index.
php/en/intervyu/1475-sergej- loznitsa- evropejskaya- tsivilizatsiya- zabyla- chto- takoe- 
sushchestvovanie- v- khore.alper.
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Valur Ingimundarson
Narrating Iceland’s Financial Crisis:  
Contested Memories of Blame, Justice and Reconstruction
In April 2016, less than a decade after the collapse of the Icelandic banking sys-
tem, the prime minister of Iceland, Sigmundur Davíð Gunnlaugsson, became 
the first global politician brought down by the Panama Papers scandal. It was 
revealed that he had co- owned an offshore company with his heiress wife 
that held millions of dollars in claims on the three Icelandic banks that went 
bankrupt during the 2008 financial crisis. The leak did not only raise ethical 
questions about keeping large sums of money in an offshore account but also 
about potential conflicts of interest. The Prime Minister was heavily involved 
in policymaking on the relaxation of currency and capital controls, which 
had been put in place through an emergency legislation prior to the crash. 
After mounting a defiant attempt to cling to power, Gunnlaugsson was forced 
to resign as prime minister. In addition, it was revealed that the Minister of 
Finance, Bjarni Benediksson, and the Minister of the Interior, Ólöf Nordal, had 
also had business dealings with offshore companies, even if they had been sev-
ered. While similar ethical concerns were voiced, the two ministers managed 
to hold onto their positions.
The leaks in the Panama Papers scandal sparked one of the largest mass 
protests in Iceland’s history. The immediate reference point of a spontaneous 
manifestation of public anger was in the present, but it was also embedded in 
a recent past. Indeed, it was in part a throwback to and a re- enactment of the 
popular revolt in 2008, when sustained public demonstrations – dubbed the 
“Pots and Pans Revolution” – led to the fall of the government.1 What is more, 
it conjured up another instance of historical equivalence: Iceland had been the 
first country to charge a prime minister for crimes in connection with the global 
financial crisis. To prevent a renewed crisis of legitimacy, the government saw 
no other option than to call early elections in 2016. This dramatic episode was 
a reminder that despite having recovered fully in economic terms thanks to a 
tourist boom, Iceland was – and still is – haunted by the trauma of the financial 
 1 On the Icelandic protest, see Jón G. Bernburg, Economic Crisis and Mass Protests: The 
Pots and Pans Revolution in Iceland (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).
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crash, which is the largest that any country has experienced when measured 
in terms of the size of the economy.
In this chapter, I examine the response to the Icelandic financial collapse 2 by 
focusing on the politics of memory and justice to come to terms with a tainted 
past. I argue that the Icelandic case has many similarities with transitional jus-
tice processes, such as trials, truth commissions/reports, lustration or apolo-
gies, in countries undergoing transitions after a societal break- down. True, it 
was not about a civil conflict or a transformation from an authoritarian to a 
democratic regime.3 But the politics of justice and regret after political shocks 
can emerge without “regime change” or democratic consolidation. The crisis 
response in Iceland was about a societal reckoning, and the moralistic terms 
associated with the politics of memory and transitional justice – responsibility, 
culpability, and victimhood – were central to the Icelandic experience. As I 
will show, punitive justice took precedence over restorative justice. No public 
venues were created for open truth- seeking, such as a truth and reconciliation 
commission, designed to achieve national reconciliation or to contribute to 
political stability after a societal shock. It was feared that such measures would 
interfere with criminal prosecutions and possibly require amnesties that could 
risk a public backlash. Yet, to respond to popular demands for accountability 
and democratic renewal, decisions were made to appoint an independent com-
 2 On the Icelandic crisis, see Valur Ingimundarson, Phillippe Urfalino, and Irma Erlings-
dóttir, eds., Iceland’s Financial Crisis: The Politics of Blame, Protest, and Reconstruction 
(New York and London: Routledge, 2016); Eirikur Bergmann, Iceland and the Inter-
national Financial Crisis: Boom, Bust and Recover (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2014); Robert Z. Aliber and Gylfi Zoega, eds., Preludes to the Icelandic Financial Crisis 
(New York: Palgrave- Macmillan, 2011); Guðrún Johnsen, Bringing Down the Banking 
System – Lessons from Iceland (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014); Ásgeir Jónsson, 
Why Iceland? How One of the World’s Smallest Countries became the Meltdown’s Biggest 
Casualty (New York: McGraw–Hill, 2009); E. Paul Durrenberger and Gisli Pálsson, 
eds., Gambling Debt: Iceland’s Struggle with the New World Order (Boulder: University 
of Colorado Press, 2015); Guðni Jóhannesson, Hrunið (Reykjavík: JPV, 2009); Roger 
Boyes, Meltdown Iceland: How the global financial crisis bankrupted an entire country 
(London: Bloomsbury, 2009).
 3 On transitional justice, see Ruti Teitel, Transitional Justice (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000); Jon Elster, Closing the Books: Transitional Justice in Historical Perspective 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Jon Elster, ed., Retribution and Repa-
rations in the Transition to Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); 
Alexandra Barahona De Brito, Carmen Gonzalez Enriquez, and Paloma Aguilar, eds., 
The Politics of Memory: Transitional Justice in Democratizing Societies (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001).
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mission to write a “truth report” and to elect a new constitutional assembly by 
popular vote designed to review or rewrite the constitution.4 Thus, Iceland’s 
approach towards the economic disaster contained both backward- looking 
and forward- looking elements.
The memory politics in Iceland took, in a simplified, the form of a dialec-
tic between two metanarratives. After the collapse, many on the Left put the 
blame on the neo- liberal policies pursued by the Right, whose privatisation 
agenda had been accompanied by an ideological fixation on deregulation with 
minimum oversight. In contrast, the Right defended itself by pointing to the 
global financial crisis as a key factor in the fall of the banks, even if it was also 
critical of selective bankers for their reckless behaviour. Such simple dichoto-
mies, however, ignored instances of shared political complicity. While the con-
servative Right was the driving force, centrist forces and the Social Democratic 
Left colluded with it and business interests during the pre- crisis period. The 
only political entity not tainted by the banking collapse was the Left Green 
Movement, which had been critical of the neo- liberal turn in the early 2000s. 
In general, what political elites had in common during the period leading up to 
the crash was a desire to manage an economic boom in a technocratic fashion 
without much government interference and to reap the political benefits from it.
Following the banking collapse, the politics of transition created new divi-
sions and raised questions of selective justice and failed political reform. Not-
withstanding a highly critical “truth report” about the failures of the banks 
and heavy prison sentences of bankers, political and financial elites refused to 
accept any responsibility, pointing fingers at each other. Moreover, the inability 
to implement the constitutional project after setbacks and the staging of judicial 
proceedings against the former prime minister – which ended in a sentence 
with no punishment for a minor charge – underscored the conflict- ridden 
nature of the transitional process. To be sure, from the start there was wide-
spread public support for the jail sentences of leading bankers. Over 30 have 
 4 On the constitutional project, see the following contributions in Ingimundarson, Urfa-
lino, and Erlingsdóttir, Iceland’s Financial Crisis: Thorvaldur Gylfason, “Constitution 
on Ice,” 203 – 19; Jon Ólafsson,“The Constituent Assembly: A Study in Failure,” 252 – 272; 
Bjorg Thorarensen, “The Constitutional Council. Objectives and Shortcomings of an 
Innovative Process,” 239 – 251; Jon Elster, “Icelandic Constitution- Making in Compara-
tive Perspective,” 187 – 202; Salvör Nordal, “Constitutional Revision. A Weak Legislative 
Framework Compounded by Political Disputes,” 220 – 229; Pasquale Pasquino, “Constit-
uent Power and Authorization. Anatomy and Failure of a Constitution- Making Process,” 
230 – 238. See also Hélène Landemore, “Inclusive Constitution- Making: The Icelandic 
Experiment,” Journal of Political Philosophy 23, no. 2 (2015): 166 – 191.
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received a combined prison sentence of close to 90 years. This punitive aspect 
of the response to the crisis in Iceland differed markedly from the experience 
in Spain, Ireland, Greece, or Portugal. In these countries, criminal prosecu-
tions were neither part of a “reckoning with the past” nor of a future- oriented 
“reconstruction” agenda in the aftermath of the crisis, even if a few bankers 
have been prosecuted in Ireland and Spain. Yet, while the Icelandic banking 
collapse was generally seen as a catastrophic event, affecting Icelandic society 
as a whole, the question of blame remained contested.
As I illustrate here, one important explanatory factor is that the bounda-
ries between the memories of the pre- and post- crash period became quickly 
blurred. This meant that the political memory battle over accountability was 
not confined to the period leading up to the crisis but also to the response 
to it. In this way, a direct relationship between the “old guard” and the “new 
regime” was established, which influenced, in a substantial way, the “politics 
of reconstruction”. Therefore, the undoing of the pre- existing ideological order, 
which – as Ruti Teitel has argued – is crucial in all political transitions, did not 
succeed.5 Major actors from the past have been punished through stiff prison 
sentences. But some of the dominant elements of the previous political and 
business elites were also able to shape the transition by reinventing themselves 
either in new or old roles and as part of rehabilitation attempts.
The Making of a Tragedy: From Financial Euphoria to a Societal Disaster
The global expansion of the Icelandic banks from 2003 to 2007 stemmed from 
neo- liberal policies, which were adopted – in the late 1990s – by a centre- right 
government under the ideological guidance of Iceland’s largest party, the con-
servative Independence Party. What followed was a deeply flawed, politicised 
privatisation process,6 which not only freed the banks from state control but 
also led to a strong cross- ownership arrangement between them and the larg-
est companies. This ill- fated fusion created the conditions for a spectacular 
growth of the banking system, which had few historical parallels.7 The expan-
 5 See Teitel, Transitional Justice, 116.
 6 See Johnsen, Bringing Down the Banking System; Guðrun Johnsen, “The Rise and Fall 
of a Financial Empire,” in Iceland’s Financial Crisis. The Politics of Blame, Protest, and 
Reconstruction, ed. Valur Ingimundarson, Philippe Urfalino, and Irma Erlingsdóttir 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 37 – 53.
 7 See Aliber and Zoega, Preludes to the Icelandic Financial Crisis; see also Gylfi Zoega, 
“Iceland’s Financial Crisis: An Economic Perspective,” in Iceland’s Financial Crisis. The 
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sion was driven by access to cheap credit in global capital markets, which the 
banks also used to finance a debt- induced domestic consumer spree and to 
create a housing bubble.8
By 2008, the banking system had become ten times the size of Iceland’s GDP. 
During this transformative period, a group of approximately 30 businessmen 
accumulated enormous economic power, enabling them to stage what came 
close to a societal “take- over”.9 Representing competing financial and political 
groups, these “oligarchs” became the main donors to political candidates and 
parties, purchased private media companies, and provided financial support 
to public/private education and cultural institutions. Political elites not only 
became highly dependent on this new capitalist class; they relished their role 
in initiating the massive transfer of power from the public sphere to the private 
sector. As then Finance Minister and later Prime Minister, Geir Haarde, put 
it in 2005: “[…] few things are more rewarding in politics than to see when a 
good idea becomes embedded and wins in the ideological struggle […] I am 
sure that no one wants to return to the time when the financial sector was sub-
jected to political control”.10 As a result, the state was sharply weakened, with 
politicians and financial regulators – including the Central Bank – relegated 
to the role of passive spectators in a show run by private financial interests.
To be sure, the architect of the Independence Party’s privatisation agenda, 
Davíð Oddsson – who was Iceland’s prime minister from 1991 until 2005 and 
a governor of the Central Bank from 2005 to 2009 – sometimes attacked the 
excesses of the new bank owners.11 But his criticism was selective: apart from 
attacking specific businessmen and bankers, whom he saw as his foes, he tar-
geted the largest opposition party, the Social Democratic Alliance, for its ties 
with some of them, while remaining silent on similar connections between the 
Politics of Blame, Protest, and Reconstruction, ed. Valur Ingimundarson, Philippe Urfal-
ino, and Irma Erlingsdóttir (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 21 – 36.
 8 See Jon Daníelsson and Gylfi Zoega, “Collapse of a Country,” Institute of Economic 
Studies – Working Papers Series 9, no. 3 (2009), http://www.ioes.hi.is/sites/hhi.hi.is/
files/W-series/2009/WP0903.pdf.
 9 See Valur Ingimundarson, “A ‘Crisis of Affluence’: The Politics of an Economic Break-
down in Iceland,” Irish Studies in International Affairs 21 (2010): 57 – 63.
 10 Geir Haarde, “Address on the occasion of the SBV Day,” April 7, 2005, quoted in Vigdís 
Þóra Sigfúsdóttir, “Réttarstaða ráðherra sem sakborninga fyrir Landsómi í ljósi stjór-
narskrár lýðveldisins Íslands og Mannréttindasáttmála Evrópu” (ML thesis in Law, 
University of Bifröst, 2011), 1.
 11 See, for example, Morgunblaðið, March 4, 2003; November 23, 2003 and November 25, 
2003.
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Conservatives and other business groups. Indeed, as noted, apart from the Left 
Greens, all political parties colluded with the new economic “masters”, celebrat-
ing what became dubbed as the Icelandic “outrush” – an aggressive territorial 
aggrandisement strategy in global markets. The president of Iceland, Ólafur 
Ragnar Grímsson, played a key role in legitimising the project abroad by pro-
moting, in essentialist terms, the “special brand” of Icelandic entrepreneurship 
with references to heroic mediaeval Viking myths.12
Given this state of euphoria, it should not have come as a surprise that the 
reaction of politicians to the first signs of trouble facing the banks in late 2007 
and early 2008 was that of complete denial. Having stayed out of government 
from 1995 until 2007, the Social Democratic Alliance had no influence over 
the economic policies during this period. However, after joining a coalition 
government with the Independence Party in 2007, it became as seduced by 
the power of finance capital as other political forces. Placing their trust in the 
financial elite, the conservative Prime Minister Geir Haarde, and the Social 
Democratic Foreign Minister Ingibjörg Sólrún Gísladóttir even embarked on 
a “road show” abroad, where they went out of their way to vouch for the health 
of the Icelandic banking system at a time when it was visibly buckling under 
the strain and coming under fire abroad for its unsustainable growth and size.13 
When the three largest banks eventually crumbled in the early stages of the 
2008 global financial crisis, the government had practically no defenses at its 
disposal, except for one contingency plan – admittedly an extremely impor-
tant one – that prevented a total financial collapse. As a result of the banking 
system’s gigantic size, there was no way the Icelandic government could save 
it. But when facing a bank run at home and abroad, the Icelandic parliament 
passed an emergency law to ensure that deposit holders were given priority 
to bond holders and to pave the way for all domestic assets to be transferred 
to new banks. What this meant was that the banking system shrunk, in one 
fell swoop, to a fraction of what it had been before the disaster. But to avert a 
sovereign debt default, an IMF bailout and emergency loans from the Nordic 
 12 See Guðjón Friðriksson, Saga af forseta. Forsetatíð Ólafs Ragnars Grímssonar. Útrás, 
athafnir og einkamál (Reykjavik: Forlagið bókabúð, 2008). See also Kristin Loftsdóttir, 
“Vikings invade present day Iceland,” in Gambling Debt. Iceland’s Rise and Fall in the 
Global Economy, ed. E. Paul Durrenberger and Gisli Pálsson (Boulder: University of 
Colorado Press, 2015), 3 – 15.
 13 Ingibjörg Gísladóttir, “Islands økonomi, stærk og flekisbel,” Icelandic Foreign Minis-
try, accessed January 22, 2018, http://www.utanrikisraduneyti.is/frettaefni/raedurISG/
nr/4151.
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countries and Poland were needed after the government had failed to attract 
emergency loans from Western countries and Russia.
The Politics of Justice: From a “Truth Report” to Legal Proceedings
Apart from the economic responses, the government and parliament were 
under intense public pressure from the beginning to explain and confront the 
crisis through political means. Iceland’s crisis management strategy, which was 
developed hurriedly during a state of extreme political volatility in 2008 – 2009, 
was characterised by an uneven mixture of punitive and restorative instruments, 
with the former trumping the latter. To assign blame and punishment, a Special 
Investigation Commission was appointed with the aim of writing a “truth 
report” about the collapse of the banking system,14 and a Special Prosecutor’s 
Office was established to look into potential criminal charges. Moreover, in 
an act of “lustration”, the three governors of the Central Bank were dismissed. 
Impeachment charges were subsequently filed against the former prime min-
ister, and many bank managers were prosecuted and later sentenced for fraud 
and market manipulation.
When the report of the Special Investigation Commission was published in 
2010, it proved to be highly critical of domestic political and financial elites. It 
went so far as to argue that the collapse of the banking system had been inev-
itable by the end of 2006 and that the banks had committed fraud by inflating 
the value of their stocks and, thus, engaged in market manipulation. Three for-
mer ministers, Prime Minster Geir Haarde, Finance Minister Árni Mathiesen, 
and Commerce Minister Björgvin G. Sigurðsson, were singled out for having 
possibly violated Iceland’s 1963 Law on Ministerial Responsibility. Five other 
former officials were accused of acting with negligence in failing to prevent 
Iceland’s banking collapse in 2008: The three governors of the Central Bank, 
including Davíð Oddsson, and the former Director of the Financial Supervisory 
Authority. In addition, blame was also assigned to former Foreign Minister 
Ingibjörg Sólrún Gísladóttir, as the leader of the Social Democratic Alliance, 
 14 See Vilhjálmur Árnason, “Moral Analysis of an Economic Collapse – An Exercise in 
Practical Ethics,” Nordic Journal of Applied Ethics 4, no. 1 (2010): 101 – 123; Vilhjálmur 
Árnason, “Democratic Practices, Governance, and the Financial Crash,” in Iceland’s 
Financial Crisis. The Politics of Blame, Protest, and Reconstruction, ed. Valur Ingimun-
darson, Philippe Urfalino, and Irma Erlingsdóttir (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2016), 121 – 139. See also Guðni Elísson, “Ísland, anno núll. Rannsóknarskýrslan, spuninn, 
ábyrgðin og staðleysustjórnmál,” Tímarit Máls og menningar 71, no. 2 (2010): 24 – 40.
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even if the 1963 law was not seen as being applicable in her case or in those of 
the Central Bank officials.15
While the Commission had a broad mandate, it did not operate through an 
open process or organise any public staging of truth- telling. Its findings were 
based on documented evidence and testimonies from politicians, officials, and 
bankers. A delay in completing the report proved to be frustrating for a public 
in need of explanations for the disaster. Yet, when the report finally came out 
it served, for a short time, a cathartic purpose and instantly became a foun-
dational document – an accepted interpretation of the causes of the crisis. It 
managed to fulfil the main requirement expected from truth commissions by 
giving a collective identity to a divided society.16 Yet, precisely because of this 
emphasis on unitary coherence,17 where individual and collective processes 
were treated largely in equivalent terms,18 it gave different groups a chance to 
interpret it in ways that fit their own interests.
The report satisfied the expectations of the Left by mentioning the culprits 
and by giving an account of a tainted privatisation and deregulation drive. The 
Right welcomed the exposure of insider trading practices, especially of those 
members of the banking and business elite against whom it had a political 
grudge. The report was not about societal reconciliation, which is normally 
rooted in long- term processes beyond the capacity of a short- term commission. 
It was, critical, however, of the ideology and policies that led to the excesses of 
 15 Rannsóknarnefnd Alþingis, Aðdragandi og orsakir falls íslensku bankanna 2008 og teng-
dir atburðir (Reykjavik: Icelandic Parliament, 2010), http://sic.althingi.is/.
 16 Brandon Hamber and Richard A. Wilson, “Symbolic Closure through Memory, Repara-
tion and Revenge in post- Conflict Societies,” in The Role of Memory in Ethnic Conflict, 
ed. Ed Cairns and Michael D. Roe (Houndsmills, Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2003), 144.
 17 On truth commissions, see Priscilla Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State Ter-
ror and Atrocity (New York: Routledge, 2001); Beth Rushton, “Truth and reconciliation? 
The experience of Truth Commissions,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 60, 
no. 1 (2006): 125 – 141; Charles Maier, “Doing History, Doing Justice: The Narrative of 
the Historian and of the Truth Commission,” in Truth vs. Justice. The Moral Efficacy of 
Truth Commissions: South Africa and beyond, ed. Robert Rotberg and Dennis Thomp-
son (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 261 – 278; David A. Crocker, “Truth 
Commissions, Transitional Justice, and Civil Society,” in Truth vs. Justice. The Moral 
Efficacy of Truth Commissions: South Africa and beyond, ed. Robert Rotberg and Dennis 
Thompson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 99 – 121; Nenad Dimitrijevic, 
“Justice beyond Blame: Moral Justification of (the Idea) of a Truth Commission,” Journal 
of Conflict Resolution 50, no. 3 (2006): 368 – 382.
 18 Hamber and Wilson, “Symbolic Closure,” 144.
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the boom period. It also showed how politicians had become dependent on 
financial elites. In this way, it contributed to the production of social knowledge 
indispensable to societal transitions 19 by offering a politically viable narrative. 
But the report had few long- term effects, even if some of its recommendations 
for institutional reform were acted upon. Most importantly, its subscription 
to punitive notions of political accountability was only partially accepted, not 
least because of the Icelandic parliament’s controversial handling of the issue.
A cross- party Parliamentary Committee entrusted with evaluating the report 
of the Special Investigation Commission accepted its findings. Hence, the com-
mittee recommended, if not unanimously, that three ministers as well as the 
former Minister of Foreign Affairs Ingibjörg Sólrún Gísladóttir 20 be prosecuted 
for dereliction of duty in connection with the fall of the banks. Consistent with 
the conclusion of the Special Investigation Commission, the governors of the 
Central Bank and the heads of the Financial Supervisory Authority were not 
on the list of those selected for prosecution on the grounds that the law was not 
applicable to them. The ministers who privatised the banks were also excluded 
due to statute of limitations considerations.
If parliament wanted to be absolved of the burden of charging several of 
its own members for crimes, it could have adhered closely to the recommen-
dations of the Special Investigation Commission. Yet, as it turned out, parlia-
ment was unable to avoid partisan rancour when it voted on the issue in 2010. 
The majority of MPs decided only to refer the case of former Prime Minister 
Geir Haarde to the Special Court, defeating proposals to indict the other three. 
This outcome was mostly due to the paradoxical situation in which the Social 
Democratic Alliance found itself. Having been briefly a part of the “old regime” – 
as the coalition partners of the Conservatives from 2007 to the beginning of 
2009 – it now wanted to be identified with the “new regime”, which sought to 
distance itself from the past through a commitment to a left- wing agenda and 
constitutional reform. Unable to solve this dilemma, some Social Democratic 
members of parliament decided to vote for Haarde’s impeachment as part of 
efforts “to come to terms with the past”, while shielding their own ministers 
from prosecution.
A case that had been put forward to meet public demands for accountability 
of the political elite turned, instead, into an ugly debate over whether one poli-
 19 Dimitrijević, “Justice beyond Blame,” 376 – 377.
 20 “Icelandic Parliament (September 2010),” Skýrsla þingnefndar til að fjalla um skýrslu 
rannsóknarnefndar Alþingis, accessed December 4, 2015, http://www.althingi.is/altex-
t/138/s/1501.html.
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tician should bear sole responsibility for the banking collapse. Not many were 
willing to subscribe to such a reductionist view, including those who strongly 
favoured criminal prosecution. When Geir Haarde’s case was submitted to the 
Special Court, he was indicted for displaying “serious malfeasance of his duties 
as prime minister in the face of major danger looming over Icelandic financial 
institutions and the state treasury, a danger that he knew of or should have 
known of ”.21 Other charges included a serious neglect of his ministerial duties, 
a lack of efforts to assess the financial risks facing Iceland or to take action to 
reduce the size of its banking system, and a failure to ensure that one of the 
Icelandic bank’s saving accounts in the United Kingdom and Netherlands were 
split off into subsidiary companies in those countries before the collapse of the 
banking system.22
What makes the Icelandic Special Court different from other domestic courts 
is not only its function as a venue for holding politicians and officials account-
able but also its mandate and composition. It operates under highly politicised 
conditions because the separation of legislative and judicial powers does not 
apply to its proceedings. Thus, it has to act on criminal charges issued by par-
liament, not the public prosecutor.23 Moreover, it is a hybrid court composed 
of professional judges (including those of the Supreme Court), legal specialists, 
and also political appointees. The only leeway the court has vis- à- vis parliament 
is to make decisions on the validity of individual charges. In 2011, it dropped 
the two charges against Geir Haarde, which dealt with gross negligence and 
failure to have the financial risks assessed, but it continued with the case based 
on the four remaining charges.
The Law as Public Spectacle: The Criminal Case against a Prime Minister
The trial over Geir Haarde took place in March, 2012. A highly symbolic venue, 
the Centre for Cultural Heritage in the centre of Reykjavik was temporarily 
turned into a criminal courthouse. Over 40 people offered testimonies, includ-
ing the ministers who escaped impeachment; the former governors of the 
 21 “Icelandic Parliament (September 11, 2010),” Tillaga til þingsályktunar um málshöfðun 
gegn ráðherrum, accessed July 8, 2017, http://www.althingi.is/altext/138/s/1502.html.
 22 “Icelandic Parliament (September 11, 2010).”
 23 On the Special Court, see, for example, Sigurður Líndal, “Um ráðherraábyrgð og lands-
dóm,” Skírnir 184, no. 2 (2010): 522 – 532; Svala I. Ólafsdóttir, “Rökstólar. Landsdómur 
og ráðherraábyrgð,” Úlfljótur 64, no. 2 (2011): 290 – 294.
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Central Bank; and the former directors of the failed Icelandic banks, several 
of whom had been charged with criminal conduct by the Special Prosecutor. 
This was the first time that all the major actors in the banking crisis testified 
publicly in a court of law, but they had earlier given private testimonies to the 
Special Investigation Commission. Yet, as a contribution to retributive justice, 
the testimonies proved to be of small value. Nothing new came to light – and 
no one was prepared to concede any mistakes or assume responsibility for the 
2008 disaster.
In line with the standard Conservative narrative, Geir Haarde put the blame 
on the Icelandic banks – which had acted irresponsibly, taken unacceptable 
risks, and been involved in illegal conduct – as well the global financial cri-
sis. His government had not been in a position to do anything to prevent the 
crash, such as reducing the gargantuan size of the banking system or pressur-
ing the banks to relocate abroad.24 In other words, “preventive action” was not 
possible because the crisis was beyond the control of the government. A gov-
ernment intervention would only have hastened the downfall of the banks by 
undermining their standing in global markets. Misleading public statements 
or silence on the part of high government officials, such as the Prime Minister 
and Foreign Minister,25over the real state of the banks during the “roadshow” 
were explained away as an attempt to prevent something worse. To him, there 
was no way for ministers to know that the entire banking system was at risk.26 
Given the prevailing structural constraints, it was not possible to act differently.
This line of argument was incomplete because the government had ignored 
strong warnings of an impending disaster from foreign government officials, 
economists, and journalists.27 Such sceptics were usually branded as spoil-
ers or jealous distractors in the media prior to the crash. The former minis-
ters, who testified at the trial, stated that the banking collapse could only have 
been prevented if something had been done several years before the crisis. 
 24 “The testimony of Geir Haarde before the Icelandic Special Court (Landsdómur, 
5 March 2012),” accessed July 6, 2017, http://www.landsdómur.is/adalmedferd/nr/9.
 25 Financial Times, March 27, 2008; Iceland Review, March 12, 2008.
 26 “The testimony of Geir Haarde.”
 27 See Carsten Valgren and Lars Christiansen, “Iceland. Geyser Crisis,” Research, March 21, 
2006, accessed July 6, 2017, http://www.mbl.is/media/98/398.pdf; lecture by Robert Z. 
Aliber, “Monetary turbulence and the Icelandic economy,” University of Iceland, 2008; 
Anne C. Sibert and Willem Buiter, “The Icelandic banking crisis and what do to about 
it: The lender of last resort theory of optimal currency areas.” CEPR Policy Insight 26 
(2008), http://willembuiter.com/iceland.pdf; Robert Wade, “Iceland pays price for finan-
cial excess,” Financial Times, July 1, 2008.
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In this way, they made the admittedly a- historical conclusion of the Special 
Investigation about the “inevitability” of the banking collapse after 2006 their 
own. To respond to accusations that they reacted irresponsibly by not having 
formal government meetings on the rapidly deteriorating economic situation in 
2008, they defended themselves by saying that the state of the banking system 
had been discussed in general terms. It would have been impossible to reduce 
its size in 2008, they argued, because there were no willing buyers at that time.28 
That may be true, but the government had not made any attempt to do so earlier 
because it wanted to continue to rely on the revenues generated by the banks.
The central bankers blamed the banks for recklessness and high- risk gam-
bles.29 Former Central Bank Governor, Davíð Oddsson, made the point that he 
had warned the government, in the strongest possible terms, that the Icelandic 
banks were facing serious difficulties re- capitalising themselves as the European 
banks no longer believed in their stability.30 The head of the failed banks blamed 
the international financial crisis as well as the government and the Central Bank 
for the fall of the banks.31 It was a repetition of arguments that had been made 
ad nauseam since the crash. Those who expected the first public staging of 
truth- telling to create a cathartic moment similar to that evoked by the “truth 
report” were wrong. There were no public confessions, apologies or admissions 
of responsibility. The testimonies amounted to a wholesale whitewash of the 
conduct of the political and economic elites.
 28 “The testimony of Ingibjörg Sólrún Gísladóttir, former Foreign Minister, 12 March 2012,” 
accessed July 7, 2017, http://www.landsdómur.is/adalmedferd/nr/41; “The testimony 
of Árni Mathiesen, former Minister of Finance, 13 March 2012,” accessed July 7, 2017, 
http://www.landsdómur.is/adalmedferd/nr/29; “The testimony of Björgvin G. Sigurðs-
son, former Minister of Commerce, March 6, 2017,” accessed July 7, 2017, http://www.
landsdómur.is/adalmedferd/nr/34.
 29 “The testimony of Davíð Oddsson, former Central Bank Governor, 19 March 2012,” 
accessed July 7, 2017, http://www.landsdómur.is/adalmedferd/nr/36; “The testimony of 
Ingimundur Friðriksson, former Central Bank Governor, 7 March 2012,” accessed July 7, 
2017, http://www.landsdómur.is/adalmedferd/nr/42.
 30 “The testimony of Davíð Oddsson.”
 31 See “The testimony of Hreiðar Már Sigurðsson, former CEO of Kaupthing Bank, 
8 March 2012,” accessed July 7, 2017, http://www.landsdómur.is/adalmedferd/nr/40; 
“The testimony of Sigurður Einarsson, former Chair of the Board of Kaupthing Bank, 
19 March 2012,” accessed July 7, 2017, http://www.landsdómur.is/adalmedferd/nr/57; 
“The testimony of Sigurjón Þ. Árnason, former Director of Landsbanki, 12 March 2012,” 
accessed July 7, 2017, http://www.landsdómur.is/adalmedferd/nr/59; “The testimony of 
Lárus Welding, former Director of Glitnir Bank, 12 March 2012,” accessed July 7, 2017, 
http://www.landsdómur.is/adalmedferd/nr/55.
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The Special Court convicted Haarde of only one minor criminal charge 
without punishment – of failing to hold government meetings over the pre-
carious state of the banking system ahead of its collapse – and cleared him on 
three others: of not doing anything to reduce the size of the banking system, 
of not making sure that the Icesave internet accounts of the Landsbanki in 
Britain and the Netherlands were transferred to a subsidiary, and of failing to 
produce better results from the government’s 2006 report on financial stability. 
Yet, what amounted to a defensive victory did not satisfy Haarde. He blamed 
the court for meting out political justice, describing the verdict as “ludicrously 
laughable”.32 Earlier he had termed the affair a political trial and farce, bor-
dering on persecution. He claimed to have nothing to hide because he had a 
“a clean slate” – using a language fitting to transitional justice proceedings.33 
Until the fall of the banks, he had defended the cosy relationship he had with 
selected owners of the banks, notably Björgólfur Thor Björgólfsson, who was 
listed among the world’s richest men and whom the Prime Minister boasted 
of meeting regularly.34 But on the question of responding to the crisis, Haarde 
claimed that his own actions had actually helped save Iceland from economic 
ruin and national bankruptcy by rushing the emergency law through parlia-
ment. What is more, in an attempt to clear his name, he appealed his conviction 
to the European Court of Human Rights. In 2017, the Court ruled that Geir’s 
rights had not been violated by the 2012 verdict.
Geir Haarde’s interpretation was questioned by those who agreed with the 
Special Investigation Commission that he should be held accountable for doing 
nothing to avert the economic disaster. However, the judicial proceedings 
divided public opinion on the question of whether they should have been 
held at all.35 The pressure for prosecution proved far weaker than it was in the 
beginning because many saw it as being wrong and unfair to charge Haarde 
alone and not to include the other ministers. The call for retribution is usually 
the strongest in the immediate aftermath of a major societal rupture and sen-
tences usually become far more lenient as time elapses. The outcome of the 
Special Court trial over the highest representative of the Icelandic political elite 
 32 Eyjan, April 24, 2012.
 33 See “Former Iceland Prime Minister on Trial, RTE News, 5 September 2011,” accessed 
July 8, 2017, http://www.rte.ie/news/2011/0905/iceland.html; see also Vísir, September 28, 
2010, accessed July 8, 2017, http://www.visir.is/geir- segir- akaeruna- jadra- vid- politiskar- 
ofsoknir/article/201013381550.
 34 DV, September 30, 2008.
 35 Eyjan, February 13, 2012, http://eyjan.is/2012/02/13/thjodin- klofin- vegna- akaeru- a- 
hendur- geir- haarde- svipadur- fjoldi- vill- haetta- vid- og- malid- afram/.
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tended to confirm this trend; however, importantly enough, it did not affect 
the sentencing of bankers who continued to receive severe prison terms eight 
years after the financial collapse.
It is true that Geir Haarde’s prosecution was a form of political justice. After 
a majority of the MPs issued the charges against him along political lines, the 
Public Prosecutor stated that she was bound by law to prosecute the case on 
the premises spelled out by parliament.36 The political nature of the trial was 
also underscored by the fact that eight out of 15 members of the Special Court 
were political appointees. Yet, this should not have come as a surprise when 
the case is approached from a criminal justice perspective; the use of such 
mechanism is bound to be a highly politicised and contested process. For one 
thing, it is often difficult to argue that political accountability or negligence 
should be equated with criminal acts. Whereas the bankers could be charged 
with financial crimes, such as market manipulation or illegal financial gain, 
the politicians were not directly involved in such wrongdoing. The fact that 
Geir Haarde was sentenced only for refraining from holding formal govern-
ment meetings on the precarious state of the banking shows this dilemma. On 
the other hand, the weakness of the case against Haarde does not clear him or 
his ideological allies of political responsibility. The tainted privatisation and 
deregulation drive did much to create the conditions for the catastrophe, and 
the close links between political and financial elites ensured that there would 
be no attempt to supervise and regulate the business practices of the latter.
The “Old Regime” and the Politics of Transition
When societies come to terms with a troubled past, the “old regime” is often 
not only capable of influencing the transition but also of staging a comeback. 
Previous elites may not be in charge of the hegemonic political narrative any-
more, but they can ensure that old practices survive, if in a different form.37 
Thus, the question is not about defending or re- legitimising the past, but rather 
about the degree to which these elites can sustain themselves by infiltrating the 
transition. After being forced out of the Central Bank, Davíð Oddsson became 
the editor- in- chief of the second largest newspaper in Iceland, the conserva-
tive Morgunblaðið, which he used to propagate his own interpretation of the 
economic collapse in an effort to rehabilitate himself. In addition, he played 
 36 See Morgunblaðið, January 27, 2012.
 37 Dimitrijević, “Justice beyond Blame,” 371.
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an important role in fighting the left- wing government policies on the consti-
tutional project and other issues.
Conversely, the media empire, which includes the largest newspaper, Frét-
tablaðið, and a private TV station is still controlled by the wife of Jón Ásgeir 
Jóhannesson, who was one of the leading businessmen in Iceland in the 2000s. 
As the former CEO of Baugur Group, Jóhannesson had extensive dealings 
with all the major Icelandic banks and a controlling stake in one of the larg-
est Icelandic banks before its collapse. After the banking privatisation, he was 
engaged in a fierce power struggle with Oddsson and his political allies during 
the latter’s tenure as Prime Minister and as a Governor of the Central Bank, 
which lasted until the financial collapse. Indeed, this fight to some degree was 
reenacted within a different political context and on another public stage dur-
ing the post- crisis period.
It is true that the success of the comeback of political and financial actors 
has been mixed. While Davíð Oddsson has made the most of his powerful 
media position, he made a failed bid to become the President of Iceland in 
2016, receiving less than 15 % of the vote. Three other major political play-
ers, all of whom were singled out by the Special Investigation Committee for 
bearing responsibility for the crash, have received high- level jobs abroad. In 
a symbolic political act designed to rehabilitate Haarde after his verdict, the 
Independence Party arranged for his appointment as Iceland’s Ambassador to 
the United States in 2014. In 2012, former Foreign Minister Ingibjörg Sólrún 
Gísladóttir became the UN Representative for Women in Afghanistan and later 
its Regional Director for Europe and Central Asia, and in 2017 she was made 
Director of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights at the 
Organization for Security and Co- operation in Europe (OSCE). In 2010, Árni 
Mathiesen, the former Minister of Finance, became the Assistant Director- 
General in the Fisheries and Aquaculture Department of the UN Food and 
Agricultural Organisation (FAO) in Rome.
The President, Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson, whose popularity had reached an 
all- time low after the crash as a result of his role in celebrating the Icelandic 
banks and their global expansion, managed to reinvent himself politically in a 
spectacular fashion. He sided with nationalist grassroots activists by refusing 
twice to sign a law concerning solving the Icesave issue and by agreeing to a 
taxpayer- funded liability claim in connection with the failed Icelandic bank 
in Britain and Holland. By doing so, he automatically triggered two referenda 
on the bill, which was overwhelmingly rejected by voters. In 2012, he was ree-
lected president by popular vote for a fifth consecutive term. He eventually 
refrained from running again in 2016 after briefly entering the contest after 
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the Panama Papers scandal on the grounds that he could ensure stability in a 
period of political turmoil.
As for leading businessmen, Jón Ásgeir Jóhannesson’s economic position is 
much weaker than it was in the 2000s. Unlike most of the bank directors, he has 
been spared a jail term, but he was sentenced in a tax fraud case and received a 
suspended sentence. And despite having won a case before the European Court 
of Human Rights on the grounds that his human rights had been violated by 
Icelandic courts for punishing him twice for the same act, he is still facing 
charges by the Special Prosecutor in connection with the financial crisis. On 
the other hand, Björgólfur Thor Guðmundsson, who experienced a steep fall 
in the world of business during the financial crisis, has largely reclaimed his 
former wealth status. Moreover, he has not been charged with financial crimes 
by the Special Prosecutor. Thus, two rival tycoons from the pre-2008 period 
and former stakeholders in the banks have been able to continue to exert their 
influence, even if their positions differ substantially. Interestingly, both called 
for the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission to deal with 
the aftermath of the crash.38 Yet, the problem with such a course of action was 
evident from the start. To opt exclusively for restorative justice mechanisms 
in the name of societal reconciliation would not only have shielded potential 
perpetrators from retributive justice; as noted, such a commission could also 
have provided the heavily compromised state with implicit power to “wipe out 
the slate clean”. For this reason, it is not surprising that the idea put forward 
by two leading figures in the financial crash received no backing; rather, it 
was treated like a self- serving vehicle for restorative truth- telling without legal 
accounting or retributive justice.
Conclusion
What shows the deep societal impact of the crisis is that Iceland’s surprisingly 
speedy economic recovery – which has resulted in high growth rates, full 
employment, and far lower debt levels than before the banking collapse – has 
failed to transform, politically, into a “new normal”. Instead, highly contested 
political narratives about the causes and nature of the crash or about the assign-
ment of responsibility have emerged. As I have shown here, the response has 
been heavily influenced by judicial mechanisms. The pressure for punitive 
accountability has not been followed by calls for other forms of reconciliation 
 38 See Eyjan, March 23, 2012; DV, March 28, 2012.
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or amnesties, except in the form of selective public debt relief designed to 
underscore “collective victimhood”. And despite the praise heaped on it, the 
“truth report” has not served as a blueprint for “societal reconstruction”, even if 
it has frequently been used as a reference point. Indeed, the politically enacted 
process of “coming to terms with the past” has been characterised by conflict.
The rituals associated with the politics of justice were initially based on the 
notion that political time should be divided into “before” and “after”.39 The 
judicial proceedings against Geir Haarde were backward- looking and based 
on a law dating back to the early 20th century, when Iceland had not been 
granted sovereignty from Denmark. Even if the law was archaic, it became 
part of the constitution of 1944 and the 1963 Law on Ministerial Responsibility, 
underscoring historical continuity. But when the law, which had never been 
used, was evoked in 2010, it led to political instrumentalisation. As a result, 
the Right interpreted the trial of Geir Haarde as part of the left- wing govern-
ment’s vendetta against the policies and ideology of the “old regime”. This view 
partly contributed to the erasure of the distinction between the pre- crisis and 
post- crisis periods in the battle of political memory. This was by no means a 
foregone conclusion. Massive popular mobilisation had discredited the Right 
in 2008 – 2009 and forced the Social Democratic Alliance – through a leader-
ship change – to leave the government with the Conservatives and distance 
itself from their neo- liberal agenda. Yet, during the tenure of the left- wing 
government from 2009 to 2013, the former managed to reinvent itself through 
collective action and stage a political comeback. What proved to be a pivotal 
factor was the Right’s nationalistic attack on the government’s handling of the 
Icesave dispute with Britain and Holland, especially its willingness to assume 
Icelandic sovereign legal liability for debts of the bankrupt Icelandic private bank 
in these countries. Moreover, it was successful in dismantling core aspects of 
the agenda of the left- wing government, such as the constitutional experiment.
This success, however, has not led to a new revisionist account of the crisis. 
The Right has not been able to overcome its compromised past or rehabilitate 
itself; the Left, having had to adopt unpopular measures to deal with a state of 
exception after the banking collapse, also failed to capitalise on its early vic-
tories and to reclaim its moral high ground. To be sure, as noted, there has 
been much support for bringing bankers and businessmen to justice, and the 
Special Prosecutor has been successful in getting a number of guilty verdicts. 
But when it comes to the political elites, things have been much murkier due to 
a failure to restore political trust. This shows the ambiguities of the politics of 
 39 See Teitel, Transitional Justice, 116.
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transition: the inability to construct universally accepted master narratives, the 
refusal to accept responsibility, and the persistent lack of distinction between 
the “old regime” and the “new” one. No permanent political realignment of 
power relations has resulted from the crisis.
Thus, the politics of memory has not led to the rehabilitation of political elites, 
whose legitimacy is still being questioned. 10 years after the crash, Icelandic 
society is still grappling with a memory of a troubled past in a state of renewed 
economic euphoria, which bears more than a faint semblance to the period 
before the rain in 2008. Karl Marx’s often- quoted remark about history repeat-
ing itself – first as tragedy, and second as farce – does not have to become a 
self- fulfilling prophecy. But, as a warning from history, it has an eerie reso-
nance in the present.
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Gunnþórunn Guðmundsdóttir
The Black Cone: Memory and Memorialisation 
in Post- Recession Iceland
How societies remember and how nations memorialise seminal events in their 
history has been the focus of much attention in recent decades and been one 
of the prime subjects of analysis in the ever- growing field of memory studies. 
The attention is not, of course, limited to academics and scholars, as we have 
many examples in recent times of how memory politics not only reflect but can 
also impinge upon our current political realities. The evocation of memories 
of the Franco- era in the current crisis in Catalonia is one such example. Here, 
incomplete memory or silenced/repressed memory leading to a problematic 
transition to democracy is blamed in some circles for the political and demo-
cratic crisis, and the conservative government’s forceful response to the inde-
pendence movement in Catalonia. What this attention to memory – collective 
memory and cultural memory – clearly demonstrates is that such memory is 
under pressure from many different forces. In short, representations of mem-
ory in society have to answer to political expediency, economic considerations, 
calls for social cohesion, cultural traditions, current aesthetic values, and local 
memory practices. In her seminal study on memory politics entitled Tangled 
Memories, Marita Sturken states:
“Public commemoration is a form of history- making, yet it can also be a contested 
form of remembrance in which cultural memories slide through and into each 
other, creating a narrative tangle”.1
One such “narrative tangle” is very much in evidence in the narratives told of 
a seminal event in Icelandic history: the 2008 collapse of the Icelandic banks, 
and the series of ever intensifying protests in late 2008 and early 2009 in 
Reykjavík, which have been termed, due to the protesters’ use of pots and pans, 
the “Kitchenware Revolution” or the “Pots and Pans Revolution”. In his study 
of the protests, Jón Gunnar Bernburg explains how they “attracted widespread 
 1 Marita Sturken, Tangled Memories. The Vietnam War, the AIDS Epidemic, and the Pol-
itics of Remembering (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 44.
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participation and support among the public, and involved a serious threat to 
public order”.2 The protests came to a head in January 2009 with thousands of 
people protesting every day in front of parliament (Althing) in the centre of 
Reykjavík. Protesters were calling for the resignation of both the government 
and the head of the Central Bank, and for new elections to be held. For the 
most part, the protests stopped with the resignation of the government led by 
the right- wing Independence Party a few weeks later, but as has become very 
evident in the years since, a new protest culture developed.
The meaning of these events, the collapse of the banks, the devastating eco-
nomic effects it had (“the biggest that any country has ever suffered relative 
to the size of its economy”),3 the huge debt the country and individuals were 
plunged into, the following protests, and the changes in the political party struc-
ture that followed, are greatly contested, as is evident for instance in Icelandic 
political discourse. There is no consensus on how the story of the unprecedented 
economic and political crisis should be told. And although the country now 
in 2018 is well under way in its economic recovery, the political ramifications 
seem far from being resolved, as governments have toppled twice in just over a 
year due to political scandals, and the political landscape is greatly affected by 
uncertainty with commentators, politicians, and journalists regularly evoking 
contested memories in their discourse of the recent tumultuous past. As Valur 
Ingimundarson suggests:
“[…] one can describe the Icelandic experience as a struggle – within the context 
of the politics of memory – between two metanarratives. On the one hand, the 
Left […] blamed the crash on the Right, arguing that its neoliberal policies and 
ideology had, over the period of 18 years, transformed Icelandic society, with cat-
astrophic results. On the other, the Right pointed to the global financial crisis as a 
key factor in instigating the crash, together with Icelandic bankers who had acted 
with supreme recklessness. Both sides – and the population in general – agreed 
on interpreting the economic collapse as a national disaster, affecting Icelandic 
 2 Jon Gunnar Bernburg, Economic Crisis and Mass Protest: The Pots and Pans Revolution 
in Iceland (London: Routledge, 2016), 7. See also his book for a detailed description of 
the unfolding of the protests.
 3 Valur Ingimundarson, Phillipe Urfalino, and Irma Erlingsdóttir, “Introduction,” in 
Iceland’s Financial Crisis: The Politics of Blame, Protest, and Reconstruction, ed. Valur 
Ingimundarson, Phillipe Urfalino, and Irma Erlingsdóttir (London: Routledge, 2016), 
1 – 18, here 1.
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society as a whole. However, the political question of how to account and assign 
blame was contested from the start”.4
At one extreme of the narrative spectrum we have the story of an Icelandic 
financial success story that hit hard times due to world events beyond the 
politicians’ control, which culminated in riots where hooligans threw rocks 
at the parliament building, thereby impeding the lawful political process and 
deposing democratically elected officials. On the other end of the spectrum, 
the banking crisis is seen as a turning point, where a corrupt banking system 
in cahoots with the political elite was exposed, and in its wake the nation had 
to experience some sort of rebirth – a return to less materialistic values – and 
ordinary people took to the streets with their pots and pans to show that pol-
iticians cannot get away with bankrupting a nation without suffering the con-
sequences. This is the version that has travelled well, being for instance one 
of the inspirations for the protest movement in Spain called “15-M” or “Los 
Indignados”.5 Iceland is often cited as a shining example of a society where 
corrupt bankers are jailed and a new constitution adopted.6 Two cartoons cap-
ture the very different response to this image of Iceland succinctly: on the one 
hand, a Spanish cartoon showing the “Icelandic Solution” as the firm response 
 4 Valur Ingimundarson, “The Politics of Transitions, Memory, and Justice: Assigning 
Blame for the Crisis,” in Iceland’s Financial Crisis. The Politics of Blame, Protest, and 
Reconstruction, ed. Valur Ingimundarson, Phillippe Urfalino, and Irma Erlingsdóttir 
(London: Routledge, 2016), 140 – 155, 141.
 5 See for instance articles on the movement’s website: “Islandia. Revolucion Islandesa,” 
WordPress, https://movimientoindignadosspanishrevolution.wordpress.com/1248-2/. 
Hörður Torfason, one of the leaders of the Pots and Pans Revolution, claims that for 
much of the so called 15-M protestors Iceland was the model: “‘Estoy alucinado de 
lo organizados qué están los indignados españoles’: Para muchos manifestantes del 
15-M, Islandia y los islandeses son el modelo.” Hörður Torfason, “Estoy alucinado de 
lo organizados qué están los indignados españoles,” interview by Najara Galarraga 
Gortázar, El País, June 23, 2011, https://politica.elpais.com/politica/2011/06/22/actuali-
dad/1308768044_418504.html.
 6 Many court cases were indeed brought through the courts in Iceland and some bankers 
received prison sentences. With most of them out of prison by now and the sense in 
society that they still engage in the same practices, Icelanders tend to be more disillu-
sioned by the process than people who look at this from the outside. The new consti-
tution, which held much promise for many, was never adopted. For a comprehensive 
analysis on this see “Part III: The politics of Iceland’s constitutional reform,” in Iceland’s 
Financial Crisis: The Politics of Blame, Protest, and Reconstruction, ed. Valur Ingimun-
darson, Phillipe Urfalino, and Irma Erlingsdóttir (London: Routledge, 2016), 185 – 272.
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to the stealing bankers (image 1), and a recent cartoon by the cartoonist Elín 
Elísabet published in the English language newspaper Reykjavík Grapevine in 
September 2017 (image 2), which proved popular among Icelanders (if shares 
on social media can be relied upon) and captures the Icelandic left’s frustra-
tion with the idealization of the country, where corruption is still rife and the 
old parties are back in power.7
Fig. 1 La revolución silenciada. ©Azagra.
 7 This view of the aftermath of crisis can also be seen in Elvira Mendez’ book, La Rev-
olucion de los vikingos (Barcelona: Planeta, 2012). The Catalan journalist Eric Lluent is 
not nearly as positive in his version of events in Islàndia 2013. Crònica d’una decepció 
(Barcelona: Eric Lluent, 2014), Kindle.
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Fig. 2 Elín Elísabet, Jailing the Bankers. © Elín Elísabet.
Somewhere between these two narratives we have more complicated stories 
of a systemic failure, of a thwarted revolution, and of a new government that 
eventually betrayed the protesters, by not following through on the sweeping 
changes promised. The gap between these narratives has not been bridged, 
and there is no national consensus on how this time of crisis and disruption 
should be remembered. Of course, this lack of consensus comes as no surprise, 
as we know that such times of national upheaval have a complex relationship 
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with the national narrative and collective memory. In remembering the recent 
past, we are not so much burdened with the discourse of “recovering” a lost 
past, which is the model of memory Ann Rigney terms the “plenitude and 
loss” model; rather, the dissonance of the narratives told make it clear that it 
would be more helpful to pay attention to Rigney’s suggestion that we move 
away from that model to:
“A social- constructivist model that takes as its starting point the idea that memo-
ries of a shared past are collectively constructed and reconstructed in the present 
rather than resurrected from the past”.8
In this paper, I examine one instance of an attempt at the memorialisation of 
recent events that highlights these problems and ask the question, what hap-
pens at the convergence of activism, art, memorialisation, and cultural mem-
ory in the wake of crisis?
One of the ways in which a nation remembers is through various cultural 
activities, for instance in literature, but perhaps in a more official capacity in 
the building of public memorials. Memorials in Iceland have a history in the 
20th century that more or less follows the development elsewhere in Europe, even 
though the timing can be slightly different; and for a country without a military 
(but with a heavy reliance on its fishermen), it is perhaps understandable that 
the tomb of the unknown soldier, which spread throughout Europe in the wake 
of World War I, should transform into the tomb of the unknown sailor in the 
late 1930s in Iceland.9 The overall development has been described as a move 
from monuments to memorials – that is, from heroic monuments of battles 
won to trauma memorials to grieve for lost lives.10 The memory boom at the 
turn of the millennium with its many memorials, museums, and narratives of 
war and the holocaust raised many questions about the role of such memorials. 
These are memorials that bear witness to our need to remember, but perhaps 
also expose a longing to forget our inglorious past. James E. Young believes that:
 8 Ann Rigney, “Plenitude, Scarcity and the Circulation of Cultural Memory,” Journal of 
European Studies 35, no. 1 (2005): 11 – 28, here 14.
 9 Ketill Kristinsson, “Eyrnamörk gleymskunnar. Nokkur orð um minnismerki,” Ritið 13, 
no. 1 (2013): 165 – 182.
 10 See for instance Jay Winter, Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning: The Great War in Euro-
pean Cultural History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
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“Once we assign monumental form to memory, we have to some degree divested 
ourselves of the obligation to remember. In shouldering the memory- work, mon-
uments may relieve viewers of their memory burden”.11
But the memory work enacted in public memorials is not the only activity that 
has been tied to forgetting. The undertakings that we engage in regularly in the 
belief that they will help us remember – writing, building memorials, archiv-
ing the past – all bear within them the threat of forgetting.12 As Ian Sinclair in 
Lights Out for the Territory claims:
“Memorials are a way of forgetting, reducing generational guilt to a grid of albino 
chess pieces, bloodless stalagmites. Shapes that are easy to ignore stand in for the 
trauma of remembrance”.13
Memorials, therefore, are objects at the crux of complex memory politics – 
political circumstances, society’s expectations – in their motivation, design, 
execution, building, location, and their function in their environment. Are 
they sites of memory, forgetting, or simply indifference? It has been theorised 
that for a memorial to encourage remembrance, some sort of regular activity, 
be it ceremonies, less formal public events, or social traditions, must be con-
nected to it. This, as do other acts of memory, takes place in society. Matthew 
Allen and Steven Brown have pointed out that:
“It is society that maintains memorials, both by protecting them from damage, 
but not least by orchestrating some type of activity around them. If there are no 
ceremonies connected to memorials, at more or less regular intervals, they simply 
disappear into their surroundings, be it a natural landscape or cityscape”.14
One memorial of a contested past that has now joined the memorial flora in 
Iceland is called The Black Cone: Memorial to Civil Disobedience and is the work 
 11 James E. Young, The Texture of Memory: Holocaust Memorials and Meaning (New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press, 1993), 181.
 12 I discuss this in more detail in my book: Gunnþórunn Guðmundsdóttir, Representations 
of Forgetting in Life Writing and Fiction (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2017).
 13 Iain Sinclair, Lights Out for the Territory (London: Granta, 1997), 9.
 14 Matthew J. Allen and Steven D. Brown, “Embodiment and Living Memorials: The 
Affective Labour of Remembering the 2005 London Bombings,” Memory Studies 4, 
no. 3 (2011): 312 – 327, here 323.
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of the Spanish artist Santiago Sierra (image 3). It sits in Austurvöllur Square 
where Althing or parliament sits and where the country’s cathedral is located. 
The sculpture consists of a large piece of rock that a black cone has been driven 
into so as to create a fissure in the rock. A plaque on the rock states in both 
Icelandic and English:
“The Black Cone: Monument to Civil Disobedience. When the government violates 
the rights of the people, insurrection is for the people and for each portion of the 
people the most sacred of rights and the most indispensable of duties. Declaration 
of the Rights of Man and Citizen (1793)”.
Fig. 3 Santiago Sierra, The Black Cone, Reykjavik. Photographer: Dagur Gunnarsson.
The memorial was erected as part of a Sierra retrospective at the Reykjavik 
Art Museum in 2012, three years after the Pots and Pans Revolution. In the 
performance the rock was placed on the square directly in front of Althing 
and the artist drove the black cone into the rock, the cone apparently alluding 
to the cone- shaped hats condemned persons were forced to wear during the 
Inquisition in the 12th century, a fairly obscure reference that I think is safe to 
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say most Icelanders would miss.15 Given this, immediately the question arises 
of the success of the imagery employed in the work. This also makes clear that 
rather than being a memorial created by the authorities to remember an event, 
the impetus instead came from the artist supported by the museum.
In his study of war memorials, Jay Winter wishes to shift the attention to 
smaller acts of remembrance, to the periphery rather than the centre: “from 
first- order to second- or third- order actors”.16 As he claims, one of the reasons 
for this is that the “great national sites of remembrance are exceptional, and their 
histories provide a misleading impression for thousands of others. Another is 
that in contemporary cultural history, multivocality is the order of the day”.17
As such, recent studies have moved away from the top- down approach:
“[…] which emphasised the capacity of dominant groups to act in effect as puppet-
eers, pulling the strings of cultural activity. That elites have tried to do so is self- 
evident […]; less convincing is the claim that they effectively controlled the space 
within which all forms of cultural expression in general and commemoration in 
particular have developed”.18
When the work was unveiled it was placed provocatively on Austurvöllur Square 
in a direct line of sight between the main entrance of Althing and the monu-
mental statue of Jón Sigurðsson, the 19th century national independence hero. 
Initially, it was only supposed to be a temporary installation as part of Sierra’s 
Reykjavík exhibition, but the artist donated the work to the city of Reykjavík 
with the clever proviso that it should stay in that square. The Reykjavik Art 
Museum recommended the city should accept the gift, and the city’s cultural 
committee supported the idea. It is important to note in this context, and at 
that time, Jón Gnarr, a comedian and writer who had founded a sort of anti- 
political party called the Best Party, was voted in during the municipal elections 
in 2010 and was therefore mayor of Reykjavík. The Best Party was a direct result 
of the demands for a new political culture after the crisis and its main aim was 
not to espouse traditional political practice and discourse. The city was there-
 15 Information on Sierra’s exhibition and events related to it can be found on the Reykjavík 
Art Museum website: “Santiago Sierra: Kvikmyndir og önnur verk,” Reykjavík Art 
Museum, last modified April 15, 2012, http://listasafnreykjavikur.is/syningar/santiago- 
sierra- kvikmyndir- og- onnur- verk.
 16 Jay Winter, Remembering War. The Great War between Memory and History in the Twen-
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fore in the hands of people very sympathetic to the protests and all forms of 
activism. The city did, however, suggest that the Black Cone should be moved 
to the southwest corner of the square, but this was still only a few metres away 
from Althing. Althing declared itself opposed to the placement of the Black 
Cone on that square, where it was thought it would “spoil the overall image 
of the square”. The minority in the city council agreed and the Independence 
Party councillor claimed the work was connected to the 2008 – 2009 riots; and, 
even though most people had protested peacefully, violence was used and 
police officers wounded. As Kjartan Magnússon stated, who says he hopes 
such events will never be repeated: “Even though the violence wasn’t extensive 
and involved mostly threats, a lawfully elected government was pushed from 
power”. And furthermore, “I don’t think that there is any reason to remember 
such events with a memorial. It could at least have been placed elsewhere, not 
in this sacred national place”.19 What Sierra’s memorial and the circumstances 
of its donation remind us of is how complex it is for a nation to remember a 
contested past in a cohesive fashion.
Austurvöllur is indeed one of Iceland’s primary lieu de memoire. It is in the 
very heart of the city in the shadow of Althing – the city’s cathedral – surrounded 
by hotels and restaurants; and its crowning glory in the very centre of it is the 
statue of Jón, the independence hero. It is the square where national celebra-
tions take place but also the site of the major protests in the country’s political 
history – for instance, the protests against Iceland signing the NATO treaty in 
1949 and the “Pots and Pans Revolution” during 2008/2009. Where memorials 
are placed is a decisive component of their effectiveness. The location of trauma 
memorials in particular, can be especially sensitive; it affects their meaning and 
their place in the national consciousness. Should we hide them in cemeteries, 
as we do with Reykjavík war memorials, or should we place them in the heart 
of the city like the holocaust memorial in Berlin? The Black Cone was moved 
a few metres so it is no longer an obstacle on the way from the main entrance 
of Althing to the statue of Jón – a route taken by politicians and dignitaries 
every year on the 17th of June, Jón’s birthday and Iceland’s Independence Day. 
It is, however, still on this all- important square, although slightly marginalised 
and its proximity to the bushes behind it could result in it being mistaken for a 
slightly bulky landscaping feature. In 2015 it was overshadowed by a relatively 
traditional statue of Ingibjörg H. Bjarnason (the first female parliamentarian 
in Iceland) created by the sculptor Ragnhildur Stefánsdóttir.
 19 GAR, “Svarta keilan tákn um ofbeldi á helgum stað,” Fréttablaðið, October 4, 2012.
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Fig. 4 Ragnhildur Stefánsdóttir, Ingibjörg H. Bjarnason, Reykjavik. Photographer: Dagur 
Gunnarsson.
The statue of a woman with her skirt flying behind her as if she is facing a storm 
is raised on a plinth (about half the size of Jón’s plinth) right beside Althing, 
directly across the street from the Black Cone. It was unveiled on the 19th of 
June 2015 on the centenary of women’s right to vote in a very successful cer-
emony. That day, Austurvöllur was filled with thousands of (mostly) women, 
and the crowds were addressed by Vigdís Finnbogadóttir, the first democrati-
cally elected woman president. The memorial has received nothing but praise, 
which is perhaps evidence that women’s rights is a less contested issue in the 
country than during the 2008/2009 protests, and that its aesthetics are more 
pleasing to the general public.
Despite the Best Party’s enthusiasm for Sierra’s work, not all on the Left sup-
ported it. Sierra is a highly political artist, and some of his installations have 
been very provocative indeed. For instance, one involved paying homeless 
people for having a line tattooed on their backs.20 Sóley Tómasdóttir, a coun-
 20 This is a series of works Sierra has performed in several countries. The fundamental 
principle is the same: the homeless, prostitutes, and the destitute are paid to take part. 
Their backs turned toward the camera, the artist tatoos a line across their backs. See 
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cillor for the Left- Green Party, stated it was all well and good to memorialise 
civil disobedience, however:
“The work that is now going to be placed on the square cannot be considered appro-
priate for this, as it thereby celebrates an artist who has used his strong economic 
and social position to undermine other people’s dignity who are not in a position 
to protest or refuse his offer of paid denigration”.21
Therefore, his mode of political statement does not invite consensus. When 
asked whether the Independence Party would remove the memorial if it came 
to power in the city in the future, the aforementioned city councillor, Kjartan 
Magnússon, explained in typical political speak: “We have a certain outcome 
now and then we will see how this will turn out”.22 There are of course famous 
instances where memorials become controversial because of the artist them-
selves, as when a 21-year- old unknown Chinese- American won the contest to 
build the Vietnam War memorial in Washington DC, with her design for a 
memorial which moved sharply away from the triumphant war memorials of 
the past. It is debatable whether the artist’s background in the case of the Black 
Cone would have been highlighted in this way if the work had been placed in 
a museum or in a remoter part of Reykjavík.
The work also raises questions about the role of art in political activism. This 
is a complex question beyond the scope of this paper but one I would never-
theless like to quickly reference, as it is of great relevance here. As stated above, 
when the memorial was erected it was in conjunction with a large exhibition 
of Sierra’s work in the Reykjavík Art Museum, one of the two main publicly 
funded galleries in town, and thus the work was implicitly endorsed by the city 
authorities in charge at the time. Along with the performance of the installa-
tion of the memorial, another work of Sierra’s was driven through the streets of 
Reykjavík. A large sign with letters forming the word ‘NO’ was placed on the 
back of a truck and was camped outside institutions such as banks, parliament 
and other relevant places. Benedikt Hjartarson has pointed out that Sierra’s 
art raises questions about the political potential of art, and not least the avant- 
garde, which in Peter Burger’s famous terms has lost its political relevance. The 
possibilities of street art must therefore also be limited since it has been in part 
more information on Sierra’s works to date on his website. Santiago Sierra, “Santiago 
Sierra,” http://www.santiago- sierra.com.
 21 GAR, “Svarta keilan tákn um ofbeldi á helgum stað.”
 22 Ibid.
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or in whole commercialised and/or institutionalised 23 – issues, for instance, 
raised forcefully in Banksy’s documentary, Exit through the Gift Shop (2010).
Returning to Reykjavík’s Austurvöllur and the traditional monument in its 
centre – the statue of Jón Sigurðsson – we can see that it is a symbol of unity, a 
symbol of independence and the idea of Icelandicness. Jón Sigurðsson stands 
on a tall plinth in the middle of the power hub of the city. He is brought flow-
ers on his birthday, but people have also climbed on top of him with various 
purposes, from drunken teenagers to performance artists, confirming that his 
presence speaks to a certain understanding of Icelandic history. The Black Cone 
and what it stands for undeniably interrupts this narrative of national unity 
and coherence, as it reminds us of all the protests that have taken place in that 
square: how it is a contested space where protests and activism exist alongside 
the symbols of power and nationhood.
Memorials can preserve the memory of a nation or hide it; they can be a 
symbol of unity or disharmony. In some ways, the Black Cone is successful as 
it questions the politicians’ notions of national unity and identity. When the 
politicians place flowers at the foot of Jón’s plinth on the 17th of June these days, 
they have to walk past the Black Cone – the narrative of a peaceful nation in 
docile awe of its government has been interrupted. The memorial reminds us 
that the square is also a place of protest and disharmony, as was evidenced in 
the Spring of 2015 where 26,000 people demanded that the PM leave office after 
the scandal that was revealed in the so- called Panama Papers.
Adopting Winter’s “pluralistic approach to cultural history” allows us to 
acknowledge that:
“Sites of memory are created not just by nations but primarily by small groups of 
men and women who do the work of remembrance. They are the ‘social agents’ of 
remembrance; without their work, collective memory would not exist”.24
Perhaps the major problem with the Black Cone is that no one has taken own-
ership of it. It is more or less ignored, even during protests in the square. This 
might suggest that despite the success of the protests, people do not seem to 
have a need to memorialise or celebrate the “Pots and Pans Revolution” for a 
 23 Benedikt Hjartarson, “Fagurfræði neikvæðisins: Um arfleifð framúrstefnunnar og 
möguleika skapandi andófs á öld sjónarspilsins.” A paper given at the symposium NEI! 
Symposium in The Reykjavík Art Museum on the occasion of Sierra’s retrospective 11 
March 2012. Quoted with the permission of the speaker.
 24 Winter, Remembering War, 136. Emphasis in original.
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variety of reasons. Perhaps this is mainly as a result of the sense of disappoint-
ment with the limited reforms that have been accomplished since. The memorial 
has also almost disappeared from public discourse, as there is hardly anything 
to be found on it since its installation – it simply is not mentioned any more. It 
seems as if this artwork/memorial has almost disappeared into the cityscape. 
The only activities I have witnessed around it are walking tours for tourists 
that evidently stop by it on their tour of central Reykjavík, and that children 
like to climb on it. The question this raises and one that remains is whether we 
assimilate artistic memorialisation of civil disobedience into the political and 
public landscape if its aesthetics do not speak to the society and if none of the 
relevant memory agents take ownership of the memorial.
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Franziska Sajdak
“So I decide for you”: Generation and Identity in  
Göran Rosenberg’s A Brief Stop on the Road from Auschwitz
Although constituting a part of Scandinavian societies since the 18th and 19th cen-
turies, Jewish culture and identity have scarcely been present in Scandinavian 
literature and literary studies. Interest in Jewish issues first increased noticeably 
after the publication of Cordelia Edvardson’s Bränt barn söker sig till elden (1984), 
in which she recounts her experiences in the German concentration camps and 
as a Jewish survivor in Sweden. Still, even in the years following Edvardson’s 
autobiographical novel, comparatively few new literary texts addressing Jewish 
life in Scandinavia have been published. Considerable development in liter-
ary approaches to Jewish history, culture, and identity in Scandinavia specifi-
cally, has only been detectable in recent years. Since about the year 2000 many 
Swedish, Danish and Norwegian texts (fiction and non- fiction) discuss life in 
the wake of the historic caesura caused by the Holocaust.
This paper discusses Göran Rosenberg’s autobiographical novel Ett kort uppe-
håll på vägen från Auschwitz (2012) as a Swedish example of new approaches to 
history and Judaism in Scandinavian literature.1 In his novel, Rosenberg – the 
son of Polish Holocaust survivors who emigrated to Sweden after the Second 
World War – intends to create a bigger picture of the past by collecting and 
combining information about the historical situation and his family history. In 
order to do so he actually retravels his father’s journey from Poland, through 
Germany and the German concentration camps, and then onwards to Sweden. 
As is revealed towards the end of the narrative, Rosenberg’s father eventually 
commits suicide because he cannot handle his traumatic memories. Having lost 
his father as a child, he mainly remained a mystery to his son. Thus, Rosenberg’s 
desire to undertake this journey is to gain a deeper understanding of the past 
and especially of his father. By focusing the narrative of his own past on the 
history and character of his father in particular, Rosenberg clearly bases his 
text on a generational approach. In the following I discuss how the novel nego-
tiates the concept of generation, such as the genealogical perspective on father 
and son, by juxtaposing past and present, and how in turn these conceptions 
 1 For the following discussion I refer to the English translation: Göran Rosenberg, A Brief 
Stop on the Road from Auschwitz, transl. by Sarah Death (London: Granta, 2015).
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of generation constitute a vital part of identity formation.2 First, I discuss the 
significance of transgenerational connections when dealing with Jewish iden-
tity in the wake of the Holocaust. I refer to the transgenerational concept of 
telescoping introduced by the psychoanalyst Haydée Faimberg and apply this 
concept to Rosenberg’s text as suggested by the literary scholar Sigrid Weigel. 
Then I argue how the novel’s transgenerational approach also opens up a reverse, 
contemporaneous approach concerning generation, which in turn offers new 
conceptions of identity.
Discussing the familial consequences of experiencing the Holocaust, A Brief 
Stop on the Road from Auschwitz can be counted in the diverse category of 
international literature on transgenerational Holocaust- trauma and questions of 
identity. Well- known examples are works such as the graphic novel Maus (1991) 
by American cartoonist Art Spiegelman, the novel Everything is Illuminated 
(2002) by American novelist Jonathan Safran Foer, and Vielleicht Esther (2014) 
by Ukrainian- German author Katja Petrowskaja, all of which reflect the con-
temporary relevance of trauma.3 In research, especially in Marianne Hirsch’s 
analyses of postmemory in photography, the continuous impact of past experi-
ences of trauma are illustrated. Hirsch introduced the concept of postmemory 
to describe the ways descendants of the survivors of trauma can identify, to 
some degree, with the traumatic memories of the previous generation insofar 
as they appear to be their own personal memories, while still being aware that 
these memories are not first- hand experiences.4 Similarly, research conducted 
by Cathy Caruth on transgenerational trauma and literature and by Jeffrey 
Alexander on cultural trauma for instance, has established trauma as a central 
concept in cultural studies.
Yet, while there is extensive analysis on predominantly anglophone Holocaust 
literature (and to a lesser extent on Holocaust literature in other languages) that 
deals with transgenerational trauma,5 Scandinavian literature on Jewish iden-
 2 Cf. Ohad Parnes, Ulrike Vedder, and Stefan Willer, Das Konzept der Generation. Eine 
Wissenschafts- und Kulturgeschichte (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2008), 302 – 303.
 3 For further examples cf. for instance the anthology edited by Melvin J. Bukiet, Nothing 
Makes You Free: Writings by Descendants of Jewish Holocaust Survivors (New York and 
London: W. W. Norton & Company, 2002).
 4 Marianne Hirsch, The Generation of Postmemory: Writing and Visual Culture after the 
Holocaust (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012); see also Marianne Hirsch, Fam-
ily Frames: Photography, Narrative, and Postmemory (Cambridge and London: Harvard 
University Press, 2012).
 5 Cf. for instance Dominick LaCapra, Writing History, Writing Trauma (Baltimore and 
London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001).
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tity and trauma is barely represented in literary studies. One of the few stud-
ies dealing explicitly with Jewish trauma in Scandinavian literature is Anders 
Ohlsson’s Men ändå måste jag berätta: Studier i skandinavisk förintelselitteratur 
(2002), in which he offers an overview of texts discussing identity and memory 
after the Holocaust. However, considering the amount of new Scandinavian 
texts on Jewish heritage and identity published since Ohlsson’s study, it is worth 
taking a look at this recent development and one of its representatives in the 
literary landscape. For this, Weigel’s transgenerational concept of telescoping 
offers an appropriate approach because it illustrates how the past and present 
are intricately linked and poses the question of the literary representation of 
trauma confronted with memory gaps and silence, as well as of its function. 
This proves beneficial in analysing the writing of Rosenberg as a member of the 
so- called second generation who – as described by Hirsch – experience the past 
through their parents, the actual witnesses of trauma. The different perspectives 
offered by the concept of generation and the role they play in identity forma-
tion, which is depicted in A Brief Stop on the Road from Auschwitz, delineate 
the multi- layered nature of identity confronted with experiences of trauma.
Exploring the Shadows of the Past
Göran Rosenberg’s autobiographical novel A Brief Stop represents an attempt 
to give a complete account of his family’s history as well as to deal with issues 
raised by such history. The need to collect information and question the past 
arose from the fact that, for the most part, the past as well as Jewish religion 
and culture were kept silent in the narrator’s family. His memory only consists 
of a few fragments “firmly trampled into the darkness and silence”.6 As a result 
the history and person of his father, who died when the narrator was still a 
child, often seem elusive, foreign and distant in retrospect.7 His own person, 
too, appears to contain mysterious and puzzling elements. The narrator wishes 
to rectify this condition. Concerning himself as a child, he writes:
“I wish I could make contact with him and explain a few things. That the Place 
[Sweden] cannot become his if it doesn’t also become [his parents’]. That he can-
not make the Place his own if he doesn’t know where he comes from. That he has 
a certain responsibility, small though he is, for the success of the Project.
 6 Rosenberg, A Brief Stop on the Road from Auschwitz, 253, 305.
 7 Ibid., 305 – 306.
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I’d also like to ask him a few things. About language, for instance. About those early 
words in Polish. Where did he hide them? Are they perching like lost birds in his 
memory, waiting to be discovered? There’s something about Polish that, much later, 
I don’t understand. The body recognizes the language, but the head does not. […] 
Maybe if I hadn’t been in such a hurry to put their [the parents’] world behind me, 
or if I’d gone back to it sooner, I too would have been able to unearth a forgotten 
language, or at least a few coherent sentences, not just in Polish but also in Yiddish, 
and perhaps over time even to understand them.
And not only the languages, but also the worlds that went with them”.8
At the same time as the narrator expresses the impossibility of reconnecting 
with his former self and therefore the past in search for answers, he confirms 
the inextricable links between his parents’ past and his own identity. As the 
passage points out, these links are important for two reasons: first, in having 
been prompted by their past to leave their Polish home, the narrator’s parents 
rely on their son to fulfil “the Project” (as he calls it) of a new life in Sweden – 
that is, on his ability as the first family member born in Sweden to explore the 
new country and to form the necessary connections in order to tie himself 
and thereby even his parents to this foreign place; and second, before their 
migration to Sweden they unconsciously left parts of themselves and their lives 
within their son, which are now part of him but are mysterious and seemingly 
waiting to be (re)discovered. Although he declares the futility of any attempt 
to grasp these mystifying elements of his identity retrospectively, he acknowl-
edges beyond doubt their essential role and locates his own identity within 
these secret parts of himself.
How powerful the past is in shaping one’s present life and future, the narrator 
witnesses as a boy with regard to his father’s situation in Sweden. Superficially, 
Sweden offered him infinite possibilities to create a new life for himself and 
his family. However, the trauma of the Holocaust and the loss of his Polish 
home, as well as a lack in his ability to speak the language and to communicate 
his experiences to those around him who had not witnessed anything similar, 
prevented him from putting down roots. Consequently, his father seemed to 
be separated from Swedish life by an “invisible wall”.9 Likewise, the narrator’s 
relationship to his father is shaped to a large extent by this silent past – the 
unresolved trauma – in that it also established something of an invisible wall 
between the two of them. Thus, trauma as a commonality between the two 
 8 Ibid., 40 – 41.
 9 Ibid., 13 – 14, 240 – 241.
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generations – although one that causes detachment – acts as a form of inter-
generational connection.
Trauma as an unconscious bond between the generations causes the narra-
tor’s perception of his own identity to fragment and remain unfamiliar. From 
an early age he experiences unexpected re- appearances of this seemingly van-
ished past, being pushed towards it without really understanding why:
“Occasionally something happens to thrust him back towards [their world], and their 
shadows momentarily penetrate him, and a sensation of darkness and cold lingers 
on. […] he goes ice- cold every time he hears the word “Jew” in one combination 
or another. He knows that Mom and Dad are Jews, and that he and his little sister 
are too, and the Klein family on the other side of the railroad bridge, and Auntie 
Ilonka at the other end of the rowanberry avenue. And even if he doesn’t know 
what it means, he knows it has something to do with the shadows”.10
Although these shadows of the past are never discussed and often seem incom-
patible with his father’s otherwise cheerful and energetic character,11 and are 
therefore left to guesswork and the imagination, the narrator recalls the feel-
ing of something indeterminate being transferred from father to son, which in 
turn creates distance between them and connects them at the same time. The 
narrator exemplifies this feeling through his memory of holding his father’s 
hand on their way to the harbour:
“I try to say something, perhaps I’m scared, but I have a powerful sense of your 
being somewhere else. I can feel it through your hand as it holds mine, and the 
sensation penetrates my body and hides there, waiting to be summoned again by 
a closely written aerogram in Polish, by a letter in Swedish with bold, leftward- 
slanting capitals, by a medical report in German, by an annulled draft contract, or 
simply by the lively imagination of someone determined at any cost to unearth a 
memory fragment or two and piece together a narrative”.12
Having been previously eager to leave everything ambiguous behind him in 
order to fit into a “Swedish” lifestyle, the only option to reconnect with this 
silenced, vanished history is for him to put together memory fragments, hoping 
 10 Ibid., 39 – 40.
 11 Ibid., 275 – 276, 279 – 280.
 12 Ibid., 295.
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they will fall into place like in a giant jigsaw puzzle.13 His chosen method to do 
this is to retravel his father’s journey from Auschwitz, through several German 
work camps and onwards to Sweden 60 years later.14 Thus, A Brief Stop is an 
autobiographical novel that simultaneously narrates the past and depicts the 
process by which the present narrative of the past comes into being.
Additionally, the incremental process of research and writing is reflected 
in the style of the novel. Primarily, the text is formulated as a narrative that 
addresses the narrator’s father directly using the Swedish pronouns du (you, 2nd 
pers. sg.) or ni (you, 2nd pers. pl.). Thus, the text strongly conveys the impression 
of a conversation between two people in which the narrator recapitulates family 
history in order to confront his father with questions concerning this history. 
The narrative is constantly deferred to by the narrator’s thought process and 
by questions directed towards his father concerning the material found, as for 
instance following the reading of an old newspaper article issuing a warning 
about Swedish society accepting too many foreigners after the war:
“Does it surprise you that such things are written? Or does it merely confirm what 
you already know or suspect about the land of the vast forests? I’m trying to under-
stand why, over time, so many of you want to leave again, not because you’re forced 
to but because you want to, in fact long to, and reading lines like these helps me 
understand a little better”.15
The narrator’s childhood and his relationship to his parents are fundamentally 
characterised by the silence and denial concerning the aforementioned shad-
ows.16 Only when trying to retrospectively combine and recount his collection 
of seemingly contradictory memories as an adult can the narrator discern the 
complexity of issues obliterated by it: the survivor’s feeling of guilt over mur-
dered family members and friends, the longing for a new and successful future, 
 13 Ibid., 50: “So I piece fragments together.”
 14 Ibid., 100 – 101, 119 – 120.
 15 Ibid., 195.
 16 Ibid., 44. He writes concerning a former home: “Had there been such a place, they [the 
parents] would have talked about it, would have given me a sense of its smell, its taste, 
taken me there, told me about the people who once lived there. But they tell me noth-
ing. Where there must once have been a place like this one, there is now only silence. 
Silence and shadows. Whatever fragments of such a place lie hidden somewhere – and 
no human being lives without such fragments – someone or something has crushed 
them all too carefully and buried them all too deeply, in too- wide expanses of darkness.”
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and the loneliness originating from the indifference concerning Jewish expe-
riences within Swedish society.17
Both, the novel’s general impetus that understanding one’s family history will 
help rediscover one’s own forgotten parts and understand one’s own person by 
giving those shadows a concrete shape, as well as the novel’s narrative style, i. e. 
retelling the past as a conversation between father and son on a journey repli-
cating the past, emphasise the narrator’s intention of linking different genera-
tions. Thus, in A Brief Stop generational borders are crossed by the narrator’s 
memory process and identification with his father’s person, not only following 
in his footsteps and learning about his life but, literally speaking, on behalf of 
his father as his father was not able to express himself during his lifetime.18 In 
this way, the novel represents an attempt to actively create a familial link that 
surpasses the obscure bond between parent and child caused by trauma, which 
was never really disputed as the son lost his father so early. Uncovering the silent 
parts of his family history and imagining speaking to his father is an attempt 
to overcome the distance – “the invisible wall” – between the two generations.
The Telescoping of Generations
In discussing the bonds, relationships and complex memory processes of trauma 
between different generations, A Brief Stop addresses the process of transgen-
erational transference originally described by Sigmund Freud.19 The psycho-
analytical concept of transgenerational transference denotes the process of 
transferring traumatic, and therefore suppressed, memory unconsciously from 
generation to generation. As outlined by Freud, the process of transgenerational 
transference is characterised by two principles: first, compulsive repetition as 
traumatic memory not only keeps affecting the generation that experienced 
it initially but also continues to affect following generations; and second, the 
principle afterwardsness, which identifies that trauma and its potential conse-
quences can only be identified retrospectively.20
 17 Ibid., 279 – 282.
 18 Ibid., 277.
 19 Sigmund Freud, Der Mann Moses und die monotheistische Religion. Schriften über die 
Religion (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1994).
 20 Ibid., 77 – 78, 81 – 88, 99 – 100, 102 – 104. See also Sigrid Weigel, Genea- Logik. Generation, 
Tradition und Evolution zwischen Kultur- und Naturwissenschaften (Munich: Wilhelm 
Fink Verlag, 2006), 140 – 141.
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Based on Freud’s work, the psychoanalyst Haydée Faimberg has studied 
the process of transference between two or three generations. She introduced 
the term ‘telescoping’ for the transfer of unconscious information and conflict 
between the parent generation and child generation, as the image of a telescope 
depicts the way family memory can be pushed together, comprising different 
generational layers but ultimately consisting of the same essential elements.21
According to Faimberg, transgenerational transference is based on the child’s 
unconscious identification with their parents.22 She describes the result of this 
identification process as the “internal parents” of a person.23 These “internal 
parents” do not necessarily have to correspond to the parents’ actual charac-
ters.24 Yet, they are constantly present in the unconscious and thus influence 
their children’s lives into adulthood. As Faimberg explains, “with the identifi-
cation process the psyche is fixed in an “eternity” characteristic of the uncon-
scious in its quality of timelessness”.25 People experiencing transgenerational 
transference are unable to process past events as being part of the past, and 
therefore they live, according to Faimberg, in “a circular, repetitive time”, which 
always implies multiple generations at the same time.26
As the impact of traumatic experiences can only be identified after some 
time has elapsed, Faimberg’s method of analysis aims at retroactively identifying 
the different layers and factors involved in constituting individual processes 
of transgenerational transference.27 This means that every psychoanalytical 
interpretation is based on analysing our “internal parents”. For this, Faimberg 
observes the “private language” the patient uses to communicate the internal 
parents.28 This includes analysing the exact course of the patient- analyst inter-
action, and also the silences and gaps in the patient’s narrative, for example.29 
Faimberg emphasises the need to acknowledge:
“[The] presence of an ‘other’ who participates from the beginning with his own psy-
che, including his unconscious psyche, in the constitution of the subject’s psychic 
 21 Haydee Faimberg, The Telescoping of Generations (London: Routledge, 2005), 38, 60; 
Weigel, Genea- Logik, 102.
 22 Faimberg, The Telescoping of Generations, 7.
 23 Ibid., 8 – 11, 21.
 24 Ibid.
 25 Ibid., 11.
 26 Ibid., 12.
 27 Ibid., 87.
 28 Ibid., 54.
 29 Ibid., 39, 45 – 47, 48, 77 – 78, where she describes this process as “listening to listening”.
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makeup. All this implies a process that permits the recognition (in the history of 
the transference) of the conflictual modalities that place a human being in rela-
tionship with the generations that preceded his or her birth”.30
Faimberg’s idea of unconscious meaning beyond that which is communicated 
on the surface and brought into discourse by transgenerational transference is 
taken up by literary scholar Sigrid Weigel as a cultural memory concept in the 
context of literary analysis. She adopts Faimberg’s term “telescoping” because it 
emphasises the complex, intricate and overlapping nature of transgenerational 
memory that is held together by the unconscious.31
Weigel criticises the general tendency to discuss trauma most often as gaps 
within memory.32 In order for this to make sense, these gaps would have to be 
filled with information, which often is impossible to achieve. Therefore, trauma 
is in general defined as an obstacle in the memory process. Weigel opposes the 
idea of trauma as a gap because the image of a gap declares nothing more than 
the mere fact of irretrievable loss. Instead, she is interested in signs and symbols 
used to mark or cover up these “gaps”, meaning the signs and images that are 
used as replacements for something that otherwise could not be expressed.33 
Thus, the apparent gaps produced by trauma within the overall structure of 
transgenerational memory are by no means devoid of content. By virtually con-
stituting an archive of the signs, symbols and distortions traumatic memory has 
turned into in the unconscious, literature can benefit from a psychoanalytical 
approach focusing on unconscious communication processes.34 In the context 
of literature transgenerational transference can therefore be understood as a 
specific form of communication. Trauma in literature therefore does not just 
indicate “the unspeakable” but reveals through the diversity of modifications 
and alterations its complex narrative processes, which can express multiple 
things – the conscious and the unconscious – at once.35
Weigel’s literary approach to trauma undermines the general assumption 
that information is completely lost in the transgenerational memory process, 
and that the only things transferred are memory gaps. Instead, she demands a 
 30 Ibid., 114.
 31 Weigel, Genea- Logik, 102.
 32 Sigrid Weigel, “Télescopage im Unbewußten. Zum Verhältnis von Trauma, Geschichtsbe-
griff und Literatur,” in Trauma. Zwischen Psychoanalyse und kulturellem  Deutungsmuster, 
ed. Elisabeth Bronfen, Birgit R. Erdle, and Sigrid Weigel (Cologne: Böhlau, 1999), 71.
 33 Ibid., 62, 65, 68 – 70.
 34 Ibid., 62
 35 Ibid., 69.
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shift in focus to the extensive transfer of information that is actually happen-
ing continually.36 Weigel does not claim that the developing signs and symbols 
provide adequate representations of the past and the trauma itself; yet, they 
constitute the archive that we refer to when addressing trauma and therefore 
offer at least the possibility of deciphering meaning retroactively!37 Weigel’s 
approach could be summarised with the following question: what are we actu-
ally talking about when addressing trauma? According to Weigel, literary anal-
ysis benefits from the transfer of the psychoanalytical concept of telescoping 
into the literary field, as it offers the chance to identify so- called gaps not only 
as vacancies hindering further insight, but as essential, complex elements of 
communication processes, thus allowing for further analysis of the signs and 
meanings developing in connection with trauma.38
Looking at processes of transgenerational transference and defining trauma 
as a memory concept that represents a continual link between the unconscious 
across generations emphasises the vital importance of communication itself.39 
In order to approach trauma via the variety of signs and symbols the uncon-
scious offers it is essential to keep narrating and thus (re-)constructing this 
unconscious meaning.40 As a memory concept, telescoping is thus based on the 
act of narration itself and not on the maintenance of certain static memories.41
The telescoping approach emphasises that continuity, an essential aspect of 
any memory concept in terms of identity, is not necessarily achieved through 
the transferred contents but rather through the process of communication itself 
and its interminable continuation in the unconscious. Thus, as proven by the 
constant need for discussion in public discourse, illustrated for instance by the 
amount of texts dealing with respective issues, as well as by the variety of images 
generated by trauma, trauma in itself does not have to be a break within the 
overall structure of transgenerational memory.42 Instead, it creates its own form 
of ambiguous and interlaced connections, and transgenerational continuity.43
By focusing on the communication process of trauma, Weigel’s literary 
approach to the concept of telescoping allows for further discussion on Rosen-
berg’s narrative attempt at crossing generational borders and getting to know his 
 36 Ibid., 71.
 37 Ibid., 71 – 72.
 38 Ibid., 69 – 72.
 39 Ibid., 68, 76; Weigel, Genea- Logik, 102.
 40 Ibid.
 41 Ibid.
 42 Weigel, “Télescopage im Unbewußten,” 76; Weigel, Genea- Logik, 102 – 103.
 43 Ibid.
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father beyond the mere statement of immense loss of information, even if the 
narrator naturally has to face this irrevocable fact at every turn in his research.
“A place perfectly chosen”: Narrating Transgenerational Trauma
The narrator’s project of researching his father’s journey, which brought him as 
a Jewish prisoner from his Polish home to Germany during the Second World 
War and then as a Holocaust survivor to Sweden, is supposed to retrieve the 
past by replacing the vast number of gaps in his family’s history with useful 
information. He is convinced that only complete knowledge of the past will 
enable him to understand his father’s story and character well enough to attain 
a concrete connection between father and son that surpasses and thus replaces 
the indistinct image of his father with which he is left. Yet, even though he 
definitely gains new insight into his father’s story by putting together memory 
fragments, there are still many gaps left that cannot be overcome. They are left 
to speculation and can only be approached by the imagination,44 although he 
declares he would “rather not speculate”.45 Concerning the train stations and 
places his father passed on his way, the narrator writes for instance:
“[W]here did you get on the train? So many stations no one remembers anymore. 
So many places that no longer exist. So many trains to choose from. So many trains 
that stop too soon and for good. So I decide for you”.46
Yet, when it comes to his father’s life in the ghetto of Łódź and inside the German 
concentration camps the imagination fails,47 even after meticulously visiting 
the sites of camps in which his father was imprisoned. Although the narrator 
discusses his use of the imagination in the process of writing in order to depict 
his father’s life inside the camps, these experiences seem to remain inconceiv-
able. For instance, the narrator only notes: “I try to imagine the loneliness in 
the [train] car”, without following this sentence up with further comment.48 
 44 Rosenberg, A Brief Stop on the Road from Auschwitz, 73. The narrator repeatedly points 
out: “This I don’t know, of course. I only imagine it to be so. […] Maybe I’m wrong.”
 45 Ibid., 7.
 46 Ibid., 47.
 47 Ibid., 74: The narrator mentions that he is forced to begin the journey onboard the 
train because “[b]eyond the ghetto looms a wall I can’t get past. A wall of darkness and 
silence. Almost no fragments at all. Not now and not later.”
 48 Ibid., 95.
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The passages that deal with these events are instead superimposed by the enu-
meration of historic facts and technicalities that therefore stand between the 
narrator and the actual experiences of prisoners like his father.49
Realising the impossibility of any “direct” approach to the past, the narrator 
has to rely on the abstract data he collects along his way in order to deal with 
his father’s personal story, even though it hardly seems to belong to his father’s 
person at all.50 As his father left negligible personal information behind, the 
only way to discuss his father’s trauma is to consider ulterior issues that could 
be associated with it. Therefore, the previous question concerning the literar-
isation of trauma can be reformulated as follows: what is Rosenberg talking 
about – wishing to get closer to his father – when narrating his father’s trauma?
In particular, he reflects on places and things in Sweden that he associ-
ates with his father (having experienced them together with him) and that, in 
their repeated mention, constitute the novel’s basic incentive. The two most 
important places are the bridge just outside their hometown, Södertälje, and 
the local beach, Havsbadet. The bridge features prominently in the narrator’s 
memory because its structure reminds him of the journey his father had to take 
in order to begin a new life in Sweden.51 On the other hand, the regular visits 
to Havsbadet represent a happy family life. The narrator especially recalls the 
peaceful walks to the beach with his father, and enjoying the heat and light at 
the beach with family and friends.52 He embeds his personal impressions of 
these places into the wider context of Södertälje’s and Sweden’s history. Thus, 
he manages to give an overview of the Folkhem- zeitgeist – the powerful idea 
of the Swedish social welfare state – that prevails in his childhood.53 Depicting 
his own childhood and the town in which he grew up, he demonstrates on a 
smaller scale what affected the nation as a whole.
 49 Ibid., 120 – 124.
 50 Ibid., 51 – 52, where he points out: “Assuming it’s necessary to make all the fragments 
fit together. But that isn’t necessary at all. In this context it makes absolutely no differ-
ence on precisely which day you reach Auschwitz. Your journey has no timetable and 
no direction. You have no exact dates behind you and no exact dates ahead of you. On 
your journey, exact dates have no function. It’s me they have a function for. […] so I 
don’t lose sight of you.” He emphasises that even if he could manage to achieve a cor-
rect chronology and to get hold of all the details, the result would still be very different 
from his father’s actual experience.
 51 Ibid., 3 – 7.
 52 Ibid., 216 – 219, 267.
 53 Ibid., 25 – 27, 87 – 93.
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In effect, this means that Sweden – despite the narrator’s focus on the journey 
itself – features extensively in the revision of his father’s trauma. He virtually 
precipitates the journey’s outcome, and although he admits to probably over-
estimating the place by bestowing special meaning on it when in fact various 
random factors were involved in leading his father to Södertälje,54 reflecting 
Swedish history can indicate the importance Sweden as a destination could 
have had for his father. It is as if Södertälje had its own fortuitous character 
and history:
“[…] like a magnet, [it] had attracted the most fortuitous of human destinies, 
making the fact that he got off the train at this very Place to start his life anew 
perhaps the least arbitrary element in the story. A place perfectly chosen for doing 
exactly that, in fact, or so it sometimes, much later, seemed to me: no strong ties 
to the past, no fixed plans for the future, no readymade scenario to step into – or 
be ejected from”.55
The latter being supposedly the most important aspect of Sweden and its col-
lective project of creating the Folkhem for homeless people like his father after 
the war, it offered the chance to participate in creating something together with 
others, which would feel new to everyone irrespective of the past:
“[T]he Place seems to offer a world in which every dream is feasible, since it’s a world 
where no dreams have been shattered, including the dreams that were shattered in 
the world you come from, which is a world the Project will help put behind you. 
In that sense, the Place is an ideal one because so few people here remember what 
you have to put behind you. […] The past doesn’t have a very strong position in 
this place, and oblivion is the foundation of the Project. Oblivion and optimism. 
As far as optimism is concerned, the Place has a competitive edge against practi-
cally the whole world, since optimism has never been challenged here. While the 
outside world collapses, and with it most people’s futures, here nothing’s collapsing. 
Here the best of all worlds is in full swing […]”.56
Therefore, A Brief Stop represents a shift in topic in that it – despite its focus 
on Holocaust trauma – actually (mainly) discusses the history of the Swedish 
welfare state and the childhood memories of witnessing its development. Thus, 
 54 Ibid., 222, 225, 236.
 55 Ibid., 27.
 56 Ibid., 225 – 226.
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by juxtaposing two entirely different experiences, the unspoilt optimism of 
the Swedes and the horrors witnessed by the Holocaust survivors, the novel 
offers the chance to deduce new insights about one different from the other. 
In examining the promises made by the futuristic Folkhem idea and the appeal 
they most certainly had on young immigrants like his father who desperately 
pinned all his hopes and dreams on these promises, the son gets a chance to 
at least suspect the severity of his father’s previous experiences. Clearly, the 
novel does not represent a complete account of his father’s Holocaust trauma. 
Yet, as part of the familiar Swedish history the narrator can identify with, even 
his father’s story becomes more tangible.
At the same time, his father’s story opens up an alternative narrative of the 
Swedish Folkhem. On the one hand, it shows the legal restrictions and social 
structure by which foreigners were kept from fully participating in all the 
promises made by the Folkhem.57 On the other hand, the relentless focus on 
future prospects could induce an indifference towards divergent narratives, as 
represented by foreigners, as well as a disregard for the past (not to mention of 
difficult subjects like the Holocaust) in Swedish society, which could not meet 
the psychological needs of traumatised people with very different backgrounds.58
The narrator’s writing process shows the difficulty or even impossibility of 
dealing with the family’s Holocaust trauma. Thus, for the most part the novel 
neglects to mention the horrors of the Holocaust itself, but addresses the his-
toric premises and the consequences of his father’s life in Sweden. Nevertheless, 
the son benefits from analysing the history and characteristics of the Folkhem 
as the insight he gained enables him to create images through which he can 
formulate details about his father’s specific situation. Furthermore, he is able 
to communicate the role trauma played in his family and to eradicate – at least 
partially – the uncertainty concerning his own history, which in turn offers the 
chance to perceive a feeling of closure.59 One of the novel’s recurring images, 
for example, is the image of a horizon that refuses to open itself up to his father 
 57 Ibid., 222, 226, where he mentions the restricted areas so- called displaced persons were 
allowed to settle down, as well as 247 – 248, where he mentions the “Swedish alien sta-
tus” his parents were granted. Regarding alternative narratives of the Folkhem see Peter 
Stenberg, ed., Contemporary Jewish Writing in Sweden: An Anthology (Lincoln: Univer-
sity of Nebraska Press, 2004), xxxii.
 58 Rosenberg, A Brief Stop on the Road from Auschwitz, 78 – 80, 241 – 242.
 59 Anne Adelman, “Holocaust- Erzählungen. Beobachtungen transgenerationaler Entwick-
lung,” Mittelweg 36. Zeitschrift des Hamburger Instituts für Sozialforschung 5, no. 3 (1996): 
44 – 52.
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who continues to run up against it but keeps bouncing back.60 At the end of 
his own journey into the past the narrator concludes his father’s journey and 
his life in Sweden:
“You just happen to get off at the wrong station on your road from Auschwitz.
Yes, I think, in the end, that the Place has a part to play in this. It’s too small a place 
for someone like you, with too few people who appreciate where you come from 
and what you carry with you, with a factory too large and too dominant to free 
oneself from, with too few exits to a future other than the one already mapped out, 
and with a horizon that never really wants to open up. The place where I make the 
world into my own is also the place where the world turns its back on you. And 
the place where you finally turn your back on the world. It never becomes a home 
to you. Not the way it does to me”.61
In this way, similar to Weigel’s rejection of the impracticable aspiration of find-
ing a textual equivalent to the actual experience, Rosenberg’s novel represents 
the insight that understanding and thereby connecting with the past and his 
father is not necessarily achieved by the absorption of specific content. Rather 
than penetrating the exact events and experiences that were life- defining for 
his father in order to be able to “catch up” with his father and thus conceive a 
sense of genealogical belonging and identity, the bond between father and son 
is instead created through the act of researching and narrating itself. As a way 
of processing trauma, writing – even when it is about the limited amount of 
knowledge left for one’s retrospective – is a way to find new angles and images 
for the experience of trauma and thus to figuratively continue his father’s incom-
plete geographical and mental journey away from the trauma that came to a 
sudden halt in Sweden.
The familial trauma has changed its form across generations. It is not the 
memories of Holocaust experiences that constitute a source of conflict in the 
son’s psychological make- up but the father’s suicide as one of their conse-
quences. Likewise, the goal of his writing process undergoes a change in char-
acter. Transgenerationally, a sense of identity is not achieved by identifying and 
identifying with some imaginary origin of family history or by assigning the 
same intensity of trauma to oneself. Rather, Rosenberg’s novel can be read as the 
 60 Rosenberg, A Brief Stop on the Road from Auschwitz, 294: “What I realize, much later, 
is that time after time you make a run- up toward the horizon, and time after time you 
fall back to earth again,” as well as ibid., 259, 264 – 265, 301.
 61 Ibid., 308.
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realisation that the so- called second generation offers a role for identification. 
Identity is therefore still based on a genealogical concept as indicated by the 
numerical designation, yet it acknowledges the inherent differences between 
generations. The genealogical structure’s coherence arises from the challeng-
ing process of perpetuating and communicating memory as a contribution to 
coping with trauma and its consequences.62
The Narrative of the Second Generation
Understanding trauma as an unconscious communication process across gen-
erations (through symbols, motifs, et cetera developing in connection with 
trauma) and identifying with the task of the second generation to continue 
to retell the past, shows the chances of reshaping this narrative. Consequently, 
this approach also offers descendants of the Holocaust a chance to dissociate 
themselves from previous generations. Therefore, Rosenberg’s text can not only 
be read as an attempt to transcend generational boundaries in search of gene-
alogical identity, but can also be a way to define himself regarding contempo-
rary concepts of generation, as described by the sociologist Karl Mannheim. 
In The Problem of Generations (1928), Mannheim introduced generation as a 
social category for collectives characterised by similar experiences and features 
in a given time period. Mannheim’s main argument is that generational iden-
tity is not simply the result of listing various features; rather, it derives from 
social interaction in a specific time and place, and most importantly, from the 
consciousness of being part of a particular context.63 Literature as a means of 
negotiating human experience is part of this process.
Read in this different light, the narrator’s previously discussed project of 
researching and retravelling is not only an attempt to recreate the past and 
identify with his father but constantly demonstrates its own artificiality. The 
many pieces of information that are still missing prove that the journey is a 
pale copy of the real historic event. As the narrator admits, “I’m not even sure 
if the fragments are real, still less whether I’ve put them together correctly”, 64 
 62 Hirsch, The Generation of Post- memory, 33, where Hirsch stresses the important task 
of the following generations to “reactivate and re- embody” memory structure – e. g. by 
using their personal, familial approach.
 63 Karl Mannheim, “The Problem of Generations,” in Theories of Ethnicity: A Classical 
Reader, ed. Werner Sollors (Basingstoke and London: Macmillan Press, 1996), 129.
 64 Rosenberg, A Brief Stop on the Road from Auschwitz, 28.
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and this insecurity is present throughout the text. It shows how much the story 
relies on the narrator’s personal choices. Freed of the presumption of being an 
accurate account of history, the narrative can be understood as a conception of 
the past that enables him to create his own story and identity that both relates 
to and is in contrast to this imaginary past.
Rosenberg’s conversation- like style is thus not only an expression of his 
wish to connect with his father, but it can be read in a much more confronta-
tional sense. The binary positions of “you” and “I” also explicitly denote that 
“I am not you” and “you are not me”! Owing to the fundamental difference 
in experiences and situations, they express the discernment of limits to the 
transgenerational identification process. Therefore, the discussion of Swedish 
history and depiction of the Folkhem in A Brief Stop is not merely a substitute 
born out of necessity in the absence of other information; rather, it creates the 
narrator’s specific generational experience as one of the early beneficiaries of 
the Swedish welfare state. Whereas his father never really lost his feeling of 
homelessness, the narrator himself found a home in Sweden.65 Consequently, 
contrary to his father, he experiences “horizon after horizon […] opening up 
to [him] with no effort at all”, causing his own and his father’s world to drift 
apart.66
Addressing the past is an important part of the process of coping with famil-
ial trauma; yet, in order to create a prolific concept of identity, it is necessary 
for the narrator to leave the past and his father’s trauma behind to a certain 
extent.67 Realising during the writing process the significance of his own story 
as a child of the Swedish Folkhem, he is part of the identity negotiation of 
Jewish post- war descendants who now attempt to narrate stories of their own.
 65 Rosenberg, A Brief Stop on the Road from Auschwitz, 308: “The place where I make the 
world into my own is also the place where the world turns its back on you. And the place 
where you finally turn your back on the world. It never becomes a home to you. Not the 
way it does to me.” (Ital. by F. S.).
 66 Ibid., 295. The novel even ends on that note: “For me, a place with all horizons open. For 
you, a place with all horizons closed. For you, a brief stop on the road from Auschwitz.” 
Ibid., 321.
 67 Using Faimberg’s words: through his writing process, the narrator thus receives the 
chance to leave the “circular, repetitive time.” Faimberg, The Telescoping of Genera-
tions, 12.
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Conclusion
Contemporary Scandinavian literature addressing Jewish history is marked 
by a shift in authorship. Whereas past texts dealing with the Holocaust were 
primarily written by eyewitnesses such as Cordelia Edvardson, who thus con-
stituted the so- called first generation, now the majority of texts are written by 
descendants of Jewish Holocaust survivors. The autobiographical novel A Brief 
Stop on the Road from Auschwitz by Swedish author Göran Rosenberg exempli-
fies the continual implications and consequences of this traumatic experience 
from the perspective of the second generation.
The purpose of this paper was to show the significance of generation in 
the processing of identity. In A Brief Stop on the Road from Auschwitz the 
narrator’s incentive in writing about his father (a member of the first gener-
ation) is the longing to eradicate the silence and ignorance caused by trauma 
with regard to family history in order to be able to fully identify with this 
history and thus to locate his own person within his genealogy. However, his 
project confirms the impossibility of recreating and directly reconnecting 
with the past. In place of this, in accordance with the concept of telescoping 
proposed by Weigel, the narrator realises that the transgenerational bond 
essential for identity formation is based on the act of communication itself, 
which is enforced by trauma. Furthermore, accepting the role of narrator 
bestowed by this “genealogy of trauma” also offers the potential to shape 
this communication individually and thus to create his own conception of 
Scandinavian- Jewish identity.
In the context of so- called Holocaust literature Rosenberg’s narrative ap-
proach in general is all too familiar.68 What is new, however, is that he writes in 
a Scandinavian context. Being among the increased number of texts that have 
brought Jewish issues into public discourse in Scandinavia in recent years,69 
 68 Regarding German literature see Hartmut Steinecke, “Die Shoah in der Literatur der 
‘zweiten Generation’,” in Shoah in der deutschsprachigen Literatur, ed. Norbert Eke and 
Hartmut Steinecke (Berlin: E. Schmidt Verlag, 2006), 135 – 153. Correspondingly, regard-
ing the general development in the US see Arlene Stein, “Trauma Stories, Identity Work, 
and the Politics of Recognition,” in Sociology Confronts the Holocaust: Memories and 
Identities in Jewish Diasporas, ed. Judith M. Gerson and Diane L. Wolf (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2007), 84 – 91.
 69 Other examples of this development in literature are Rose Lagercrantz, Om man ännu 
finns (Stockholm: Atlantis, 2012); Danny Wattin, Herr Isakowitz skatt (Stockholm: Pirat-
förlaget, 2014); Birte Kont, En by i Rusland (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2011); Ricki Neu-
man, Ni är inte så märkvärdiga som ni tror (Stockholm: Weyler, 2012).
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Rosenberg’s text participates not only in connecting past and present gener-
ations but in formulating the post- war generation’s current realisation of a 
unique identity.
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